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I. INTRODUCTION
Criminal jurisdiction over Native Americans' is partitioned
1. The authors use the term "Native Americans," rather than "Indians," in this article. Our
choice of collective identifier stems not only from our own personal preferences, but finds ample sup-
port in Professor Berkhofer's penetrating treatise exposing the underlayment of white conceptions of
America's original peoples. See R.F. BERKHOFER, JR., WHITE MAN'S INDIAN: IMAGES OF THE
AMERICAN INDIAN FROM COLUMBUS TO THE PRESENT (1978). Beginning with the origin of the Span-
ish term "los Indios," derived from Columbus's profound geographic error, id. at 4-5, Berkhofer pro-
ceeds, throughout the remainder of his work, to expose the culturo-centric and ethnocentric biases of
Europeans, and later white Americans, who perpetuated the erroneous use of the term "Indians" as an
artificial construct of Euro-American prejudices, beliefs, and attitudes.
[lI]t has to be remembered that the term "Indian" is a white man's word; a concept arising
out of an original error into which white men have insisted on imparting meaning. To be
aboriginal of the Americas is to be Sioux, or Cree, or Mohawk, or Navajo - a tribesman.
Among those who live most intimately with tradition, to talk about "Indian issues" or
"Indian aspirations" is to talk a dangerous kind of nonsense. One may offend someone by
seeming to speak for him.
H. FEY & D. McNICKLE, INDIANS AND OTHER AMERICANS 239 (1970). See also United States v.
Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 331 n.33 (1978)(" 'Navaho' is not their word for themselves. In their own
language, they are dine, 'The People.' ").
No truly self-generated movement exists among America's first peoples to embrace any one collec-
tive term to the exclusion of another. Native Americans remain much less concerned about a collective
designation than they are about their band, tribal, or national identities. Each Native nation or tribe
considers itself a discrete unit confederated loosely with others against the dominant Euro-American
culture.
We recognize accordingly that the term "Native Americans" itself is an unfortunate overgeneral-
ization. Dean Strickland has admonished those who would perpetuate the entrenched fiction that "all
Indians are alike":
We must destroy the prevailing myth that there is a single body of transitory Native
law uniformly applicable to all Indian people. Because there is no single Indian tribe, no
single Indian culture, no single Indian personality, no single Indian language, and no single
Indian history, there can be no single body of rules that can be applied to every Indian
tribe, culture, personality, language, and history. Much of the confusion of Indian law and
policy in the past has been a refusal to face what we have always known - that while there
are many common interests among Indian people, there are also many divergent needs
within the Indian community.
Strickland, The Puppet Princess: The Case for a Policy Oriented Framework for Understanding and
Shaping American Indian Law, 62 OR. L. REV. 11, 17 (1983). For penetrating analyses of white con-
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among three sovereigns: tribal,2 federal, and state governments.
Whether one or more of these sovereigns' has criminal jurisdiction in
a particular case is determined by a confluence of factors: where the
offense was committed, the gravity of the offense, and whether either
the perpetrator or the victim was Native American. Outside the terri-
tory of Native reservations, state jurisdiction, for all intents and pur-
poses, is exclusive for all crimes except federal crimes. Within
reservation borders, however, criminal jurisdiction is split among the
three sovereigns. Jurisdiction in most instances resides inherently
ceptions of Native Americans, see generally BERKHOFER, supra; R.H. PEARCE, THE SAVAGES OF
AMERICA: A STUDY OF THE INDIAN AND THE IDEA OF CIVILIZATION (1965).
Semantic arguments aside, however, the concern here is with the manner in which the topic of
fresh pursuit has been understood and dealt with by traditional domestic "Indian" law. Accordingly
the generic designation "Native Americans," whatever that term's shortcomings, has been used to char-
acterize the collective ethnicity of America's indigenous peoples. It is not the authors' intent to lend
any credence to the analytic homogenization of Native peoples or to reinforce the prevailing notion that
"all Indians are alike."
2. Decisions of the domestic court system frequently note that "the basic unit of the federal-
Indian relationship is the tribe." Attorney Gen. v. Hermes, 127 Mich. App. 777, 782, 339 N.W.2d
545, 549 (1983). See also United States v. Washington, 520 F.2d 676, 691 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 1086 (1976). This characterization is reflected in the statutory definition at section 19 of the
Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, 25 U.S.C. § 479 (1982), that a "tribe" is "any Indian tribe, organ-
ized band, pueblo, or the Indians residing on one reservation." Yet, the term "tribe" perhaps is applied
best in the ethnological sense rather than in a legal and political sense. While the utility in the law of
such a general, judicially-manageable term is undenied, it is by its very generic nature problematical.
With the resurgence of Native American nationalism since the late 1960s, many Native groups
have reasserted the independent nationhood status they maintained prior to the formation of the United
States. See, e.g., Oneida Indian Nation v. New York, 691 F.2d 1070, 1089 (2d Cir. 1982) (Oneidas
"qualify as a 'nation' with whom Congress could enter into 'treaties and alliances' as used in clause I"
of the Constitution). See also infra note 109. Some communities of Native peoples may indeed be
construed as "tribes," that is, as separate, complete, discrete political units. Yet other native communal
entities, such as the numerous, politically autonomous "bands" of Ojibwa and Arapaho, are not sepa-
rate "tribes," despite the fact that they legally may be designated as "tribes" as that term is defined by
statute. City of Sault Ste. Marie v. Andrus, 532 F. Supp. 157, 160 (D.D.C. 1980). "Band" identity is
nonetheless the controlling identification for these peoples.
Because the term "tribe" has such wide recognition in the case law and the literature, the authors
will use that term in its generic sense throughout this article. The authors do not intend thereby to
denigrate any Native nation's assertion to national sovereignty.
3. The authors are speaking in this article solely of the recognition of sovereignty under the do-
mestic law of the United States. The sovereign status of Native peoples under international law is much
more problematical and is well beyond the scope of this article. For recent works espousing the inter-
national sovereign status of indigenous peoples, see Kronowitz, Lichtman, et al., Toward Consent and
Cooperation: Reconsidering the Political Status of Indian Nations, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 507
(1987); Barsh, Indigenous Peoples: An Emerging Object of International Law, 80 AM. J. INT'L L. 369
(1986); Johnston, The Quest of the Six Nations Confederacy for Self-Determination, 44 U. TORONTO
FAC. L. REV. 1 (1986) (noting the Haudenosaunee's "defiant assertions of independence and sover-
eignty" and refusal to become "a part of Canada"); Barsh, Indigenous North America and Contempo-
rary International Law, 62 OR. L. REV. 73 (1983); Green, Aboriginal Peoples, International Law and the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 61 CANADIAN B. REV. 339 (1983); Clinebell & Thomson,
Sovereignty and Self-Determination: The Rights of Native Americans Under International Law, 27 BUF-
FALO L. REV. 669 (1978). See also generally, R.D. ORTIZ, INDIANS OF THE AMERICAS: HUMAN
RIGHTS AND SELF-DETERMINATION (1984).
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with the tribe. Jurisdiction over many Native-involved crimes is as-
serted unilaterally by the federal government as well. The states take
jurisdiction over crimes involving only non-Natives, and as a function
of the federal arrogation of power, may have criminal jurisdiction
granted to them by the federal government over reservation lands
within their borders. The result is an incongruous meld of concurrent
criminal jurisdiction on Native reservations, under which the tribe and
at least one additional sovereign - the United States or a state -
share jurisdiction.
The impact of this patchwork of jurisdiction on tribal sovereignty
is fundamental. Maintaining the peace and administering justice
within a territory are inherent attributes of a sovereign power. Yet
tribal authority to do either is impaired by both the intrusion of an-
other sovereign's jurisdiction and the concomitant loss of tribal power.
Employing the jurisdictional issue of fresh pursuit as a paradigm, this
article will explore the implications for tribal sovereignty of the pres-
ent tripartite arrangement.
The present jurisdictional apportionment by territorial compart-
mentalization, while adequate to cover most arrest situations, is inade-
quate to resolve the issue of fresh pursuit,4 where a Native suspected of
violating state law off the reservation is pursued by state law enforce-
ment officers across reservation borders onto tribal lands. While state
officers may have exclusive authority over the crime and the suspect at
the off-reservation location where the crime is committed,5 the officers,
absent a specific congressional grant of jurisdiction to the state, have
no jurisdiction over Native Americans within reservation borders.6
Yet on-reservation arrests of Natives by state officers for off-reserva-
tion offenses go relatively unchecked. Many courts, even those that
recognize the illegality of the state's exercise of jurisdiction on the res-
ervation, will not invalidate such arrests.
The fundamental premise of this article is that fresh pursuit onto
4. Fresh pursuit refers generally to those pursuits of fleeing suspects that cross jurisdictional
boundaries. Fennessy & Joscelyn, A National Study of Hot Pursuit, 48 DEN. L.J. 389, 390 (1972);
Carson v. Pape, 15 Wis. 2d 300, 308, 112 N.W.2d 693, 697 (1961); 5 AM. JUR. 2DArrest § 51 (1962).
The phrase "close pursuit" also is used occasionally for the same concept. By contrast, the better-
known term "hot pursuit" usually refers to immediate and continuous pursuit of a fleeing violator
independent of the crossing of any jurisdictional barriers. See, e.g., Fennessy & Joscelyn, supra, at 389-
90; Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 753 (1984). The substitution of the term "fresh" or "close"
pursuit for "hot pursuit" may be an attempt to divorce the cross-jurisdictional doctrine from the image
of the Hollywood car chase. See, e.g., United States v. Getz, 381 F. Supp. 43, 46 (E.D. Pa. 1974);
Charnes v. Arnold, 600 P.2d 64, 66 (Colo. 1979). In this article the authors are concerned solely with
the concept of cross-jurisdictional fresh pursuit, concentrating on state-tribal reservation boundaries.
5. There are exceptions to the exclusive off-reservation authority of the state in the area of treaty-
reserved hunting and fishing rights. See infra section II.A.
6. See infra section II.B.2.a. and note 48.
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a Native reservation, unless specifically authorized by the tribe and
carried out in full compliance with tribal law, is a violation of inherent
tribal sovereignty. To protect tribal self-government and control over
the reservation, courts must shift their focus in fresh pursuit cases
away from the rights of the individual suspect and the police powers of
the state, to the right of a sovereign to inviolate borders.
This article explores the limits of state infringement of tribal sov-
ereignty in the context of fresh pursuit onto Native reservations.7 It
looks first at existing principles of criminal jurisdiction over Native
Americans, as those principles are defined by the domestic8 law of the
United States, including the related areas of on-reservation arrest and
extradition. The article next discusses the doctrine of fresh pursuit as
applied in three cross-jurisdictional models: intrastate, interstate, and
international law. Finally, the article outlines the current common
law analysis for determining whether a state has jurisdiction on the
reservation, indicating statutory actions tribes may take to increase the
likelihood of a judicial determination that state authority to pursue
across reservation borders is preempted. The authors ultimately con-
clude that tribal sovereignty, even in the absence of a tribal statutory
enactment or a tribal-state agreement, should operate as an insupera-
ble barrier to the ability of state officers to make fresh pursuit arrests
on the reservation.
7. This article does not deal expressly with the situation in which a Native commits a crime on a
reservation and is pursued thereafter from the reservation to state lands. See, e.g., North Dakota v.
Littlewind, 417 N.W.2d 361 (N.D. 1987) (arrest by BIA police officer following pursuit from reserva-
tion into state held valid under state law as citizen's arrest). Nevertheless, the sovereignty analysis set
out by the authors for tribal extradition to the state conceptually would apply also to state extradition
to the tribe. One state specifically has addressed this situation by statute. In Nevada, both federal
Bureau of Indian Affairs and tribal police officers are authorized to arrest without a warrant
[o]utside the boundaries of an Indian reservation or Indian colony if he [sic] is in fresh
pursuit of a person who is reasonably believed by him [sic] to have committed a felony
within the boundaries of the reservation or colony or has committed, or attempted to com-
mit, any criminal offense within those boundaries in the presence of the officer or agent.
NEV. REV. STAT. § 171.1255 (1985).
Neither do the authors address fresh pursuit between reservations. In certain jurisdictional con-
figurations, such as the Navajo-Hopi reservations in Arizona and the Crow-Northern Cheyenne reser-
vations in Montana, a suspect could be pursued from one reservation onto another without crossing
into state jurisdiction. As with the tribal-state pursuit situation, it appears that intertribal pursuit could
be resolved according to the sovereignty principles articulated for the state-tribal model. State law
enforcement pursuit solely between reservations, on the other hand, may present unique jurisdictional
issues. See infra note 9.
8. In international law, the national or internal law of a sovereign state is termed "municipal
law." However, because this article discusses, in part, the doctrine of fresh pursuit in the context of
intrastate law and the law of municipalities, the authors have elected to use the term "domestic law" to
describe the national law of the United States.
19881
196 UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59
II. CRIMINAL JURISDICTION
The issue of fresh pursuit onto Native reservations must be
viewed in the context of asserted criminal jurisdiction over Natives
and Native American reservations. An analysis of which sovereign -
federal, state or tribal - has jurisdiction over whom, on and off the
reservation, provides a critical conceptual backdrop to the issue of
fresh pursuit.
A. Off-Reservation Jurisdiction
Criminal acts that give rise to fresh pursuit by state law enforce-
ment officers necessarily occur outside the boundaries of the reserva-
tion.9 Jurisdiction over virtually all non-federal criminal offenses
committed off the reservation lies exclusively with the state.10 The
proposition that a state has criminal jurisdiction over non-Natives who
commit crimes within its borders is basic to American jurisprudence.
Additionally, the United States Supreme Court has declared that the
state has full criminal jurisdiction over Natives who violate state laws
outside reservation boundaries. 1 Consequently, off the reservation,
state criminal jurisdiction over Natives is coextensive with the state's
jurisdiction over non-Natives. 12
9. In some instances where Native reservations abut, such as the Crow and Northern Cheyenne
reservations in Montana, it would be possible for state pursuit to begin on one reservation and continue
across the borders of another. For the pursuit and subsequent arrest to be lawful, however, the state
officer would need to have jurisdiction over the suspect and the offense at the time and place that the
pursuit began. In the example of the Northern Cheyenne - Crow, state officers would have no juris-
diction to arrest a Native suspect on either reservation, since Montana exercises criminal jurisdiction
only over the Flathead Reservation, see infra note 41, and thus should have no jurisdiction to undertake
fresh pursuit. Absent a grant of criminal jurisdiction, Montana officers would have jurisdiction over a
non-Native suspect if the victim of the alleged crime was also non-Native, but not if the victim was
Native. See infra section II.B.2. Whether Montana officers would have authority to pursue and arrest
a non-Native for a victimless offense such as a traffic violation is not clear. See infra note 55. Because
of the unique jurisdictional quagmire presented by the relatively remote likelihood of pursuit by state
officers between reservations, that situation is not considered here.
10. The sole exception is tribal jurisdiction over tribal members for hunting and fishing violations
committed during the exercise of off-reservation treaty usufructuary rights. See infra notes 15 and 26
and accompanying text.
11. "It has never been doubted that States may punish crimes committed by Indians, even reser-
vation Indians, outside of Indian country." Organized Village of Kake v. Egan, 369 U.S. 60, 75 (1962).
See also DeCoteau v. District County Court, 420 U.S. 425, 427 n.2 (1975); Ward v. Race Horse, 163
U.S. 504 (1896); Pablo v. People, 23 Colo. 134, 135-37, 46 P. 636, 637 (1896)(state law held applicable
to Ute killing another Ute at off-reservation site); State v. Youpee, 103 Mont. 86, 61 P.2d 832
(1936)(state law applicable to Assiniboine accused of statutory rape of Assiniboine minor off-reserva-
tion). "Whatever sovereign power the federal government had to try Indians for crimes committed off
of the reservation and on land ceded to the federal government by treaty was transferred to the state
upon its admission to the Union." Sturdevant v. State, 76 Wis. 2d 247, 254-55, 251 N.W.2d 50, 54
(1977) (noting, id. at 250 n.1, 251 N.W.2d at 52 n.1, that this principle applies "only to state penal
statutes not including fish and wildlife conservation laws").
12. "Absent express federal law to the contrary, Indians going beyond reservation boundaries
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By contrast, tribal governments generally have no criminal juris-
diction off the reservation, even over their own members."3 Tribal
court jurisdiction, rather, traditionally has been limited to offenses
committed within the confines of the reservation. 4 In selected in-
stances, most notably violations of off-reservation treaty hunting and
fishing rights, tribes may retain jurisdiction to prosecute their mem-
bers for offenses occurring outside the tribe's territorial boundaries. 5
Absent this potential jurisdictional aberration, however, state criminal
have generally been held subject to nondiscriminatory state law otherwise applicable to all citizens of
the State." Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 148-49 (1973). See also New Mexico v.
Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 335 n.18 (1983). The Court expressly noted in Jones that this
principle is "as relevant to a State's tax laws as it is to state criminal laws. 411 U.S. at 149
(citations omitted) (emphasis added).
13. DeCoteau v. District County Court, 420 U.S. 425, 427 n.2 (1975): "If the lands in question
are within a continuing 'reservation,' jurisdiction is in the tribe and the Federal Government .... On
the other hand, if the lands are not within a continuing reservation, jurisdiction is in the State ......
14. See Clinton, Criminal Jurisdiction Over Indian Lands.: A Journey Through a Jurisdictional
Maze, 18 ARIz. L. REV. 503, 557 n.281 (1976) (citing 4 NAT'L AM. INDIAN COURT JUDGES AWS'N,
JUSTICE AND THE AMERICAN INDIAN 4, 40 (1974)); Ex parte Kenyon, 14 F. Cas. 353, 355 (C.C.W.D.
Ark. 1878) (No. 7720); Hearings on the Constitutional Rights of the American Indian Before the Sub-
comm. on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 267
(1961).
15. Settler v. Lameer, 507 F.2d 231, 237.(9th Cir. 1974):
[R]egulatory interference by the state with treaty fishing is obnoxious to the treaty tribes.
These tribes have the power to regulate their own members and to arrest violators of their
regulations apprehended on their reservations or at [off-reservation] "usual and accus-
tomed" fishing sites.
United States v. Washington, 520 F.2d 676, 686 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1086 (1975), vacated
on other grounds, 443 U.S. 658 (1979). See also Lac Courte Oreilles Band of Lake Superior Chippewa
Indians v. Wisconsin, 14 Indian L. Rep. (Am. Indian Law. Training Program) 3135, 3138 (W.D. Wis.
1987) (Chippewa "tribes possess the authority to regulate their members in the exercise of treaty usu-
fructuary rights off the reservation .... [Tihe power to regulate necessarily includes the power to
enforce the regulations against tribal members by arrest or other enforcement mechanisms."); United
States v. Michigan, 471 F. Supp. 192, 273-74 (W.D. Mich. 1979) (Bay Mills Indian Community's and
Sault Ste. Marie Chippewa Tribe's treaty rights include the power to regulate their members off reserva-
tion so long as members are fishing under tribal regulation and in ceded area); United States v. Wash-
ington, 384 F. Supp. 312, 340-42 (W.D. Wash. 1974), af'd, 520 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1975) (tribes meeting
certain qualifications and conditions, including procedures for enforcement, identification of members,
and reporting, could regulate off-reservation treaty fishing rights of members); State v. Courville, 36
Wash. App. 615, 620, 676 P.2d 1011, 1014 (1983) ("Muckleshoot Tribe has the power to regulate the
treaty fishing rights of its individual members off-reservation."). See also Note, Indian Law-Tribal
Off-Reservation Jurisdiction-Settler v. Lameer, 507F.2d 231 (9th Cir. 1974), 1975 Wis. L. REV. 1221;
Reynolds, Indian Hunting and Fishing Rights: The Role of Tribal Sovereignty and Preemption, 52
N.C.L. REV. 743, 760 (1984) (federally protected treaty rights implicate tribes' reservation of power to
control exercise of the right). Cf State v. Gowdy, 1 Or. App. 424, 427, 462 P.2d 461, 463 (1969)(Na-
tive fishing off-reservation in violation of both tribal regulations and state game laws is outside reserved
treaty rights and in same position as non-Native who violates state fishing laws).
Notwithstanding favorable scholarly opinion and the growing volume of lower court precedent
acknowledging tribal regulatory authority, including criminal enforcement powers, over members' off-
reservation hunting and fishing rights, the Supreme Court has yet to consider this issue. Nonetheless,
one source notes that in the Pacific Northwest, "[v]irtually all tribes in the Puget Sound region, and the
Yakima and Warm Springs tribes on the Columbia, exercise Settler-type regulatory authority." Wilkin-
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jurisdiction remains exclusive for all off-reservation violations of state
law.
B. Jurisdiction Within Reservation Boundaries
Criminal jurisdiction on the reservation is controlled by a tripar-
son & Conner, The Law of the Pacific Salmon Fishery: Conservation and Allocation of a Transboundary
Common Property Resource, 32 U. KAN. L. REV. 17, 48 n.174 (1983).
It is not clear whether the tribal power to regulate the off-reservation usufructuary activities of
tribal members is exclusive of state regulation. The tribal power recognized in Settler and subsequent
cases has been qualified where the treaty rights are to be shared "in common with" all citizens of the
state. This express treaty provision, common to several treaties of the Pacific Northwest, accords equal
rights in the fishery to the non-Natives in the treaty area. These "in common with" treaty provisions
have been construed by the Supreme Court as according to a state the authority to regulate Native off-
reservation treaty fishing rights for narrowly defined conservation purposes. See Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v.
Washington Dep't of Game, 433 U.S. 165, 175-77 (1977). Lower courts, even in the absence of the
pivotal "in common with" treaty language, uniformly have construed reserved Native usufructuary
rights to be held in common with non-Native settlers in the treaty area and to be subject thereby to
limited state regulation. See United States v. Michigan, 623 F.2d 448 (6th Cir. 1980) (tentatively adopt-
ing the common usufruct treaty concept espoused in People v. LeBlanc, 399 Mich. 31, 248 N.W.2d 199
(1976)); Lac Courte Oreilles Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v. Wisconsin, 653 F. Supp. 1420,
1434-35 (W.D. Wis. 1987) (court noted the lack of "in common with" language in Chippewa treaties,
but held itself bound by Puyallup line of cases to find that state may regulate treaty-based usufructuary
activities when reasonable and necessary for conservation).
The language of the decisions implicates concurrent tribal and state regulation.
Regulation of off-reservation Indian treaty fishing by the United States, the State, or the...
tribes does not preempt the regulation by any of the other two. Jurisdiction of each entity
to regulate is unimpaired by the exercise of another entity's regulatory jurisdiction. With
respect to matters over which there may be multiple jurisdiction, the extent of exercise or
nonexercise of regulatory jurisdiction by the entity having primary interest in the matter
may be relevant to the appropriateness of another entity's exercise of its jurisdiction.
United States v. Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312, 403 (W.D. Wash. 1974). See also Settler, 507 F.2d at
237 (existence of tribal self-regulation "does not mean that the State of Washington is without any
authority to regulate off-reservation fishing. That power has been expressly recognized, but it has been
strictly limited."). But where a tribal regulatory scheme incorporates the state's limited conservation
interests, the tribal exercise of authority ousts state jurisdiction.
Both Bay Mills' and the Sault Tribe's treaty rights include the power to regulate their
members so long as they are fishing under tribal regulation and in the area ceded by the
Treaty of 1836. Both tribes presently exercise that power and regulate the fishing activities
of their members. This regulation preempts any state authority to regulate the fishing ac-
tivity of the tribal members.
United States v. Michigan, 471 F. Supp. 192, 274 (W.D. Mich. 1979). Accord United States v. Wash-
ington, 384 F. Supp. 312, 403 (W.D. Wash. 1974) ("the exercise of... tribal regulatory control may
affect the finding of 'necessity' which is required for the validity of any state exercise of its police power
to preserve the resource"), affid, 520 F.2d 676, 686 (9th Cir. 1975)("[s]o long as the tribes responsibly
insure [sic] that the run of each species in each stream is preserved, the legitimate conservation interests
of the state are not infringed"), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1086 (1976); Lac Courte Oreilles Band of Lake
Superior Chippewa Indians v. Wisconsin, 14 Indian L. Rep. (Am. Indian Law. Training Program)
3135, 3138-39 (W.D. Wis. 1987) ("effective tribal self-regulation of a particular resource or activity
precludes state regulation of that resource or activity as to the tribes .... [W]here 'the tribes responsibly
insure' that conservation and public safety and health goals are met, the legitimate interests of the state
are not contravened."). See also Reynolds, supra, at 770 ("if a tribe can show that it adequately is
regulating its members to ensure perpetuation of the resource, state regulation will not be deemed
necessary").
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tite division among the tribes, the states, and the federal government. 6
Two allocations of criminal justice power generally are consistent
among all reservations: tribes exercise criminal jurisdiction over Na-
tive offenders, and states -take exclusive jurisdiction over non-federal
crimes involving only non-Natives. In addition, if a state has been
granted or has assumed criminal jurisdiction pursuant to Public Law
280 or a similar enabling statute,17 federal jurisdiction within reserva-
tion borders continues only as to federal crimes. In the absence of a
specific jurisdictional grant or an assumption of jurisdiction under
Public Law 280, however, federal jurisdiction vis-a-vis the states is
paramount for Native-involved criminal activity. Tribal criminal ju-
risdiction, restricted to Native offenders, is not affected by Public Law
280.
1. Tribal Jurisdiction
Native nations and tribes are sovereign entities, "distinct, in-
dependent political communities" possessing sovereign powers over
both their members and their territory. 18 Among the attributes of sov-
ereignty exercised by tribes are the powers to control their internal and
16. As the following section of this article demonstrates, courts and scholars have wrestled for
well over a century with the complexities, anomalies, and disarray of the "jurisdictional maze" on
Native reservations. Clinton, supra note 14, at 504. Notwithstanding the significant and apparent diffi-
culties inherent in attempting to develop a clear picture of criminal jurisdiction within reservation
borders, the United States Department of Justice recently asserted, with a stupefying lack of accuracy,
that "jurisdiction over all persons and [sic: in] Indian country is clear, and no legal uncertainties exist."
Indian Reservation Special Magistrate: Hearing before the Sen. Select Comm. on Indian Affairs, 99th
Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1986) [hereinafter cited as Reservation Special Magistrate] (statement of Mark M.
Richard, Dep. Ass't Att'y Gen., Criminal Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice). The United States Department
of the Interior termed this description "apt." Id. at 17 (statement of Hazel Elbert, Dep. to the Ass't
Sec'y of Indian Affairs (Tribal Services), U.S. Dep't of Interior). As this article will show, and as the
writings of other authors and scholars on this subject uniformly demonstrate, the determinacy that the
Justice Department finds in criminal jurisdiction within Indian country can be attributed only to a
pernicious disregard of fact, a significant lack of legal insight, or an intentionally self-deceptive inven-
tiveness.
A table setting out the major parameters of on-reservation criminal jurisdiction is attached at
Appendix A. The table is cross-referenced to notes in the text to facilitate explanation of jurisdictional
authorities.
17. See infra section II.B.2.a. and note 47.
18. New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 332 (1983); Santa Clara Pueblo v.
Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 55-56 (1978); United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557 (1975); Worcester v.
Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 560-61 (1832).
The Supreme Court has narrowed the universality of this well-patined doctrine in the civil law
context. In Montana v. United States, the Court held that the Crow Tribe, as a general matter, could
not regulate hunting and fishing on lands which, while within the territorial confines of the reservation,
were not owned by the tribe. 450 U.S. 544, 557-67 (1981). See also Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. Washington
Dep't of Game, 433 U.S. 165, 174-75 (1977) (dismissing Tribe's assertion of exclusive tribal regulatory
authority over on-reservation fishing where fewer than 22 acres of the original 18,000 acre reservation
remained in trust status).
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social relations, and "to make their own laws and be ruled by them."' 9
Central to tribal sovereignty is the administration of justice within the
tribe's territory.2 °
19. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. at 332; Martinez, 436 U.S. at 55-56; Mazurie, 419 U.S. at
557; Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220-21 (1959).
The beneficence of the Court's frequent statement is belied by myriad congressional enactments
and federal administrative and judicial decisions. For example, the Major Crimes Act, codified at 18
U.S.C. § 1153(a) (1982), unilaterally extended federal criminal jurisdiction to Native reservations and
displaced Native restitutionary concepts of justice with non-Native retributive and punitive values.
It tries them, not by their peers, nor by the customs of their people, nor the law of their
land, but by... the law of a social state of which they have an imperfect conception, and
which is opposed to the traditions of their history, to the habits of their lives, to the strong-
est prejudices of their savage nature; one which measures the red man's revenge by the
maxims of the white man's morality.
Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556, 571 (1883).
The Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 (IRA), 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-479 (1986), was implemented to
coerce about 70 percent of Native American tribes to adopt the form of government of the dominant
society. Barsh, When Will Tribes Have a Choice? in RETHINKING INDIAN LAW 43 (Nat'l Lawyers
Guild 1982). Public Law 280, see infra notes 39-41 and accompanying text, delegated to selected state
governments jurisdiction over most crimes and civil matters throughout most Native reservations
within their borders. With the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303 (1982), Con-
gress imposed upon Native American tribes the dominant society's vision of civil rights. The Alaska
Native Claims Settlement Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1628 (1986), requires Inuit and Aleut Natives to set
up economic corporations in the western capitalist model to govern their Native affairs. See Branson,
Square Pegs in Round Holes: Alaska Native Claims Settlement Corporations Under Corporate Law, 8
U.C.L.A.-ALASKA L. REV. 103 (1979); Lazarus & West, The Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act: A
Flawed Victory, 40 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 132 (1976).
Much political control of Native nations is vested by Congress in the Secretary of the Interior. See
generally Title 25 of the United States Code (1982). For instance, the Secretary assumes the power to
review and overrule most actions of Native governments, including constitutional amendments, 25
U.S.C. § 476 (1982), and tribal codes of law and order, 25 C.F.R. § 11. l(e) (1987). In fact, most IRA
constitutions contain a boilerplate provision that all major actions of tribal governments must be re-
viewed and approved by the Secretary. See, e.g., Constitution and Bylaws of the Wisconsin Winnebago
Tribe, arts. 9 (Amendments) and 12 (Adoption of Constitution and Bylaws), reprinted in 2(1) J. Wis.
INDIAN RESEARCH INST. 106, 110, 112 (1966); Revised Constitution and By-Laws of the Oneida Tribe
of Indians of Wisconsin, art. 7, reprinted in 2(2) J. Wis. INDIAN RESEARCH INST. 34, 38 (1966) ("No
amendment shall become effective until approved by the Secretary of the Interior.").
The [Bureau of Indian Affairs in the Department of Interior] possesses final authority
over most tribal actions as well as over many decisions made by Indians as individuals.
BIA approval is required, for example, when a tribe enters into a contract, expends money,
or amends its constitution. Although the normal expectation in American society is that a
private individual or group may do anything unless it is specifically prohibited by the gov-
ernment, it might be said that the normal expectation on the reservation is that the Indians
may not do anything unless it is specifically permitted by the government.
Cohen & Mause, The Indian: The Forgotten American, 81 HARv. L. REV. 1818, 1819-20 (1968) (cita-
tions omitted). See, e.g., Moapa Band of Paiute Indians v. Department of Interior, 747 F.2d 563 (9th
Cir. 1984) (upholding Secretary's decision to rescind tribal statute that would have permitted, as an
economic development measure, houses of prostitution on tribal reservation).
The ultimate arrogance of political control is seen in attempts by the United States Congress to
terminate the political existence of several Native nations. See infra note 38.
20. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 322 (1978) (Native tribes, vested with sovereign pow-
ers, have "the right to prescribe laws applicable to tribe members and to enforce those laws by criminal
sanctions."); Ortiz-Barraza v. United States, 512 F.2d 1176, 1179 (9th Cir. 1975) ("Intrinsic in this
[tribal] sovereignty is the power of a tribe to create and administer a criminal justice system."). See also
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Despite the fundamental sovereign nature of criminal justice ad-
ministration, the United States Supreme Court ruled in 1978 that
tribes have no jurisdiction to prosecute non-Natives committing of-
fenses within reservation boundaries.2" While that decision has been
Powers of Indian Tribes, 55 I.D. 14 (1934), in I Opinions of the Solicitor of the Department of the
Interior Relating to Indian Affairs 1917-1974 at 445, 471-76 [hereinafter cited as Op. SoL); Note, Indi-
ans-Crimes by Indians out of Indian Country or Reservation-Jurisdiction of State to Arrest Indian on
the Reservation, 45 N.D. L. REV. 430, 436 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Arrest on the Reservation] (quot-
ing Cohen, Indian Rights and the Federal Courts, 24 MINN. L. REV. 145, 147 (1940)); Comment, Tribal
Control of Extradition from Reservations, 10 NAT. RESOURCES J. 626, 628 (1970) [hereinafter cited as
Tribal Control of Extradition].
The Supreme Court recognized early on that criminal jurisdiction is a sine qua non of tribal sover-
eignty, when it held that the district court of the Dakota Territory had no jurisdiction to try a Native
for the murder of another Native on the Brule Sioux Reservation:
The pledge to secure to these people, with whom the United States was contracting as a
distinct political body, an orderly government, by appropriate legislation thereafter to be
framed and enacted, necessarily implies, having regard to all the circumstances attending
the transaction, that among the arts of civilized life, which it was the very purpose of all
these arrangements to introduce and naturalize among them, was the highest and best of
all, that of self-government, the regulation by themselves of their own domestic affairs, the
maintenance of order and peace among their own members by the administration of their
own laws and customs.
Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556, 568 (1883).
21. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978). The Court fabricated and grafted
onto Indian common law an ill-reasoned, invidious doctrine that tribal exercise of criminal jurisdiction
over non-Natives was a power "inconsistent with their status." Id. at 208 (emphasis in original). Justice
Stewart's unanimous opinion in Wheeler v. United States, handed down fifteen days after Oliphant,
dubbed the doctrine "implicit divestiture." 435 U.S. 313, 326 (1978).
The decision in Oliphant served to settle only the domestic law of "inherent [Indian criminal]
jurisdiction to try and punish non-Indians," 435 U.S. at 212 (emphasis added), and did not abrogate
any tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-Natives retained by treaty. See, e.g., Treaty with the De-
lawares, Sept. 17, 1778, art. 4, 7 Stat. 13 (reserving tribal court jurisdiction over non-Native offenders if
"a fair and impartial trial can be had by judges or juries of both parties" according to the laws and
customs of both parties and natural justice). Many other early treaties, while not expressly reserving
criminal jurisdiction in the tribes, waived federal protection for non-Indian trespassers onto Native
lands and reserved to the tribes the power to punish the interlopers. See, e.g., Treaty with the Chero-
kee, Nov. 28, 1785, art. 5, 7 Stat. 18, reprinted in 2 INDIAN AFFAIRS: LAWS AND TREATIES 3, 9 (C.J.
Kappler ed. 1904) [hereinafter cited as KAPPLER TREATIES] (non-Native settler trespassing on lands.
allotted to Choctaws "shall forfeit the protection of the United States and the Indians may punish him
or not as they please"); Treaty with the Shawnee, Jan. 31, 1786, art. 7, 7 Stat. 26, reprinted in KAPPLER
TREATIES at 17. These reservations of exclusivity and punishment largely have been mooted over time.
Their application was restricted to the boundaries circumscribed by the specific treaty. The "punish...
as they please" clause disappeared as a standard treaty provision by the mid-1790s. See generally KAP-
PLER TREATIES, supra.
Moreover, Oliphant left open the question whether the Court intended to divest tribes of their
inherent criminal powers over all nonmembers or only over non-Natives. See Duro v. Reina, 821 F.2d
1358 (9th Cir. 1987), in which the court upheld the criminal jurisdiction of the Salt River Pima-Mari-
copa tribal court over a Torrez-Martinez defendant accused of discharging a firearm in the murder of a
Gila River victim on the Salt River Reservation. Finding that Oliphant disposed only of inherent tribal
jurisdiction to try and punish non-Natives, the court determined that the defendant, because of his close
contacts with the Salt River Community, was an "Indian" subject to tribal court jurisdiction. Id. at
1363-64. This assertion of tribal court jurisdiction over nonmember Natives is not an isolated occur-
rence. See, e.g., Reservation Special Magistrate, supra note 16, at 38 (testimony of Robert Fasthorse,
Chief Judge, Oglala Sioux Tribal Court) (Oglala Tribal Court asserts jurisdiction over Natives of other
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widely criticized,2 2 it remains United States domestic law that Native
federally recognized tribes). The complexities of nonmember versus non-Native tribal jurisdiction are
discussed infra at note 77.
The Salt River Pima-Maricopa Community, whose criminal jurisdiction was upheld in Duro, pre-
viously had sought from Congress a grant of jurisdiction over misdemeanor violations of the tribal
criminal code by non-members within the boundaries of the reservation. In the second session of the
99th Congress, Representative Udall introduced H.R. 4900, a bill to grant criminal misdemeanor juris-
diction to the Salt River Pima-Maricopa Indian Community. H.R. 4900 passed the House on Sept. 23,
1986 and was referred to the Senate Select Committee on Indian Affairs. Cong. Index (CCH) 35,090
(1985-86). At a Senate hearing held in July 1986 on S. 2564, a similar bill, the legislation received
almost universal support-from the Salt River Community itself, the Department of Interior, the Ari-
zona senators, the Governor and Attorney General of Arizona, and the mayors of Phoenix, Scottsdale,
Tempe, and Mesa. Administration of Justice within the Salt River Pima-Maricopa [SRPM] Indian Res-
ervation: Hearing before the Sen. Select Subcomm. on Indian Affairs, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 21-55 (1986)
[hereinafter cited as Administration of Justice]. The hearing highlighted the exceptional circumstances
of the SRPM community warranting a possible return of jurisdiction over non-Natives: 80,000 travelers
cross the reservation daily, and weekend traffic amounts to some 5000 to 6000 people tubing or boating
on the river through the reservation. Id. at 8, 15. The Department of the Interior, in supporting the
grant of full misdemeanor jurisdiction to the SRPM community, noted that it would consider the ap-
propriateness of recommending similar jurisdiction for other reservations on a case-by-case basis based
on five factors: an independent tribal judiciary of sufficient size to handle the misdemeanor caseload;
comprehensive and equitable tribal misdemeanor statutes; a geographical location that encourages sub-
stantial tribal/non-tribal contact; the support of local and state governments; and a tribal fiscal ability
to accommodate the cost of exercising misdemeanor jurisdiction over non-tribal members. Id. at 9
(statement of H. Elbert, Dep, Asst. Sec'y for Indian Affairs, Tribal Operations). Despite the wide-
spread local, state, and federal support for the legislation, S. 2564 was not reported out of committee
before the end of the 99th Congress. Cong. Index (CCH) 21,051 (1985-86). Some insight into the lack
of success of the legislation may be gleaned from introductory remarks of Senator Melcher at later
congressional hearings on related criminal jurisdiction issues. Although Sen. Melcher termed the
Pima-Maricopa bill "very satisfactory and very worthwhile," he added: "[T]he precedent it would set
might alarm a great number of non-Indians .... In the long run, it might cause Congress to overreact
and place even more unworkable patterns of enforcement of justice for minor offenses, on Indian reser-
vations." Reservation Special Magistrate, supra note 16, at 12 (remarks of Sen. Melcher). As of Jan. 1,
1988, no similar legislation had been introduced in the 100th Congress. Cong. Index (CCH) (1987-88).
22. The case unleashed a mammoth amount of critical academic commentary. See, e.g., Barsh &
Henderson, The Betrayal: Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe and the Hunting of the Snark, 63 MINN.
L. REV. 609, 617 (1979) (decision characterized by "gestalt jurisprudence" and "exhibits an unusual
propensity for the selective use of history, assuming conclusions, and even according greater weight to
defeated bills than enacted law"); Williams, The Algebra of Federal Indian Law: The Hard Trail of
Decolonizing and Americanizing the White Man's Indian Jurisprudence, 1986 Wis. L. REV. 219, 268
(characterizing the case as "a critical anamnesis for United States' colonial legal theory"); Stetson,
Decriminalizing Tribal Codes: A Response to Oliphant, 9 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 51, 53, 56 (1981) (Rehn-
quist's "reasoning was poorly founded, even irrational," and his "conclusions fly in the face of logic,
precedent, and justice, apparently relying on the inevitable ensuing confusion to cover the tracks");
Note, Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe: A Restriction of Tribal Sovereignty, 15 WILLAMETrE L.
REV. 127 (1978); Note, Indian Law-Indian Tribes Have No Inherent Authority to Exercise Criminal
Jurisdiction Over Non-Indians Violating Tribal Criminal Laws Within Reservation Boundaries-Oli-
phant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 28 CATH. U.L. REV. 663 (1979); Note, Oliphant v. Suquamish In-
dian Tribe: A Jurisdictional Quagmire, 24 S.D. L. REV. 217 (1979); Note, Jurisdiction: Criminal
Jurisdiction and Enforcement Problems on Indian Reservations in the Wake ofOliphant, 7 AM. INDIAN
L. REV. 291 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Enforcement Problems]; Note, Indians-Jurisdiction-Tribal
Courts Lack Jurisdiction Over Non-Indian Offenders, 1979 Wis. L. REV. 537, 540 [hereinafter cited as
Tribal Courts Lack Jurisdiction] (decision represents "a new interpretation of Indian law and is difficult
to resolve with precedent"); Note, The Legal Trail of Tears. Supreme Court Removal of Tribal Court
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tribes may not exercise criminal jurisdiction over non-Natives.23 De-
spite this unwarranted judicial excision of tribal court jurisdiction, the
authority of tribal police to detain non-Native offenders on the reser-
vation and turn them over to the appropriate state or federal authori-
ties remains unaffected.24
Jurisdiction Over Crimes By and Against Reservation Indians, 20 NEw ENG. L. REV. 247, 283 (1984-85)
[hereinafter cited as The Legal Trail of Tears] (decision reflects an "intensive ethnocentrism" and "co-
vertly racist attitude"). See also the commentary of Judge William C. Canby, Jr., Circuit Judge, United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, infra note 110.
One of the more outspoken critics of the Oliphant decision has been Chief Judge Bowen of the
Puyallup Tribal Court, who stated that arguments presented in his tribal court by the federal govern-
ment, relying in large part on the reasoning of Oliphant,
would be persuasive if this court accepted the legitimacy of the cited federal cases as a
matter of tribal law. However, the federal cases relied on by the United States--holdings
which present the potential of pernicious, cavernous effects on tribal sovereignty - are
wrong from a tribal and international law perspective.
Satiacum v. Reagan, Case No. 81-1136 (Puy. Tr. Ct. Sept. 17, 1982), 10 Indian L. Rep. (Am. Indian
Law. Training Program) 6009, 6010 (1983).
23. Five years after Oliphant, the Supreme Court unanimously upheld the right of a tribal govern-
ment to regulate the on-reservation hunting and fishing activities of non-members. New Mexico v.
Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324 (1983). By denying tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-Na-
tives, however, the Oliphant decision may seriously impair the ability of a tribe to enforce effectively its
regulation of non-member hunters and fishers. As a consequence, tribes must depend on "foreign"
mechanisms such as federal laws that make the unlicensed trespass for hunting or fishing on reservation
trust lands and violations of tribal fish and game codes, federal criminal offenses rather than tribal
criminal offenses. See 18 U.S.C. § 1165 (1982)(federal criminal trespass statute); 16 U.S.C. § 3372(a)(1)
(1982)(Lacey Act).
[A tribe's] recourse for violations of conditions of entry [for hunting and fishing] by non-
members is limited to suspension or revocation of permits and licenses, eviction of persons
violating the [tribal Conservation] Code from Indian-owned land and trust lands and refer-
ral of violators to federal authorities for prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 1165.
White Earth Band of Chippewa Indians v. Alexander, 518 F. Supp. 527, 535 (D. Minn. 1981). The
United States Commission on Civil Rights, however, has noted that federal authorities decline to prose-
cute the great majority of criminal offenses committed by non-Natives on the reservation. U.S. CIVIL
RIGHTS COMM'N, INDIAN TRIBES - A CONTINUING QUEST FOR SURVIVAL 154-55 (1981).
The Navajo Nation has attempted to address these concerns through laws governing exclusion of
non-Navajos. In 1978, the Nation amended its exclusion statute, in part as a response to the Oliphant
decision:
If the Navajo Nation may not try non-Indians (or possibly non-Navajos) who are alleged to
have violated the criminal laws of the Navajo Nation (or who are alleged to have commit-
ted acts which would be criminal if committed by a Navajo), then it is appropriate to adopt
a procedure for removal of such individuals from the Navajo Nation.
Preamble to Tribal Council Resolution CO-73-78, NAVAJO TRIB. CODE tit. 17, subch. 5 (Supp. 1984-
85). One of the grounds for exclusion is when a non-member who is accused of conduct punishable
under the laws of the Nation, declines to consent in writing to the criminal jurisdiction of the Navajo
courts. NAVAJO TRIB. CODE tit. 17, § 1901(c)(1) (1977). The Navajo exclusion laws are separate from
and in addition to the Navajo extradition statute, NAVAJO TRW. CODE tit. 17, § 1951 (1977). See infra
note 78. For discussion of a similar Menominee law authorizing banishment of members, see infra note
27.
24. Quechan Tribe of Indians v. Rowe, 531 F.2d 408, 411 (9th Cir. 1976). Similarly, tribal police
retain the power to investigate violations of state and federal law by non-Natives. Ortiz-Barraza v.
United States, 512 F.2d 1176, 1181 (9th Cir. 1975).
These powers arguably were unaffected by Oliphant. See State v. Ryder, 98 N.M. 453, 649 P.2d
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As an inherent attribute of self-government, tribes exercise crimi-
nal jurisdiction over their members.25 Even this sovereign power,
however, has been circumscribed in domestic law, both as to territory
and as to type of crime. In the first instance, tribal criminal jurisdic-
tion generally extends only within the confines of reservation bounda-
ries.26 Second, since United States law has curtailed tribal court
powers to a maximum sentence for any one offense of imprisonment
756 (N.M. Ct. App. 1981), aff'd on other grounds, 98 N.M. 316, 648 P.2d 774 (1982), in which a BIA
police officer stopped a driver for a traffic offense, realized the driver was a non-Native, and detained
him for approximately ten minutes until another BIA officer, cross-commissioned as a state peace of-
ficer, could arrive and issue the driver a state citation. The New Mexico Court of Appeals held that:
Oliphant does not prohibit an arrest of non-Indians. Indeed, Oliphant tacitly acknowledges
that such an arrest may be made, so long as the Indian authorities "promptly deliver up any
non-Indian offender, rather than try and punish him themselves."
To hold that an Indian police officer may stop offenders but upon determining they are
non-Indians must let them go, would be to subvert a substantial function of Indian police
authorities and produce a ludicrous state of affairs which would permit non-Indians to act
unlawfully, with impunity, on Indian lands.
Ryder, 98 N.M. at 455-56, 649 P.2d at 758-59 (quoting Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 208). Accord Op. Sol.
Dep't Interior, Jurisdiction over Offenses Committed by Non-Indians in Indian Country (1978), re-
printed in 5 Indian L. Rep. (Am. Indian Law. Training Program) H-10 (1978) (reaffirming, post-Oli-
phant, the right of tribal police to arrest non-Natives and deliver them up to federal authorities). But
see State v. Burrola, 137 Ariz. 181, 669 P.2d 614 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983) (leaving open the question of
illegal arrest of non-Native by tribal police for offense of possession of prohibited weapon). See also
Enforcement Problems, supra note 22, at 306-08; The Legal Trail of Tears, supra note 22, at 275; Tribal
Courts Lack Jurisdiction, supra note 22, at 567 n. 161; Comment, Criminal Jurisdiction in Indian Coun-
try, 6 G.M.U. L. REV. 225, 242 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Criminal Jurisdiction].
On appeal, Ryder was affirmed on other grounds. 98 N.M. 316, 648 P.2d 774 (1982). The New
Mexico Supreme Court did not find it necessary to decide whether the officer was empowered under
Oliphant to arrest a non-Native. The court held, rather, that the arresting officer was a BIA police
officer authorized to enforce federal law on the reservation. Since the federal Assimilative Crimes Act,
see infra note 53, incorporated state substantive criminal law in this case (traffic offense), the officer
could have issued the defendant a federal traffic citation. 98 N.M. at 318, 648 P.2d at 776. Thus, when
the officer stopped the defendant, he was acting as a federal officer enforcing federal law, and not as a
tribal officer exercising criminal jurisdiction over a non-Native. Because the initial stop was valid,
detaining the driver for no more than ten minutes under the mistaken impression that only a cross-
commissioned officer could issue a citation was reasonable. Id. at 319, 648 P.2d at 777. Whether the
lower court's ruling would stand in the case of a tribal officer not commissioned as a BIA police officer
is not clear, although it is noteworthy that the supreme court did not dispute the lower court's reading
of Oliphant.
25. "[A]n Indian tribe's power to punish tribal offenders is part of its own retained sover-
eignty .. " United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 328 (1978); United States v. Jackson, 600 F.2d
1283, 1285 (9th Cir. 1979). See generally, Clinton, supra note 14, at 557-64. See also Criminal Jurisdic-
tion, supra note 24.
26. Clinton, supra note 14, at 557 n.281; DeCoteau v. District County Court, 420 U.S. 425, 427
n.2 (1975). As noted previously, however, tribes may have off-reservation jurisdiction over treaty hunt-
ing and fishing violations committed by tribal members. See supra note 15. Generally this will require
that the tribe provide for such jurisdiction by tribal code. See State v. Smith, 51 Or. App. 223, 229-230,
625 P.2d 1321, 1326 (1981) (notwithstanding established Yakima right to regulate tribal fishing at all
usual and accustomed off-reservation sites, state court had jurisdiction over criminal offenses not ex-
pressly provided for by tribal regulations).
This territorial definition of tribal sovereign jurisdiction comports with international legal norms.
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for one year or a fine of 5000 dollars, or both,2 7 tribal criminal juris-
A general principle of international law presumes that a state can require adherence to its laws only
from persons permanently or transiently within its territory.
It is a general rule of criminal law that the crime must be committed within the territorial
jurisdiction of the sovereignty seeking to try the offense in order to give the sovereign juris-
diction .... The criminal jurisdiction of the United States - that is, its jurisdiction to try
parties for offenses committed against its laws - may in some instances extend to its citi-
zens everywhere.... But in all such cases it will be found that the law of Congress indicates
clearly the extraterritorial character of the act.... Except in cases like these, the criminal
jurisdiction of the United States is necessarily limited to their own territory ......
Yenkichi Ito v. United States, 64 F.2d 73, 75 (9th Cir. 1933) (quoting United States v. Smiley, 27 F.
Cas. 1132, 1134 (N.D. Cal. 1864) (No. 16,317)) (court had no jurisdiction to try and convict defendant
for bringing illegal aliens into United States where seizure and arrest took place outside the territorial
limits of the United States "on the high seas some forty miles off the coast of Southern California," 64
F.2d at 74).
Section 38 of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES (1965) provides: "Rules of United States statutory law, whether prescribed by federal or state
authority, apply only to conduct occurring within, or having effect within, the territory of the United
States, unless the contrary is clearly indicated by the statute." Extraterritorial conduct deemed to have
"an effect within the territory of the United States" is very limited and includes, generally, only such
acts as threaten the security of the United States and the operation of its governmental functions,
particularly "the counterfeiting of the state's seals and currency and the falsification of its official docu-
ments." Id. at § 33. Although not extant as a separate sectional heading in the revised RESTATEMENT
presently under redraft, the concept of territorial circumscription of domestic law, with the same few
exceptions, is present in the newer drafts. See RESTATEMENT OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF
THE UNITED STATES § 403 comment f (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1985) ("Legislative intent to subject conduct
outside the state's territory to its criminal law should not be found except on the basis of an express
statement or a clear implication"). See also 18 U.S.C. §§ 1651-1659 (1982)(extending U.S. jurisdiction
beyond territorial waters and onto high seas for acts of piracy and privateering against U.S. ships); 18
U.S.C. § 1203 (Supp. IV 1987) (extending U.S. jurisdiction beyond territorial borders in cases of hos-
tage-taking where the abductors attempt to compel the United States "to do or abstain from doing any
act"). This commonly is called the "protection principle" of international law. A "Reporter's Note" to
§ 33 of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) states: "The preference of the common law for the territorial
basis of jurisdiction has led the United States... to make little use of the protective principle." For a
thorough treatment of international and United States extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction, see the ex-
tended discussion presented by C.L. Blakesley in 2 INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 3-53 (M.C. Bas-
siouni ed. 1986).
27. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(7) (Supp. IV 1987) provides that:
No Indian tribe in exercising powers of self-government shall -
(7) require excessive bail, impose excessive fines, inflict cruel and unusual punishments,
and in no event impose for conviction of any one offense any penalty or punishment greater
than imprisonment for a term of one year and a fine of $5,000, or both.
Prior to 1986, tribes were even more circumscribed: to sanctions no greater than imprisonment for
six months or a fine of $500, or both, for any one offense. Tribal sentencing powers were expanded as
part of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, in order "[t]o enhance the ability of tribal governments to
prevent and penalize the traffic of illegal narcotics on Indian reservations." Pub. L. No. 99-570, § 4217,
100 Stat. 3207-146 (1986). Despite the narrow focus of the bill enlarging Native sentencing authority,
the expanded powers are not limited to narcotics offenses.
This intrusive limitation on tribal courts' sentencing powers need not impair the meting out of
harsher punishment where convictions are obtained on multiple charges. See, e.g., Ramos v. Pyramid
Tribal Court, 621 F. Supp. 967, 970 (D. Nev. 1985), where the defendant was sentenced by the Pyramid
Lake Tribal Court to two years imprisonment following conviction on seven separate offenses. No one
sentence violated the pre-1986 prohibition against sentences greater than six months. The Nevada
206 UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59
diction generally has been limited to charges of lesser crimes. 28  More-
district court refused to find that the imposition of consecutive sentences violated 25 U.S.C. § 1302(7)
or per se constituted cruel and unusual punishment.
Neither does the federal statutory limitation on the tribal court sentencing power affect what is
perhaps the "ultimate" inherent sanctioning power of the tribal government to control serious offenses
within its homeland. The Menominee Tribal Legislature, in 1987, unanimously voted to empower that
Nation's tribal court to banish from the reservation members who violate the revised tribal controlled
substances statute. Menominee Nation, Menominee Tribal Legislature, Amendment to Ordinance 80-
17, § 5 (April 16, 1987). The Tribal Court was given the discretion to order banishment on the first
offense, but "in the case of 2nd and succeeding offenses, [a fine of $1000 and banishment from the
Menominee Indian Reservation for a period not less than one year nor more than 5 years] shall be
imposed by the Court." Id. at § 5(l)(e) (emphasis provided). For a discussion of the Navajo Nation's
law authorizing exclusion of nonmembers under certain circumstances, see supra note 23.
28. Clinton, supra note 14, at 557 n.281. It remains unsettled, however, whether tribal court
authority must be limited to lesser offenses. See United States v. John, 437 U.S. 634, 651 n.21 (1978)
("We do not consider here the more disputed question whether [the Major Crimes Act] also was in-
tended to pre-empt tribal jurisdiction."); Clinton, supra, at 559 (describing tribal court restriction to
lesser crimes as "open to substantial question," noting that whereas Congress has limited the punish-
ment that tribal courts may impose, it has not specifically prevented tribes from prosecuting serious
offenses).
The Major Crimes Act, as amended, see infra note 53 and accompanying text, provides that for
any of the enumerated felony offenses committed within "Indian country" by a Native, the defendant
"shall be subject to the same laws and penalties as all other persons committing any of the above
offenses, within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States." On its face the Act does not deprive
tribal courts of concurrent jurisdiction over the enumerated crimes. See United States v. Cowboy, 694
F.2d 1228, 1235 (10th Cir. 1982) (Major Crimes Act only "extend[s] federal ... jurisdiction to cover
[enumerated] offenses" and does not suggest divestiture of inherent tribal jurisdiction). Nor does the
face of the Act require that federal courts exercise exclusive jurisdiction over such crimes. See Goodson
v. United States, 7 Okla. 117, 54 P. 423 (1898)(not required that the United States exercise sole and
exclusive jurisdiction over Native reservation or its inhabitants in order that United States may have
jurisdiction to try punishable offenses committed on such reservations). Moreover, the Supreme Court
expressly has noted the narrow scope of the Act as a "carefully limited intrusion ... into the otherwise
exclusive jurisdiction of the Indian tribes to punish Indians for crimes committed on Indian Land."
United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641, 643 n.1 (1977); United States v. Center, 750 F.2d 724, 725 (8th
Cir. 1984). See United States v. Torres, 733 F.2d 449, 459 n. 12 (7th Cir. 1984) (noting "the tribal court
may have concurrent jurisdiction if an Indian commits one of the fourteen enumerated crimes of [the
Major Crimes Act] against another Indian"); United States v. Broncheau, 597 F.2d 1260, 1265 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 859 (1979) (noting without deciding that "[t]ribal courts may have concur-
rent jurisdiction" with federal courts under the Major Crimes Act). Cf Duro v Reina, 821 F.2d 1358,
1364 n.5 (9th Cir. 1987) ("It is not clear whether federal jurisdiction preempts tribal jurisdiction" under
the Major Crimes Act.).
Some courts of appeals have interpreted the Act as positing exclusive jurisdiction in the federal
courts. See, e.g., Felicia v. United States, 495 F.2d 353, 355 (8th Cir. 1974) (Native defendant con-
victed of assault with intent to do great bodily harm upon another Native was "within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the United States"); Sam v. United States, 385 F.2d 213, 214 (10th Cir. 1967)(prosecu-
tion of Navajo for rape of a Navajo woman within Indian country was beyond jurisdiction of Navajo
tribal court). Accord United States v. Blue, 722 F.2d 383, 384 (8th Cir. 1983). Indeed, Justice Rehn-
quist in Oliphant hinted, without deciding, that federal jurisdiction may be exclusive under the Major
Crimes Act. "If tribal courts may try non-Indians, however, as respondents contend, those tribal
courts are free to try non-Indians even for such major offenses as Congress may well have given the
federal courts exclusive jurisdiction to try members of their own tribe committing the exact same of-
fenses." 435 U.S. 191, 203 (1978) (emphasis in original). But the legislative history of the Act appears
inapposite. Express provision for federal jurisdiction, "and not otherwise," in an early version of the
Act was deleted from the final bill at the urging of one Congressman. "I think it is sufficient that the
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over, tribal prosecution of Natives for crimes consistent with the
diminished tribal sentencing powers may subject the defendants to a
second state or federal prosecution for the same act, charged as a more
serious crime under applicable state or federal law.2 9
The exercise of tribal criminal jurisdiction is dependent upon the
existence of a tribal court or other mechanism for criminal dispute
resolution.3" In the absence of an agreement permitting law enforce-
courts of the United States should have concurrent jurisdiction in these cases." 16 CONG. REC. 934
(1885) (remarks of Mr. Budd). See Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 203 n.14. The Court in Oliphant observed
that the issue was "mooted for all practical purposes" by the congressional limitation on tribal court
penalty and sentencing powers. Id.
29. Subjecting a defendant to both a tribal and a state or federal prosecution for the same crime
does not implicate double jeopardy. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978); United States v.
Strong, 778 F.2d 1393, 1396 (9th Cir. 1985); United States v. Walking Crow, 560 F.2d 386 (8th Cir.
1977). The Navajo defendant in Wheeler pled guilty in the Navajo Tribal Court to two offenses re-
served to tribal jurisdiction: disorderly conduct and contributing to the delinquency of a minor. One
year later, he was indicted in federal court for statutory rape arising from the same incident. Wheeler
argued double jeopardy; the government argued dual sovereignty. The Supreme Court held that the
defendant was not subjected to double jeopardy because the prosecutions brought by the tribe and the
federal government originated in separate sovereigns. 435 U.S. at 332.
In Walking Crow, a Rosebud Sioux pled guilty in tribal court to the misdemeanor of simple theft
and one month later was indicted in federal court for felony robbery under the Major Crimes Act. On
appeal the Eighth Circuit refused to set aside the subsequent federal conviction, in part because of the
deleterious implications such an action could have on inherent tribal jurisdiction:
From a practical standpoint, the result that the appellant would have us reach might
mean that the felony jurisdiction conferred on the federal courts by [the Major Crimes Act]
could in instances be frustrated by relatively minor prosecutions in the tribal courts. Such a
situation would be undesirable and might lead to still further congressional encroachment
on the jurisdiction of these courts.
560 F.2d at 389. See also Ramos v. Pyramid Tribal Court, 621 F. Supp. 967, 969-70 (D. Nev.
1985)(conviction of Paiute in state court was not double jeopardy bar to prosecution in tribal court for
similar violations arising out of same incident); Burns, Criminal Jurisdiction: Double Jeopardy in Indian
Country, 6 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 395 (1978); Comment, Tribal Courts, Double Jeopardy and the Dual
Sovereignty Doctrine, 13 GONZ. L. REV. 467 (1978).
30. One prominent observer of domestic Native law has termed tribal courts "often the single
most important vestige of tribal sovereignty on the reservations." Clinton, supra note 14, at 557. As
United States courts have recognized in the context of tribal law enforcement, the power that tribes
retain to administer justice is only meaningful in conjunction with the power to enforce. Ortiz-Barraza
v. United States, 512 F.2d 1176, 1180 (9th Cir. 1975). See also Babbitt Ford, Inc. v. Navajo Indian
Tribe, 710 F.2d 587, 598 (9th Cir. 1983) ("Civil jurisdiction to enforce [tribal repossession statute] is a
necessary exercise of tribal self-government and territorial management"); Settler v. Lameer, 507 F.2d
231, 239 (9th Cir. 1974) ("regulatory authority retained by the Yakima Nation with respect to the
exercise of [member] off-reservation fishing rights can be truly effective only through off-reservation
enforcement powers [of arrest and seizure] at the 'usual and accustomed' fishing places"); Lac Courte
Oreilles Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v. Wisconsin, 14 Indian L. Rep. (Am. Indian Law.
Training Program) 3135, 3138 (W.D. Wis. 1987) ("the power to regulate necessarily includes the power
to enforce the regulations against tribal members by arrest or other enforcement mechanisms").
In 1898, the Curtis Act abolished "all tribal courts in Indian Territory," divesting Native tribes in
Oklahoma of the right to establish courts with general civil and criminal jurisdiction over their mem-
bers. Act of June 28, 1898, ch. 517, 30 Stat. 495. In affirming the effect of the Curtis Act on the Creek
Nation, one court recently noted:
There is ... no question that the abolition of their traditional courts has interfered with the
UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59
ment officers of another sovereign to arrest for violations of tribal law
and cite the violator into tribal court,3 tribal jurisdiction also is de-
pendent as a practical matter upon the establishment of a tribal police
force.32 While Native police forces and tribal courts are moderately
widespread among Native American reservations,33 the existence of
neither can be taken for granted, especially on smaller reservations."34
ability of the Creeks to exercise the rights of self-government which were consistently
promised to them by the federal government. ... Furthermore, recent developments in the
United States District Court of Oklahoma suggest that the Muscogees may find it difficult
to enforce law in their territory unless they can establish courts with general civil and
criminal jurisdiction.
Muscogee (Creek) Nation v. Hodel, 670 F. Supp. 434, 444 (D.D.C. 1987). Nonetheless, the court
stated, "it is to Congress, the body that abolished the Muscogee courts, and not to the courts, that [the
tribe] must look for a remedy." Id. at 445.
31. Cross-deputization agreements, whether unilateral or bilateral, apparently are relatively com-
mon. See COMMISSION ON STATE-TRIBAL RELATIONS, STATE TRIBAL AGREEMENTS: A COMPRE-
HENSIVE STUDY 11-20 (1981), for specific examples of state-tribal arrest and detention agreements. See
also Op. Att'y Gen. Wis. 93-79 (1979) (unpublished formal opinion) (positing that Menominee Tribe
and Menominee County may engage in cross-deputization as long as tribal police meet statutory and
constitutional requirements for appointment as deputy sheriffs). Traditional cross-deputization agree-
ments have been criticized by commentators, however, as too dependent upon political good-will and as
likely to lead to increasing state jurisdictional encroachments upon the reservation. Johnson, Jurisdic-
tion: Criminal Jurisdiction and Enforcement Problems on Indian Reservations in the Wake of Oliphant,
7 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 291, 308-09 (1979); Oliviero & Skibine, The Supreme Court Decision that Jolted
Tribal Jurisdiction, 6(5) AM. INDIAN J. 2, 7-8, 10 (1980); Skibine, Oliviero & Fagan, Potential Solutions
to Jurisdictional Problems on Reservations, 6(6) AM. INDIAN J. 9, 12 (1980). More permanent state-
tribal agreements or commissions have been proposed as alternatives. Johnson, supra, at 309-15;
Skibine, Oliviero & Fagan, supra, at 12. Sample cross-deputization and mutual aid agreements are
found in Skibine, Oliviero & Fagan, supra, at 12-13.
32. The inherent power of Indian tribes to maintain a police force "to aid in the enforcement of
tribal law in the exercise of tribal power" has been recognized expressly. Ortiz-Barraza v. United
States, 512 F.2d 1176, 1179 (9th Cir. 1975). See also Quechan Tribe of Indians v. Rowe, 531 F.2d 408,
411 (9th Cir. 1976). As with establishment of a tribal court system, sovereign tribal authority to admin-
ister justice on the reservation is dependent upon enforcement powers for its effectiveness. See supra
note 30.
33. A recent series of articles highly critical of aspects of the tribal court system states that there
currently are 147 operative reservation courts serving the nation's 487 tribal reservations. Minneapolis
Star and Tribune, Jan. 5, 1986, at IA, col. 5. A footnote to Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435
U.S. 191, 196 n.7 (1978), noted that of the 127 reservation courts in existence in 1978, 71 were tribal
courts; 30 were federal "CFR Courts," successors to the Courts of Indian Offenses; 16 were traditional
courts of the New Mexico pueblos; and ten were conservation courts. A 1983 tabulation reflected 117
tribal courts and 23 Courts of Indian Offenses. See 9 Indian Courts Newsletter 7 (1983). For an
explanation of the types of reservation court systems, see Clinton, supra note 14, at 553-57. Reservation
courts of all types handle annually an estimated 160,000 criminal, civil, and juvenile cases. Minneapolis
Star and Tribune, supra, at 12A, col.1.
34. Professor Clinton has noted that no Indian police are present on many smaller reservations.
Clinton, supra note 14, at 575.
An example of a reservation that only recently established a court system and police force is the
Lac du Flambeau Band of Lake Superior Chippewa in Wisconsin, which established a tribal court in
September 1983, and hired its first police officer in October 1984. Reply Brief of State of Wisconsin, at
5 (prepared for County of Vilas v. Chapman, 122 Wis.2d 211, 361 N.W.2d 699 (1985)). The Lac du
Flambeau Reservation of 44,500 acres has an estimated Native population of 1092 persons. CONFED-
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Yet, even in the presence of an established tribal criminal justice
system, a tribe's criminal jurisdiction over its members within reserva-
tion territory has been held not to be exclusive. Either the state or the
federal government will have at least partial concurrent criminal juris-
diction. Which of these two sovereigns will exercise concurrent juris-
diction, and over which criminal offenses, depends largely upon the
application of Public Law 280 to the particular state.
2. State and Federal Jurisdiction
Certain aspects of non-tribal criminal jurisdiction within reserva-
tion borders are consistent regardless whether the reservation is sub-
ject to Public Law 280. One constant is that either the state or the
federal government, or both, but never the tribe, will have criminal
jurisdiction over non-Natives. All criminal jurisdiction over non-Na-
tives presently is vested in non-Native sovereigns.
As discussed previously, the Supreme Court in 1978 divested tri-
bal governments of their inherent power "to try and punish" non-Na-
tives for offenses committed against Native victims.3" In addition, the
ERATION OF AMERICAN INDIANS, INDIAN RESERVATIONS: A STATE AND FEDERAL HANDBOOK 297-
98 (1986)(citing 1980 census data).
It is even more unlikely that significantly smaller tribes, such as the Paiute of Pyramid Lake (est.
pop. 720 on 475,100 acres), the Papago of Ak-Chin (est. pop. 230 on 21,800 acres), the Potowatomi in
Forest County, Wisconsin (est. pop. 220 on 11,700 acres), or the Seminole of Big Cypress, Florida (est.
pop. 315 on 42,700 acres), can afford the fiscal encumbrances of formal tribal courts and Native police
forces. The situation is far less encouraging for many of the very small tribes and mission bands of
Natives in California, such as the Santa Rosa Band (est. pop. 12 on 11,100 acres), Cabazon Band (est.
pop. 8 on 1700 acres), and Chemehuevi Tribe (est. pop. 32 on 28,200 acres). Nevertheless, where there
is enough interest or incentive, and a sufficient economic base, there is a way. See references to Puyal-
lup (est. pop. 856 on 33 acres) Tribal Court, supra note 22, and to the Suquamish (est. pop. 148 on 2700
acres) tribal police force and tribal court, at the heart of the controversy in Oliphant v. Suquamish
Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978). (All population and acreage tabulations taken from INDIAN RESER-
VATIONS, supra.)
Thirty-five percent of America's 278 federally-recognized reservations and 487 Alaskan native vil-
lages have fewer than 100 inhabitants. Almost three-fourths have fewer than 500 residents. PRESIDEN-
TIAL COMM'N ON INDIAN RESERVATION ECONOMIES, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES 83 (1984)(citing 1980 census figures).
35. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978), discussed supra notes 21 and 22
and accompanying text.
Popular scholarly and judicial sentiment appears to hold that Native governments were divested of
their jurisdiction to try crimes between non-Natives by the McBratney line of cases, discussed infra at
notes 36 and 37 and accompanying text. See, e.g., United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641, 643 n.2
(1977) ("Not all crimes committed within Indian country are subject to federal or tribal jurisdiction,
however. Under [McBratney], a non-Indian charged with committing crimes against other non-Indians
in Indian country is subject to prosecution under state law."). The McBratney line of cases addressed
solely the issue of federal versus state court jurisdiction and did not implicate the issue of concurrent
tribal court jurisdiction. This issue, in fact, never has been squarely before the Court. Even if tribal
jurisdiction over crimes between non-Natives survived McBratney, however, the Oliphant divestiture of
tribal jurisdiction over crimes by non-Natives against Natives likely is broad enough to encompass the
loss of all tribal jurisdiction over non-Native defendants, regardless of the status of the victim.
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McBratney rule has allotted to the states jurisdiction over all crimes
committed by one non-Native against another non-Native. 36 In a se-
ries of cases, the United States Supreme Court created a judicial excep-
tion to federal jurisdiction, finding that non-federal crimes on Native
lands involving only non-Natives were exclusively within a state's ju-
risdiction to prosecute.37
a. Public Law 280 Reservations
In 1953, as part of the termination era and the assimilationist pol-
icy then in vogue in federal Indian affairs,38 Congress enacted Public
36. United States v. McBratney, 104 U.S. 621 (1881). The question in McBratney was whether
the federal district court had jurisdiction to try a non-Native for the murder of another non-Native
committed on the Ute Reservation.
The State of Colorado, by its admission into the Union by Congress, upon an equal footing
with the original States in all respects whatever... has acquired criminal jurisdiction over its
own citizens and other white persons throughout the whole of the territory within its limits,
including the Ute Reservation, and that reservation is no longer within the sole and exclu-
sive jurisdiction of the United States. The courts of the United States have, therefore, no
jurisdiction to punish crimes within that reservation, unless so far as may be necessary to
carry out such provisions of the treaty with the Ute Indians as remain in force. But that
treaty contains no stipulation for the punishment of offenses committed by white men
against white men.
Id. at 624. The Court's reliance on the equal footing doctrine is a perplexing conclusion at odds with
then-existing precedent. The original states had not been found previously to have criminal jurisdiction
over non-Natives committing offenses in Indian country. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.)
515, 561 (1832) ("The Cherokee nation, then, is a distinct community, occupying its own territory.. .in
which the laws of Georgia [an original state] can have no force."). But see New York ex rel. Ray v.
Martin, 326 U.S. 496 (1946), extending the McBratney rule to the original state of New York. See infra
note 37.
Beyond this breach of its own precedent, the Court in McBratney found for state jurisdiction
despite the existence of an earlier version of the General Crimes Act (see infra note 53) that provided
for federal jurisdiction in Indian country with a few exceptions, all of which deferred to tribal jurisdic-
tion. In fact, the Court first noted and then ignored the mandate of this statute, focusing instead solely
upon interpretations of state enabling acts. See Clinton, Development of Criminal Jurisdiction Over
Indian Lands: The Historical Perspective, 17 ARIz. L. REV. 951, 977-81 (1975). The Supreme Court
later attempted a gloss on this legislative-judicial schism by finding that McBratney and its progeny
implicitly created an exception to the General Crimes Act. United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641,
644 n.4 (1977).
For a more extensive explanation of the McBratney rule, its evolution, and its application, see
Clinton, supra note 14, at 524-26; Indian Civil Rights Task Force, Development of Tripartite Jurisdic-
tion in Indian Country, 22 U. KAN. L. REV. 351, 366-73 (1974).
37. See, e.g., Draper v. United States, 164 U.S. 240, 247 (1896) ("in reserving to the United States
jurisdiction and control over Indian lands it was not intended to deprive [Montana] of power to punish
for crimes committed on a reservation or Indian lands by other than Indians or against Indians"); New
York ex rel. Ray v. Martin, 326 U.S. 496, 500 (1946) (as "to crimes between whites and whites which
do not affect Indians, the McBratney line of decisions stands for the proposition that States, by virtue of
their statehood, have jurisdiction over such crimes"). The holding in McBratney was not so explicit,
but has been read to imply state jurisdiction. McBratney itself held only that the federal government
did not have jurisdiction in cases involving crimes committed by non-Natives against non-Natives on
reservation lands.
38. Termination was the primary federal Indian policy from the early 1950s until the mid-1960s.
Implementation of the policy took multiple forms. Public Law 280, see infra note 39, enacted in 1953,
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Law 280."9 The Act conveyed initially to five, and later to six, states
ushered in the termination era by giving the states power to assume both criminal and civil jurisdiction
over all reservations within their borders. Liquidation of specific tribes as federal legal entities followed
in short order. Beginning in 1954, fourteen termination acts were passed over the next eight years,
affecting more than 11,500 Natives and 1.5 million acres of Native lands. Note, Terminating the Indian
Termination Policy, 35 STAN. L. REV. 1181, 1187 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Termination Policy].
Many of these acts emphasized in their text only the termination of federal land supervision and federal
services to the tribes. In substantive effect, however, the acts liquidated the home-rule governments of
the affected tribes, made trust land taxable by states, and forced the sale, in some instances, of enor-
mous amounts of land.
Three restoration acts subsequently were passed in the 1970s and three more in the 1980s, reestab-
lishing some 68 of the 110 tribes and bands previously terminated. The most recent re-recognition act
is the Ysleta del Sur Pueblo and Alabama and Coushatta Indian Tribes of Texas Restoration Act, Pub.
L. No. 100-89, 101 Stat. 666 (1987), which restored the federal trust relationship and reestablished the
tribes' reservations "without regard to whether legal title to such lands is held in trust by the Secre-
tary." Id. at §§ 103, 105, 203, 206. Another recently restored tribe did not fare as well. See the
Klamath Indian Tribe Restoration Act, Pub. L. No. 99-398, 100 Stat. 849 (1986) (codified at 25 U.S.C.
§ 566 etseq. (Supp. IV 1987)). While the Act restored the Klamath's lost federal tribal status, it did not
restore the Klamath trust lands. Approximately 2500 Natives and almost 1,100,000 acres in five states
remain unrestored to federal status. Termination Policy, supra, at 1187.
The effect of termination was devastating, not only for the tribes terminated but for the entire
Native American community. A Wall Street Journal article, discussing the shattered self-identity of
one terminated tribe, noted:
[Termination] was disastrous because Washington did not understand that it is virtually
impossible to successfully impose alien values on people with vastly different traditions and
culture.... Congress has too often failed to take into account the very values and traditions
that distinguish effective reform from ineffective intrusion. The short-lived Menominee
[termination] experiment will stand as a conspicuous monument to this lack of
understanding.
Wall Street Journal, Jan. 7, 1974, at 10, col. 1. See also 0. LA FARGE, TERMINATION OF FEDERAL
SUPERVISION: DISINTEGRATION AND THE AMERICAN INDIANS (1966); A. DEBO, A HISTORY OF THE
INDIANS OF THE UNITED STATES 349 (1970) ("termination was the most concerted drive against In-
dian property and Indian survival since the removals following the acts of 1830 and the liquidation of
tribes and reservations following 1887"). For a chronicle of the Menominee efforts to regain their
federal status, see Herzberg, The Menominee Indians: Termination to Restoration: Part 1, 6 AM. IN-
DIAN L. REV. 143 (1978). A comprehensive survey of the termination movement is presented in Wil-
kinson & Biggs, The Evolution of the Termination Policy, 5 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 139 (1977).
An excellent overview of the historical development of federal Indian policy through legislative
and executive actions is presented in F. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 47-206 (R.
Strickland & C.F. Wilkinson eds. 1982) [hereinafter HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW]; see also
TYLER, A HISTORY OF INDIAN POLICY (1973).. For detailed treatments surveying the spectrum of
U.S.-Native American affairs, see TYLER, supra; W. WASHBURN THE INDIAN IN AMERICA (1975).
The most comprehensive historical tract generally is acknowledged to be F. PRUCHA, THE GREAT
FATHER: THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT AND THE AMERICAN INDIANS (1984). The treatment
most sensitive and compassionate to the Native American viewpoint is DEBO, supra.
39. Act of Aug. 15, 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-280, 67 Stat. 588. For a capsule history of Public Law
280, see Criminal Jurisdiction, supra note 24, at 234-38. The major tract on the subject is considered to
be Goldberg, Public Law 280: The Limits of State Jurisdiction Over Reservation Indians, 22 UCLA L.
REV. 535 (1975).
The prevalent mood at the time of the enactment of Pub. L. 280 was in favor of a rapid termination
of federal involvement in Native affairs. See supra note 38. On July 1, 1952, the House passed a
resolution directing the House Committee on Internal and Insular Affairs to conduct a detailed investi-
gation to determine the ability of Native tribes to manage their own affairs without federal supervision.
H. R. 706, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 98 CONG. REC. 8782 (1952). Congressional policy first was announced
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both civil and criminal jurisdiction over Native reservations within the
states' borders," and contained enabling provisions for other states to
assume the same jurisdiction.4" Public Law 280 originally contained
formally in H.R. Con. Res. 108, approved on July 27, 1953, the same day that Pub. L. 280 was passed
by the House. 99 CONG. REC. 9968 (1953). That resolution declared it to be the policy of the U.S.
government to make Natives, as rapidly as possible, "subject to the same laws and entitled to the same
privileges and responsibilities as are applicable to other citizens of the United States, to end their status
as wards of the United States and to grant them all of the rights and prerogatives pertaining to Ameri-
can citizenship." H.R. Con. Res. 108, 83rd Cong., 1st Sess., 67 Stat. B132 (1953). After 35 years of
legal limbo, America's Native nations are on the verge of witnessing a long-awaited recession of H.R.
108. See H. Res. 425, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., 134 CONG. REC. H1707, H1792-93 (daily ed. April 19,
1988) ("Congress hereby repudiates and rejects House Concurrent Resolution 108 and any policy of
unilateral termination of Federal relations with any Indian nation.").
While the language of H.R. 108 ostensibly presaged the termination policy that was to dominate
Indian policy during the remainder of the decade, the Supreme Court has attempted to cast Pub.L. 280
solely as an assimilationist statute.
In Bryan v. Itasca County,... the Court emphasized that Pub.L. 280 was not a termi-
nation measure and should not be construed as such.... The parties agree that Pub.L. 280
reflected an assimilationist philosophy. That Congress intended to facilitate assimilation
when it authorized a transfer of jurisdiction from the Federal Government to the States
does not necessarily mean, however, that it intended in Pub.L. 280 to terminate tribal self-
government.
Washington v. Confederated Bands and Tribes of the Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U.S. 463, 488-89 n.32
(1979), reh'g denied, 440 U.S. 940 (1979) (citation omitted). See also Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort
Berthold Reservation v. Wold Eng'g, 106 S. Ct. 2305, 2314 (1986) (Pub. L. 280 does not "represent an
abandonment of the federal interest in guarding Indian self-governance"). Nevertheless, by granting
jurisdiction to several states without the consent of the affected Native nations, Congress blatantly
ignored fundamental concepts of Native American sovereignty and in several cases also ignored re-
served treaty rights. See Yakima, 439 U.S. at 478 n.22 (spurning as "tendentious" the tribe's assertion
that its treaty-reserved right to self-government could not be abrogated by implication and was not
abrogated expressly by enactment of Pub. L. 280. "The intent to abrogate inconsistent treaty rights is
clear enough from the express terms of Pub. L. 280."). Professor Goldberg has noted that Pub. L. 280
was enacted, at least in part, because "assimilation [was] cheaper for the federal government and pre-
ferred by states that dislike[d] the presence of an Indian sovereignty within their borders.
Goldberg, supra, at 536.
40. The civil jurisdiction provision is codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (1982), the criminal provision
at 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (1982).
The initial mandatory states were California, Minnesota, Nebraska, Oregon, and Wisconsin;
Alaska was added in 1958 by the enactment of Pub. L. No. 85-615, 72 Stat. 545 (1958). Some Native
reservations, such as the Red Lake Reservation in Minnesota and the Warm Springs Reservation in
Oregon, were not included in the original grant of jurisdiction in Public Law 280. 18 U.S.C. § 1162(a),
28 U.S.C. § 1360(a).
41. States without disclaimer clauses in their constitutions were authorized to enact enabling leg-
islation to assume jurisdiction over Indian reservations. Pub. L. 280, § 7 (repealed 1968). Two states
assumed criminal jurisdiction under this provision: Florida and Nevada. See Goldberg, supra note 39,
at 567.
States with constitutional disclaimers ofjurisdiction over Indian lands were authorized to "amend,
where necessary, their State constitution or existing statutes ... to remove any legal impediment to the
assumption of civil or criminal jurisdiction" under Public Law 280. Pub. L. 280, § 6 (codified at 25
U.S.C. § 1324 (1982)). While the literature and the case law, apparently in reliance on H.R. REP. No.
848, 83rd Cong., 1st Sess. and S. REP. No. 699, 83rd Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1953 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2409-14, frequently note that the constitutions of eight states contain express
disclaimers of jurisdiction over Native lands, see, e.g., Washington v. Confederated Bands and Tribes of
the Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U.S. 463, 491 n.36 (1979), in actuality there originally were ten states
19881 "SAVAGE HOSTILE INDIAN MARAUDERS"
no provision for tribal consent to state assumption of jurisdiction, and
tribal indignation and rancor with this aspect of the law prompted
with such jurisdictional impediments in their constitutions: Arizona (art. 20, § 4); Idaho (art. 21, § 19);
Montana (art. 1); New Mexico (art. 21, § 2); North Dakota (art. 13, § 1); Oklahoma (art. 1, § 3); South
Dakota (art. 22, § 2); Utah (art. 3, § 2); Washington (art. 26, § 2); and Wyoming (art. 21, § 26). Alaska
also has a disclaimer, albeit a slightly different one, in its constitution; but that constitutional proviso is
of no moment since Congress, in 1958, mandated Pub.L. 280 jurisdiction in that state. See supra note
40.
The disclaimer clauses of the ten states generally declared that the states "forever disclaim all right
and title" to Indian lands and that Indian lands within the state shall remain under the "absolute
jurisdiction and control of the congress of the United States." See, e.g., Washington v. Confederated
Bands and Tribes of the Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U.S. 463, 480 & n.24 (1979). The "absolute"
jurisdiction and control typically retained by the United States by such disclaimers, however, means
only "undiminished, not exclusive" control. Organized Village of Kake v. Egan, 369 U.S. 60, 71
(1962).
Several of the original ten disclaimer states have taken steps to assume jurisdiction pursuant to
Pub. L. 280. Because Pub. L. 280 does not prescribe the manner in which disclaimer states are to
modify their organic legislation, the question arose whether legislative action alone would suffice to
repeal a constitutional disclaimer of jurisdiction over reservations. In response to a challenge by the
Yakima Nation to Washington's statutory assumption of jurisdiction, the Supreme Court held that
Pub. L. 280 permits, but does not require, the amendment of the state's constitution. Yakima, 439 U.S.
at 493. Cf. In re Hankins, 80 S.D. 435, 125 N.W.2d 839 (1964) (invalidating for non-compliance with
Pub. L. 280 requirements a South Dakota statute assuming criminal jurisdiction over crimes committed
on reservation highways). Of the five disclaimer states now empowered to exercise Pub. L. 280jurisdic-
tion, see infra, Idaho, Montana, Utah, and Washington all have enacted statutes rather than amend
their state constitutions. Only North Dakota has amended its constitution to provide that the legisla-
ture "may, upon such terms and conditions as it shall adopt, provide for the acceptance of such juris-
diction as may be delegated to the state by Act of Congress." N.D. CONST. art. 13, § I.
Only three of these five disclaimer states presently exercise Pub. L. 280 criminal jurisdiction over
reservations within their borders. In 1963, Montana assumed criminal jurisdiction over the Flathead
Reservation, MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-1-301 (1987), but maintains no criminal jurisdiction over other
reservations within that state. State ex rel. Flammond v. Flammond, 621 P.2d 471, 472 (Mont. 1980).
In that same year, Idaho and Washington each assumed partial civil and criminal jurisdiction over
reservation lands within the states. Washington took jurisdiction over Native trust lands with respect
to selected, enumerated subject matter areas, but assumed full jurisdiction over the nontrust lands in
Indian country. WASH. REV. CODE § 37.12.010 (Supp. 1987). Idaho, on the other hand, also assumed
jurisdiction over enumerated subject areas, but extended that selective jurisdiction to all lands within
"Indian country.. .[as] defined by title 18, United States Code § 1151." IDAHO CODE § 67-5101 (1980
& Supp. 1987). The Supreme Court has held that such an assumption of partial jurisdiction is permissi-
ble under Pub. L. 280. Yakima, 439 U.S. at 495-99. For discussions of the peculiarities of Washing-
ton's Pub. L. 280 jurisdiction, and the litigation it engendered, see Note, Washington's Public Law 280
Jurisdiction on Indian Reservations, 53 WASH. L. REV. 701 (1978); Comment, Public Law 280. The
Status of State Legal Jurisdiction over Indians After Washington v. Confederated Bands and Tribes of
the Yakima Indian Nation, 15 GONZ. L. REV. 133 (1979).
In addition to these three states, Utah has enacted legislation that would permit it to acquire
Public Law 280 jurisdiction, UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-36-9 (1986), but to date no tribe has accepted the
offer of state jurisdiction. See United States v. Felter, 752 F.2d 1505, 1508 n.7 (10th Cir. 1985). North
Dakota, on the other hand, has amended its constitution and enacted legislation permitting it to take
civil jurisdiction with the consent of the tribes. Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reserva-
tion v. Wold Eng'g, 467 U.S. 138, 144 (1984); Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation
v. Wold Eng'g, 106 S. Ct. 2305, 2308 (1986). As in Utah, however, no tribe has yet accepted the state's
offer of jurisdiction. See Malaterre v. Malaterre, 293 N.W.2d 139, 143 (N.D. 1980) ("North Dakota
does not have jurisdiction over Indians residing within the exterior boundaries of an Indian reserva-
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Congress later to enact certain reforms as part of the Indian Civil
Rights Act of 1968.42 After 1968 state jurisdiction could be assumed
only with the consent of the affected tribes, 3  and states
tion."). For a discussion of North Dakota's "residuary jurisdiction" over certain civil actions, see infra
note 50.
None of the five remaining states with disclaimers presently exercise any criminal cognizance over
Indian country within their borders. See, e.g., Nenna v. Moreno, 132 Ariz. 565, 566, 647 P.2d 1163,
1164 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1982) (Arizona has not sought "to extend Arizona's civil and criminal jurisdiction
to Indian reservations via the mechanism provided in" Pub. L. 280); Blatchford v. Gonzales, 100 N.M.
333, 338, 670 P.2d 944, 949 (1983), cert. denied sub noma. Blatchford v. Winans, 464 U.S. 1033 (1984)
("New Mexico has not accepted jurisdiction of [Indian country] under Public Law 280 or any other
federal statute"); State v. Brooks, 14 Indian L. Rep. (Am. Indian Law. Training Program) 5015 (1987)
(Okla. Crim. App. 1986) ("Oklahoma has never acted pursuant to [Pub. L. 280] to assume jurisdiction
over the 'Indian Country' within its borders... (and] does not have jurisdiction over crimes committed
by or against an Indian in Indian Country."); State ex rel. May v. Seneca-Cayuga Tribe, 711 P.2d 77, 88
(Okla. 1985) (court "unable to identify and isolate any [Oklahoma] governmental action which
amounts to an assumption of cognizance over Indian Country"); State v. Hero, 282 N.W.2d 70, 72
(S.D. 1979) ("South Dakota is not a Public Law 280 state"); State ex rel. Peterson v. District Court,
617 P.2d 1056, 1062-63 (Wyo. 1980)(reviewing court "aware of no Wyoming legislation to accept...
[Pub. L. 280] delegation").
The disclaimer state of New Mexico has claimed from time to time that it has criminal jurisdiction
in Indian country pursuant to an 1889 statute which provides that:
All Indians, committing against the person or property of another Indian, or other person,
any of the following crimes.., within the state of New Mexico and either within or without
an Indian reservation, shall be subject therefor to the laws of this state relating to such
crimes... and the courts are hereby given jurisdiction in all such cases.
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-10-3 (1978 & Supp. 1984). New Mexico courts have held in no uncertain terms,
however, that the 1889 law, enacted decades prior to Pub. L. 280, does not constitute an assumption of
jurisdiction pursuant to that act. Blatchford, 100 N.M. at 338-39, 670 P.2d at 949-50; State v. Ortiz,
105 N.M. 308, 731 P.2d 1352 (N.M. Ct. App. 1986). Nonetheless, as of 1987, the statute remains on
the books in New Mexico.
In addition, Arizona purports to enforce on Native lands the criminal provisions of its air pollution
statutes. This assertion of state jurisdiction is undoubtedly invalid.
Arizona's attempted assumption of jurisdiction over Indian country for pollution control
purposes is illegal. Arizona has no legal power to enforce her pollution control laws on
Indians in Indian country nor has she the power to try Indians for causes of actions arising
from pollution in Indian country. Apparently, until rebuked by the U.S. Supreme Court,
Arizona will continue to claim jurisdiction to which she is not entitled.
U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY (REGION IX), APPLICABILITY OF STATE POLLUTION
CONTROL LAWS TO INDIAN RESERVATIONS 1 (quoted in Note, Environmental Law.- Protecting Clean
Air. The Authority of Indian Governments to Regulate Reservation Airsheds, 9 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 83,
99-100 (1981)). See also Will, Indian Lands Environment - Who Should Protect It, 18 NAT. RE-
SOURCES J. 465, 471 n.34 (1978); Note, The Applicability of the Federal Pollution Acts to Indian Reser-
vations: A Case for Tribal Self-Government, 48 U. COLO. L. REV. 63, 80 n.92 (1976).
42. Act of Apr. 11, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, Title IV, §§ 401-406, 82 Stat. 73, 78-80 (codified at
25 U.S.C. §§ 1321-1326 (1982)) [hereinafter Pub. L. 284]. See Criminal Jurisdiction, supra note 24, at
238.
43. Malaterre v. Malaterre, 293 N.W.2d 139, 143 (N.D. 1980). A majority vote of the adult
members of the tribe is required. Pub. L. No. 284, § 402 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 1322 (1982)). The
new provision was prospective only and left intact prior state assumptions ofjurisdiction, notwithstand-
ing that these had not been consented to by the affected tribes. 25 U.S.C. § 1323(b) (1982).
On at least one occasion, Native consent has been legislated by the federal government. The act
restoring to federal recognition two Native tribes in Texas contained the following provision:
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were permitted, upon their sole prerogative and with approval by the
Secretary of the Interior, to retrocede jurisdiction to the federal gov-
ernment in full or in part." Native tribes, however, could neither initi-
The State shall exercise civil and criminal jurisdiction within the boundaries of the reserva-
tion as if such State had assumed such jurisdiction with the consent of the tribe under
sections 401 and 402 of the [Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321-1322]....
Ysleta del Sur Pueblo and Alabama and Coushatta Indian Tribes of Texas Restoration Act, Pub. L.
No. 100-89, § 105(f) (Ysleta del Sur Pueblo) and § 206(f) (Alabama and Coushatta Tribes), 101 Stat.
666, at 667, 671-72 (1987). This general designation of state civil and criminal jurisdiction, however,
does not preclude the tribes from exercising concurrent jurisdiction in these areas. See infra note 47.
This restoration act may represent the most recent event giving rise to Native American cynicism
with the dominant society's frequently imposed requirement of consent by "majority rule." See Lone
Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 557 (1903) (upholding congressional plan for disposition of 2.5 mil-
lion acres of Kiowa and Comanche lands despite fact that plan fell short by 87 votes of three-fourths of
adult males consent required to convey tribal lands); Berkey, Implementation of the Indian Reorganiza-
tion Act, 2(8) AM. INDIAN J. 2 (1976) (discussing, in part, the Bureau of Indian Affairs interpretation of
abstaining voters as affirmative votes during tribal elections to reject the implementation of the IRA);
Tullberg, The Creation and Decline of the Hopi Tribal Council, in RETHINKING INDIAN LAW 29, 35
(Nat'l Law. Guild ed. 1982) ("Despite the preponderant sentiment against the constitution... accept-
ance by less than 15 per cent of the Hopis was enough to warrant adoption of the constitution .... ");
Barsh, supra note 19, at 45 (detailing the IRA election mockery on the Santa Ysabel Reservation in
California). See also generally Holm, The Crisis in Tribal Government, in AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY
IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 135-54 (V. Deloria ed. 1985) (detailing the present-day conflict between
IRA tribal governments premised on simple majority rule, and traditional Native social concepts of
community consensus).
Since the 1968 revision mandating tribal consent, only one state has taken steps to acquire jurisdic-
tion through its own legislative process. In 1971 the Utah State Legislature adopted a statute "obli-
gat[ing] and bind[ing] itself to assume civil and criminal jurisdiction over Indians and Indian territory,
country and lands...," pending tribal acceptance of state jurisdiction. Brough v. Appawora, 553 P.2d
934, 937 (Utah 1976); UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-36-9 (1986). To date, no tribe in that state has accepted.
See supra note 41.
Several states on their own cognizance, prior to the 1968 federal requirement of tribal consent to
state assumption of jurisdiction, enacted option statutes whereby individual tribes within their borders,
upon tribal resolution or election by tribal members, could subject themselves to full state authority.
See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-1-302 (1980) (tribe must file a resolution by governing body with the
state governor); IDAHO CODE § 67-5102 (1980 & Supp. 1986) ("additional state jurisdiction in criminal
and civil causes... may be extended.., with the consent of the governing body of the tribe"); WASH.
REV. CODE § 37.12.021 (Supp. 1987) (permits "extension of full state authority" upon receipt of tribal
resolution). No tribe in any state has so consented. The continuing effectiveness of these state legisla-
tive provisions is uncertain in light of the present federal procedural requirement for tribal consent by
referendum. 25 U.S.C. § 1322 (1982). See also 25 U.S.C. § 1361 (1982); Kennerly v. District Court,
400 U.S. 423, 428-30 (1971).
44. Pub. L. 284, § 403 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 1323(a) (1982)). See Goldberg, supra note 39, at
506.
Federal criminal jurisdiction was restored in 1970 over the Metlakatla Native Community of
Alaska. Act of Nov. 25, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-523, 84 Stat. 1358. Additionally, several states have
since retroceded partial jurisdiction to the federal government, as for example Nebraska's retrocession
of jurisdiction over the Omaha Reservation, 35 Fed. Reg. 16598 (1970), and later retrocession of crimi-
nal jurisdiction over the Winnebago Reservation, 51 Fed. Reg. 24234 (1986); Wisconsin's retrocession
of jurisdiction over the Menominee Reservation, 41 Fed. Reg. 8516 (1976); Oregon's retrocession of
criminal jurisdiction over the Umatilla Reservation, 46 Fed. Reg. 2195 (198 1), and most recently Wash-
ington's retrocession of criminal jurisdiction over the Colville Reservation, 52 Fed. Reg. 8372 (1987).
Wisconsin's retrocession of jurisdiction over the Menominee Reservation in 1976 was the result of
jurisdictional confusion in Wisconsin after the Menominee Tribe was restored to federal status. As a
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ate nor force retrocession. 45  In all, eleven states
presently assert either full or limited criminal jurisdiction pursuant to
Public Law 280.46
mandatory state under Pub. L. 280, Wisconsin had been granted civil and criminal jurisdiction over all
Indian country in the state. See supra note 40. In 1954, the Menominee Tribe was terminated from
federal status, the former reservation became Menominee County, Wisconsin, and the tribe, its mem-
bers, and its land were subjected to state jurisdiction. Indians-Menominee Reservation-Extension of
Civil and Criminal Laws of Wisconsin, Pub. L. No. 83-661 (1954). See infra note 203 and accompany-
ing text. When the tribe was restored in 1973, Menominee Restoration Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-
197, 87 Stat. 770 (1973) (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 903 et seq. (1982)), its status under Pub. L. 280 was
unclear. The state ended the jurisdictional uncertainty by formally retroceding all jurisdiction to the
federal government. See State v. Webster, 114 Wis. 2d 418, 421-24, 338 N.W.2d 474, 477 (1983).
Subsequently, Congress has avoided this dilemma by specifying jurisdiction in the restoration legisla-
tion. See Klamath Indian Tribe Restoration Act of 1986, 25 U.S.C. § 566e (Supp. IV 1987) (specifying
that the state of Oregon, an initial mandatory state, shall exercise Pub. L. 280 jurisdiction over the
restored Klamath Tribe).
The retrocession process itself also could be fraught with difficulties. In 1969, the Nebraska Legis-
lature passed Legislative Resolution 37, which retroceded all criminal jurisdiction, except for traffic
offenses, over the Omaha and Winnebago Indian reservations. The Secretary of the Interior accepted
jurisdiction only over the Omaha Reservation, and subsequently the Nebraska Legislature in 1971 at-
tempted to rescind its offer of retrocession. The federal court in Nebraska held that the Secretary's
action in accepting jurisdiction only over the Omaha Reservation was valid, stating that Public Law
280 was not intended "to make the Indian a political ping-pong ball between the state and federal
governments." United States v. Brown, 334 F. Supp. 536, 542 (D. Neb. 1971). See also United States v.
Lawrence, 595 F.2d 1149 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 853 (1979) (alleged invalidity of Washington
retrocession of jurisdiction over Suquamish Port Madison Reservation under state law immaterial
where retrocession valid under preemptive federal law).
A curious aspect of the retrocession statute is that, by its express terms, it is available only to states
that assumed jurisdiction pursuant to Public Law 280. 25 .U.S.C. § 1323(a) (1982). As the Supreme
Court recently noted:
[T]he fact that Congress did not provide for retrocession of jurisdiction lawfully assumed
prior to the enactment of Pub.L. 280 or of jurisdiction assumed after 1968 cannot be attrib-
uted to mere oversight or inadvertence. Since Congress was motivated by a desire to shield
the Indians from unwanted extensions of jurisdiction over them, there was no need to pro-
vide for retrocession in those circumstances because the previously assumed jurisdiction
over Indian country was only lawful to the extent that it was consistent with Indian tribal
sovereignty and self-government, see, e.g., Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 79 S.Ct. 269, 3
L.Ed.2d 251 (1959), and the jurisdiction assumed after 1968 could be secured only upon the
receipt of tribal consent.
Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation v. Wold Eng'g, 106 S. Ct. 2305, 2311 (1986).
While the Court's statement that state jurisdiction assumed prior to Pub. L. 280 invariably was consis-
tent with tribal sovcreignty appears more than a little disingenuous, no mechanism does seem to exist
for retrocession of state jurisdiction assumed other than pursuant to Public Law 280. See infra note 50.
45. Criminal Jurisdiction, supra note 24, at 238; Goldberg, supra note 39, at 559. Despite the
arguably discriminatory effect of federal law in failing to provide a mechanism for tribal initiation of
retrocession, some states do provide for such a procedure by state law. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 2-1-306 (1987)(tribe that previously consented to state jurisdiction may withdraw consent by appro-
priate tribal resolution within two years of state assumption of jurisdiction); N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-
19-12 (Supp. V 1987) (provision for withdrawal of state civil jurisdiction); WASH. REV. CODE
§ 37.12.100 (Supp. 1987) (authorizing a procedure for the retrocession of selected criminal jurisdiction
over the Colville Confederated Tribes). In the case of Washington, criminal jurisdiction over the Col-
ville Reservation was retroceded to the federal government in 1987. See supra note 44.
46. The states are Alaska, California, Florida, Idaho, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada,
Oregon, Washington, and Wisconsin. See supra notes 40-41. In addition, Texas now exercises jurisdic-
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The criminal jurisdiction granted to the states by Public Law 280
is coextensive with the criminal jurisdiction the state exercises else-
where within its borders.a7 Thus, the exercise of state jurisdiction in a
tion over two Native reservations pursuant to a hybrid of a tribal restoration act and Pub. L. 280 as
amended by the Indian Civil Rights Act. See supra note 43. Four additional states, pursuant to special
congressional grants of jurisdiction prior to the enactment of Pub. L. 280, maintain at least partial
criminal jurisdiction over reservations within their borders. See infra note 50.
For a relatively recent listing of the states and the extent of their Public Law 280 jurisdiction, see
Jurisdiction on Indian Reservations: Hearings before the Select Comm. on Indian Affairs on S. 1181, S.
1722 and S. 2832, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 29-35 (1980). A more dated compilation of criminal jurisdic-
tion asserted by states, under Public Law 280 or other authority, can be found in Clinton, supra note
14, at 577-83.
47. Public Law 280 provides, with regard to criminal jurisdiction:
Each of the States or Territories shall.., have jurisdiction over offenses committed by
or against Indians in the areas of Indian country listed opposite the name of the State or
Territory to the same extent that such State or Territory has jurisdiction over offenses com-
mitted elsewhere within the State or Territory, and the criminal laws of such State or Terri-
tory shall have the same force and effect within such Indian country as they have elsewhere
within the State or Territory.
18 U.S.C. § 1162(a) (1982). While the statute expressly accords criminal jurisdiction to the state, the
statutory language does not grant to the state exclusive criminal jurisdiction over Natives. Confeder-
ated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation v. Beck, 6 Indian L. Rep. (Am. Indian Law. Training
Program) F-8 (E.D. Wash. 1978) (concurrent criminal jurisdiction); State v. Michael, Ill Idaho 930,
933 n.1, 729 P.2d 405, 408 n.1 (1986) (tribal court may have concurrent jurisdiction with state on Pub.
L. 280 reservation). Public Law 280 granted to the states only so much jurisdiction as the federal
government previously asserted over Natives.
State criminal and civil jurisdiction pursuant to Public Law 280 is limited expressly with regard to
treaty hunting and fishing rights. The statute provides that:
Nothing in this section . . . shall deprive any Indian or any Indian tribe, band, or
community of any right, privilege, or immunity afforded under Federal treaty, agreement,
or statute with respect to hunting, trapping, or fishing or the control, licensing, or regula-
tion thereof.
18 U.S.C. § 1162(b) (1982) (criminal); 28 U.S.C. § 1360(b) (1982) (civil). Outside reservation bounda-
ries, states have the authority to regulate treaty usufructuary rights, but only for the narrowly defined
purposes of conservation, and perhaps safety. See supra note 15. Within reservation borders, however,
a Native nation exercises exclusive jurisdiction over usufructuary activities by its members, subject only
to state regulation in "exceptional circumstances.." New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S.
324, 331-32 (1983). The only exceptional circumstance recognized thus far by the Supreme Court
occurred in Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. Washington Dep't of Game, 433 U.S. 165, 173-77 (1977), which
held that the state had jurisdiction to regulate treaty fishing within reservation borders for the purpose
of conservation. As the Court noted in Mescalero, however, the treaty in Puyallup granted "in com-
mon" rights to non-Natives, the reservation lands in question no longer belonged to the tribe, and the
resource was both scarce and migratory, thus conferring a particularly strong regulatory interest in the
state. 462 U.S. at 332 n.15 and 342. See also State v. Billie, 497 So.2d 889, 895 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1986), review denied, 506 So.2d 1040 (Fla. 1987) (state may prosecute Seminole for on-reservation
hunting of animal protected by state endangered species law, in part because purpose of the state law
was preservation of the species). It is likely, then, that under Pub. L. 280, a state would be permitted at
a maximum to enforce against on-reservation treaty hunters and fishers only those provisions of its
criminal laws that comported with the narrow purposes for which the state may regulate treaty usu-
fructuary fights.
Another area of uncertainty in Pub. L. 280 jurisdiction is whether county or municipal criminal
ordinances fall within the Pub. L. 280 delegation of jurisdiction over "the criminal laws of the State."
It is likely that they do not. See, e.g., California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 107 S. Ct. 1083,
1089-90 n.I 1 (1987) ("We note initially that it is doubtful that Pub. L. 280 authorizes the application of
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Public Law 280 state extends to all persons, Native and non-Native
alike, and is exclusive of federal criminal authority for all non-federal
crimes. As a result of this parity with off-reservation jurisdiction, it
has been argued that not only state courts, but state police as well,
have jurisdiction within reservation boundaries.4 8  Furthermore, law
enforcement officers with jurisdiction in the county in which a reserva-
tion is located may have full criminal authority on reservation lands
within that county.49 Absent a grant of jurisdiction under Public Law
280 or other enabling legislation,5 ° however, neither state courts nor
any local laws to Indian reservations."); Segundo v. City of Rancho Mirage, 813 F.2d 1387, 1390 (9th
Cir. 1987) ("P.L. 280 subjected Indian Country to only the civil laws of the state, and not to local
regulation."); Santa Rosa Band of Indians v. Kings County, 532 F.2d 655, 661 (9th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 1038 (1977) (local land use regulations do not constitute "civil laws of [the] state"
because such local ordinances are not of "statewide application"). Accord Bryan v. Itasca County, 426
U.S. 373, 377 (1976) (no "authority in ... county to levy a personal property tax" upon reservation
Native's property); United States v. County of Humboldt, 615 F.2d 1260 (9th Cir. 1980). But cf
County of Vilas v. Chapman, 122 Wis. 2d 211, 361 N.W.2d 699 (1985). The authors are unaware of
any court decision fully determinative of this issue in the criminal context.
48. State law enforcement agencies "have complete authority over any ... reservation to which
complete or substantial criminal jurisdiction has been transferred to the state by congressional act."
Clinton, supra note 14, at 574.
49. See, e.g., State v. Folstrom, 331 N.W.2d 231, 232 (Minn. 1983) (upheld arrest of Ojibwa by
deputy county sheriff for possession of weapon without a state permit on tribal trust land in a Pub. L.
280 state); County of Vilas v. Chapman, 122 Wis. 2d 211, 213, 361 N.W.2d 699, 701 (1985) (county had
"jurisdiction to enforce a noncriminal traffic ordinance against an enrolled [Ojibwa] member... for an
offense which occurred on a public highway within the boundaries of [a Pub. L. 280] reservation").
50. While Pub. L. 280 was the first federal statute to attempt an omnibus transfer of criminal
jurisdiction to states, Congress previously had enacted special jurisdictional statutes granting criminal
jurisdiction over selected Native reservations to five states: Act of July 2, 1948, ch. 809, 62 Stat. 1224
(codified at 25 U.S.C. § 232 (1982)) (granting criminal jurisdiction over all reservations in New York to
the state); Act of October 5, 1949, ch. 604, 63 Stat. 705 (granting jurisdiction over the Agua Caliente
Reservation to California); Act of June 30, 1948, ch. 759, 62 Stat. 1161 (granting criminal jurisdiction
over Sac & Fox Reservation to Iowa); Act of June 8, 1940, ch. 276, 54 Stat. 249 (codified as amended at
18 U.S.C. § 3243 (1982)) (granting criminal jurisdiction to Kansas); Act of May 31, 1946, ch. 279, 60
Stat. 229 (granting criminal jurisdiction over Devil's Lake Reservation to North Dakota). For a discus-
sion of these statutes, see HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 38, at 373-76. See also the
Ysleta del Sur Pueblo and Alabama and Coushatta Indian Tribes of Texas Restoration Act, Pub. L.
No. 100-89, 101 Stat. 666 (1987), supra note 43, which grants to Texas full criminal jurisdiction within
the boundaries of the federal reservations reestablished by the Act.
At least one state, North Carolina, purports to exercise criminal jurisdiction over a Native tribe
pursuant to treaty. In re McCoy, 233 F. Supp. 409, 412 (E.D.N.C. 1964) ("Since the treaty of New
Echota of 1835, 7 Stat. 478, the State of North Carolina has exercised jurisdiction over criminal offenses
committed by Indiana [sic] on the Cherokee Indian reservation" in that state.). See also Wildcatt v.
Smith, 69 N.C. App. 1, 7, 10 n.16, 316 S.E.2d 870, 875, 877 n.16, appeal denied, 312 N.C. 90, 321
S.E.2d 909 (1984) (state jurisdiction obtained pursuant to Treaty of New Echota was not divested by
passage of Pub. L. 280, Pub. L. 284, or any other action of Congress).
Traditionally the Supreme Court has held that Pub. L. 280 and Pub. L. 284 constitute the sole and
exclusive means by which a state could obtain jurisdiction over Native reservations within the state's
borders. Fisher v. District Court, 424 U.S. 382, 390 (1976); Kennerly v. District Court, 400 U.S. 423,
427 (1971). See also United States v. John, 437 U.S. 634, 653-54 (1978). More recently, however, Pub.
L. 280 has been relegated by the Court to representing merely "the primary expression of federal policy
governing the assumption by States of civil and criminal jurisdiction over the Indian Nations." Three
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state law enforcement officers have jurisdiction within the reservation
over crimes involving Native Americans.5"
Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation v. Wold Eng'g, 106 S. Ct. 2305, 2310 (1986) (Three
Affiliated Tribes II). In an earlier incarnation of the same case, the Court noted that prior lawfully
assumed state jurisdiction over civil cases brought by Native plaintiffs against non-Native defendants
survived the passage of Pub. L. 280. "Nothing in the language or legislative history of Pub. L. 280
indicates that it was meant to divest States of pre-existing and otherwise lawfully assumed jurisdiction."
Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation v. Wold Eng'g, 467 U.S. 138, 150 (1984)
(Three Affiliated Tribes 1).
This "residuary jurisdiction" appears to have its roots in State ex rel. Iron Bear v. District Court,
162 Mont. 335, 342-43, 512 P.2d 1292, 1297 (1973), which found that the Assiniboine-Sioux Tribes of
the Fort Peck Reservation, in 1938, had ceded to the Montana state courts jurisdiction over the mar-
riages and divorces of its members, and that the continued exercise of that jurisdiction by the state
courts did not interfere with tribal self-government. The residuary jurisdiction doctrine seems to indi-
cate then that the passage of Pub. L. 280 was not meant to eliminate all state jurisdiction acquired
outside the provisions of that Act. As the Court noted in Three Affiliated Tribes II: "Pub. L. 280
neither required nor authorized North Dakota to disclaim the jurisdiction it had lawfully exercised over
the claims of Indian plaintiffs against non-Indian defendants prior to the enactment of Pub. L. 280."
106 S. Ct. at 2308-09. The 1984 Court cautioned, however, that the exercise of such jurisdiction prior
to and apart from Pub. L. 280 would be improper where it "cannot be squared with principles of tribal
autonomy." Three Affiliated Tribes I, 467 U.S. at 148 (citations omitted). For example, the Court
stated, jurisdiction "over claims by non-Indians against Indians or over claims between Indi-
ans... [would] intrude impermissibly on tribal self governance." Id. Nonetheless, the Court held that:
As a general matter, tribal self-government is not impeded when a State allows an Indian to
enter its courts on equal terms with other persons to seek relief against a non-Indian con-
cerning a claim arising in Indian country. The exercise of state jurisdiction is particularly
compatible with tribal autonomy when, as here, the suit is brought by the tribe itself and
the tribal court lacked jurisdiction over the claim at the time the suit was instituted.
Id. at 148-49.
51. This is true even for patented fee lands within a Native reservation. In Seymour v. Superin-
tendent of Washington State Penitentiary, 368 U.S. 351 (1962), the Supreme Court reviewed the denial
of a writ of habeas corpus sought by a Native resident of a reservation following his conviction for
burglary. In holding that the Washington courts had no jurisdiction, the Court disposed of the state's
argument that jurisdiction existed because the crime was committed on land within the reservation held
under a patent in fee by a non-Native:
This contention is not entirely implausible on its face and, indeed, at one time had the
support of distinguished commentators on Indian law. But the issue has since been
squarely put to rest by congressional enactment of the currently prevailing definition of
Indian country in [18 U.S.C.] § 1151 to include "all land within the limits of any Indian
reservation under the jurisdiction of the [U.S.] Government, notwithstanding the issuance
of any patent ......
Id. at 357-58 (footnote omitted). The Court noted further the deleterious effects of "checkerboarding"
- a euphemism for geographic jurisdiction according to ownership of parcels of land within the reser-
vation - upon law enforcement on the reservation:
[L]aw enforcement officers operating in the area will find it necessary to search tract books
in order to determine whether criminal jurisdiction over each particular offense, even
though committed within the reservation, is in the State or Federal Government. Such an
impractical pattern of checkerboard jurisdiction was avoided by the plain language of
§ 1151 and . . . [would only serve] to recreate confusion Congress specifically sought to
avoid.
Id. at 358 (footnote omitted). Thus, once a block of land is withdrawn as a Native reservation, the
entire block, including individual plots patented in fee to non-Natives, retains its status as "Indian
country" until Congress explicitly indicates otherwise. See also Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463 (1984);
United States v. Celestine, 215 U.S. 278 (1909). Cf. Washington v. Confederated Bands and Tribes of
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b. Non-Public Law 280 Reservations
Where the federal government has not granted criminal jurisdic-
tion to the state pursuant to Public Law 280 or similar enabling legis-
lation, state jurisdiction within reservation boundaries is extremely
limited. On non-Public Law 280 reservations, the state has no juris-
diction over crimes committed by Natives or against Natives.52 Of-
fenses committed by Natives are punishable by the tribe, or by the
the Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U.S. 463 (1979) (upholding Washington's assumption of checkerboard
Pub. L. 280 jurisdiction over fee lands within the reservation as not antithetical to law enforcement);
DeCoteau v. District County Court, 420 U.S. 425 (1975)(upholding extension of state criminal jurisdic-
tion to non-Native lands within a reservation where tribe expressly had ceded and relinquished "all
claim, right, title and interest" in unallotted lands). See generally Comment, Criminal Jurisdiction over
Non-Trust Lands within the Limits of Indian Reservations, 9 WILLAME-TE L. REv. 288 (1973); The
Legal Trail of Tears, supra note 22, at 253.
Checkerboarding poses interesting problems in the context of fresh pursuit. Where checkerboard
criminal jurisdiction has been upheld, precise geographical data may take precedence in determining
the legality of an on-reservation fresh pursuit arrest. Whether state jurisdiction was present at the point
where the pursuit crossed the tribal-state border, during the entire course of the pursuit, or at the point
where the arrest occurred - and which of these factors would implicate the legality of the arrest -
could complicate the fresh pursuit analysis unnecessarily and obscure the central issue of sovereign
territorial integrity. Notwithstanding the Court's acceptance of Washington's Pub. L. 280 checker-
board jurisdiction, the earlier caution of the Court in Seymour that checkerboard jurisdiction is not
only impractical but contrary to principles of Native law appears particularly apt in the area of fresh
pursuit.
52. United States v. John, 437 U.S. 634 (1978) (Major Crimes Act precludes concurrent state
criminal jurisdiction over Native defendant); DeCoteau v. District County Court, 420 U.S. 425, 427 n.2
(1975) (in a non-Public Law 280 state, jurisdiction within reservation borders "is in the tribe and the
Federal Government"); Williams v. United States, 327 U.S. 711, 714 (1946) ("the laws and courts of
the United States, rather than those of Arizona, have jurisdiction over offenses committed there [on the
reservation], as in this case, by one who is not an Indian against one who is an Indian"); Donnelly v.
United States, 228 U.S. 243, 271-72 (1913) ("offenses committed by or against Indians are not within
the principle of the McBratney and Draper Cases" [see discussion supra notes 36 and 37 and accompa-
nying text] which extended state jurisdiction to on-reservation crimes by non-Natives against other
non-Natives).
Notwithstanding the jurisdictional strictures of Donnelly and Williams, the U.S. Department of
Justice recently has taken the position that for crimes by a non-Native against a Native within reserva-
tion borders, state criminal jurisdiction is concurrent with that of the federal government. See Reserva-
tion Special Magistrate, supra note 16, at 19-20 (exchange of views between Mark M. Richard, Dep.
Ass't Att'y Gen., Criminal Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice, and Sen. Melcher). The Department based its
view on "our analysis of 18 U.S.C. 1152 [the General Crimes Act] and 1153 [the Major Crimes Act]
and the Assimilative Crimes Act [18 U.S.C. § 13]." Id. at 19. While the Department's "analysis" of
these statutes is not provided, it is necessarily false. The Major Crimes Act does not reach non-Native
defendants, but is applicable only to Native defendants, and operates to the exclusion of state court
jurisdiction. United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886). The General Crimes Act extends federal
jurisdiction over crimes between Natives and non-Natives, and has been held also to extend the Assimi-
lative Crimes Act to Indian country. See infra note 53. The Assimilative Crimes Act essentially incor-
porates definitions of lesser state crimes into the federal code. Air Terminal Serv. v. Rentzel, 81 F.
Supp. 611, 612 (E.D. Va. 1949) (Assimilative Crimes Act was intended "to fill in gaps in the Federal
Criminal Code"). Neither the General nor the Assimilative Crimes Act confers upon the states express
or implied jurisdiction over Native reservations. These acts, rather, empower only the federal courts to
prosecute non-Natives who commit crimes against Natives within reservation borders. See Williams,
327 U.S. at 714 n.10. Accord Clinton, supra note 14, at 523 n.94 ("The prevailing rule today is that the
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federal government acting under specific statutory authority, or
both. 3 Criminal acts committed by non-Natives against Natives are
federal jurisdiction conferred by [the General and Major Crimes Acts] is exclusive; where one of these
sections applies, the state has no jurisdiction.") (citations omitted).
53. United States v. John, 437 U.S. 634, 654 (1978); DeCoteau v. District County Court, 420 U.S.
425, 427 n.2 (1975). As to crimes committed by Natives, the Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1153(a)
(Supp. IV 1986), provides in part that: "Any Indian who commits against the person or property of
another Indian or other person any of the following offenses ... shall be subject to the same law and
penalties as all other persons committing any of the above offenses, within the exclusive jurisdiction of
the United States." See supra note 28 for a brief discussion of possible tribal-federal concurrent crimi-
nal jurisdiction under the Major Crimes Act.
While federal grand juries can indict under the Act only for the crimes specified, juries can be
instructed on lesser-included offenses not enumerated in the Act. Keeble v. United States, 412 U.S.
205, 212 (1973) (concluding that Congress hardly "intended to disqualify Indians from the benefits of a
lesser offense instruction, when those benefits are made available to any non-Indian charged with the
same offense"); United States v. Bowman, 679 F.2d 798 (9th Cir. 1982) (discussing at length the appar-
ent conflict between thus extending the scope of the Act and simultaneously retaining its "limited
intrusion" into inherent tribal sovereignty). At least four federal circuit courts have construed the
Keeble holding on jury instructions to extend to the power to convict and sentence for the lesser-
included offense. Bowman, 679 F.2d at 799; United States v. Pino, 606 F.2d 908 (10th Cir. 1979);
United States v. John, 587 F.2d 683 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 925 (1980); Felicia v. United
States, 495 F.2d 353 (8th Cir. 1974). Cf United States v. Welch, 822 F.2d 460, 464 (4th Cir. 1987)
("When there is a crime by an Indian against another Indian within Indian country only those offenses
enumerated in the Major Crimes Act may be tried in the federal courts."). For suggested analyses of
the reach of Keeble, see Vollman, Criminal Jurisdiction in Indian Country: Tribal Sovereignty and De-
fendants' Rights in Conflict, 22 U. KAN. L. REV. 387, 400-02 (1974); McGoldrick, Criminal Jurisdic-
tion: Jurisdiction to Sentence and Convict for Lesser Included Offenses under the Major Crimes Act: A
Critical Assessment of the Keeble Legacy, 12 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 219 (1984).
A companion statute to the Major Crimes Act, the General Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (1982),
confers federal jurisdiction also over "lesser" crimes occurring within reservation boundaries. The
"general federal laws" which the statute "extends to the Indian Country" are those laws, commonly
known as federal enclave laws, governing federal properties such as national parks and forests. See
United States v. White, 508 F.2d 453, 454-55 (8th Cir. 1974). The statute operates to extend a body of
federal laws, including the Assimilative Crimes Act, to Indian country. Williams v. United States, 327
U.S. 711 (1946). The Assimilative Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 13 (1982), incorporates state law for the
definition of some offenses in the General Crimes Act. For criticism of the Court's application of the
Assimilative Crimes Act to Native reservations, see HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note
38, at 290-91, 293 n.95; Clinton, supra note 14, at 532. See also Pueblo of Santa Ana v. Hodel, 663 F.
Supp. 1300, 1310 n.14 (D.D.C. 1987) (hinting that a future and more incisive Supreme Court review
could find the Act inapplicable to Indian country).
The application of both the General Crimes Act and the Assimilative Crimes Act within Indian
country, however, is significantly limited. Neither act reaches crimes committed by one Native against
another Native in Indian country. 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (1982) (General Crimes Act "shall not extend to
offenses committed by one Indian against the person or property of another Indian, nor to any Indian
committing any offense in the Indian country who has been punished by the local law of the tribe...");
Welch, 822 F.2d at 463 (inapplicability of Assimilative Crimes Act). Nor do the acts reach offenses by
a non-Native against another non-Native that are controlled by the McBratney rule. See supra note 37
and accompanying text.
Despite the apparent clarity of the statutory limitations, there is disagreement among the federal
courts concerning the exclusivity of tribal court jurisdiction under the General Crimes Act. The con-
troversy stems from an initial dictum in United States v. Quiver, 241 U.S. 602 (1916), suggesting that
tribal court jurisdiction might be exclusive over "lesser" crimes not expressly set out in the Major
Crimes Act. The Court noted that the enumeration of certain offenses in the Major Crimes Act as
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within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts. As discussed
previously, however, states have been granted authority over all crimes
committed by one non-Native against another non-Native, even on
reservations not otherwise subject to state jurisdiction. 4 There is
some indication also that states may have jurisdiction on the reserva-
tion over victimless crimes, such as state traffic or fish and game viola-
tions, committed by non-Natives."
applicable to Natives on reservations "carries with it some implication of a purpose to exclude others."
Id. at 606.
More recently, a unanimous Supreme Court observed that "[e]xcept for the offenses enumerated in
the Major Crimes Act, all crimes committed by enrolled Indians against other Indians within Indian
country are subject to the jurisdiction of tribal courts." United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641, 643
n.2 (1977). See also Keeble, 412 U.S. at 209-10 (reaffirming the Crow Dog reasoning that in the absence
of express congressional enactment, Native tribes retained exclusive jurisdiction to punish a crime of
murder between Natives).
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals apparently has interpreted the Antelope footnote as positing
exclusive "lesser" crime jurisdiction in the tribe. See United States v. Johnson, 637 F.2d 1224, 1231
(9th Cir. 1980). The Seventh, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits, on the other hand, have rejected the view
that the tribal jurisdiction referred to is exclusive. See United States v. Smith, 562 F.2d 453, 457-58
(7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1072 (1978); United States v. Blue, 722 F.2d 383, 386 (8th Cir.
1983); United States v. Cowboy, 694 F.2d 1228, 1235 (10th Cir. 1982).
For a discussion of the parameters of asserted federal criminal jurisdiction within reservation
boundaries, as well as the historical and statutory underpinnings, see Clinton, supra note 14, at 505-52;
Criminal Jurisdiction, supra note 24, at 226-34.
54. See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
55. See, e.g., State v. Warner, 71 N.M. 418, 379 P.2d 66 (1963), in which a non-Native was
charged with driving under the influence, a criminal offense, within the boundaries of the Navajo Reser-
vation. The court concluded that state jurisdiction over a crime committed by a non-Native where no
Native person or property was involved-in other words, a victimless crime-would not infringe upon
tribal sovereignty. Essentially, the court merely extended the McBratney rule, see supra notes 36-37,
that crimes on Native lands involving only non-Natives are exclusively within the state's jurisdiction to
prosecute. "[W]e conclude that the New Mexico State Courts have jurisdiction over criminal offenses
committed on an Indian reservation within this state, by non-Indians, which are not against an Indian
nor involving Indian property." Id. at 422, 379 P.2d at 68-69. The Supreme Court has concurred in
dicta. Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463, 465 n.2 (1984) (absent a grant of jurisdiction, "state jurisdiction
is limited to crimes by non-Indians against non-Indians .... and victimless crimes by non-Indians.")
(citations omitted). See also Enforcement Problems, supra note 22, at 303-06; Memorandum for Benja-
min R. Civiletti, Dep. Att'y Gen., "Jurisdiction over 'Victimless' Crimes Committed by Non-Indians
on Indian Reservations," reprinted in 6 Indian L. Rep. (Am. Indian Law. Training Program) K-15
(1979)(contending that states have exclusive jurisdiction over victimless crimes, including most traffic
offenses, committed by non-Natives in Indian country); Reservation Special Magistrate, supra note 16,
at 14-15 (statement of Mark M. Richard, Dep. Ass't Att'y Gen., Criminal Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice)
(positing that state jurisdiction is exclusive over victimless crimes committed by non-Natives "unless
the crime poses a direct threat to individual Indian or tribal interests").
The Wisconsin Supreme Court also has implied as much in a case concerning jurisdiction over
traffic offenses on public roads within reservation borders: "It was noted at oral argument that Me-
nominee tribal police patrol the roads on the Menominee Reservation but regulate only Indians." State
v. Webster, 114 Wis. 2d 418, 434-35, 338 N.W.2d 474, 482 (1983). See also State v. Burrola, 137 Ariz.
181, 183, 669 P.2d 614, 616 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983) (state had jurisdiction to try non-Native arrested on
reservation by tribal police officer for victimless offense of possession of deadly weapon); Ryder v. State,
98 N.M. 316, 318, 648 P.2d 774, 776 (1982) (state had jurisdiction to try non-Native arrested on reser-
vation for possession of marijuana). See also State v. Herber, 123 Ariz. 214, 216, 598 P.2d 1033, 1035
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3. Summary
Native tribes have jurisdiction, including jurisdiction to prosecute
crimes, over their members within reservation boundaries; the sen-
tencing power of tribal courts, however, is limited by federal statute.
This tribal jurisdiction, based on inherent sovereign powers, is unaf-
fected by any arrogation of criminal jurisdiction by other sovereigns.
Tribes also may possess a degree of criminal jurisdiction over their
members off the reservation, at least in the area of treaty-based fishing
and hunting regulation. Under domestic law, however, there remains
no inherent tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-Natives even for
crimes committed on the reservation against the tribe or its members.
States exercise criminal jurisdiction on Native reservations within
the state borders only where such jurisdiction has been assumed under
Public Law 280 or other jurisdictional statute. In the absence of such
a specific grant of jurisdiction, states have criminal authority within
reservation boundaries only as to crimes exclusively between non-Na-
tives. Where the states have not been granted criminal jurisdiction,
the federal courts retain jurisdiction over all offenses between Natives
and non-Natives, and over those Native-committed crimes enumer-
ated under federal law.
C. On-Reservation Arrest for Off-Reservation Crime
The foregoing discussion of general criminal jurisdiction,
although important to an understanding of the fresh pursuit issue,
concerns solely the power of each sovereign to exercise its authority in
the jurisdiction where the offense occurs. By contrast, fresh pursuit
involves the exercise of authority by law enforcement officers in a for-
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1979), which affirmed the conviction of a non-Native, who was pursued onto the reser-
vation by state officers and arrested for possession of marijuana for sale, apparently on the ground that
Arizona had jurisdiction to prosecute non-Natives for on-reservation crimes against non-Natives. The
import of the reasoning, as in Warner, is apparently that victimless crimes committed by non-Natives
will be treated by the state as the equivalent of crimes committed against non-Natives.
Criminal violations of state fish and game codes by non-Natives in Indian country fall within the
definition of victimless crimes, but jurisdiction over such crimes may be dependent upon the unwieldy
system of jurisdiction based on land tenure developed primarily in the context of civil regulatory au-
thority. Compare Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 566 (1981) (Crow Tribe may not regulate
hunting and fishing by non-Natives on non-Native fee land within the reservation) with New Mexico v.
Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 343-44 (1983) (tribal regulations preempt application of state
game laws to non-Native hunting and fishing on tribal and trust lands within the reservation). The
Court in Mescalero noted that any enforcement vacuum created by Oliphant (see discussion supra note
21 and accompanying text), to the effect that the tribe cannot employ criminal penalties against non-
Natives, would be filled by federal enforcement of the federal trespass statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1165 (1982),
and the Lacey Act of 1981, 16 U.S.C. §§ 3371 et seq. (1982). Mescalero, 462 U.S. at 342 n.27. To date,
it does not appear that this checkerboard jurisdiction over hunting and fishing offenses has been applied
to other types of victimless crimes committed by non-Natives within reservation borders.
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eign jurisdiction. The next step, therefore, is to examine, against the
backdrop of general criminal jurisdiction, judicial reaction to attempts
by state officers to make arrests within reservation boundaries where
fresh pursuit is not involved.
1. General Arrest Authority
On reservations subject to Public Law 280 or other grants of state
jurisdiction, state officers effecting arrests within reservation bounda-
ries are not operating in a de jure foreign jurisdiction. Because these
law enforcement officers have been accorded full criminal authority
over persons on the reservation, 56 an on-reservation arrest for an off-
reservation crime is valid whether the suspect is a Native American or
not. The criminal jurisdiction granted by Public Law 280 and other
enabling statutes renders such an arrest no different from an arrest by
a county sheriff in one part of the county for an offense committed in
another part of the same county. Hence, reservation boundaries in a
Public Law 280 state, in essence, are non-existent for criminal jurisdic-
tion purposes. In this limited sense, Public Law 280 operates as an
abrogation of a tribe's sovereign power to control criminal justice ad-
ministration within its territory. Because arrests by state law enforce-
ment officers on Public Law 280 reservations do not implicate cross-
jurisdictional concerns, the remainder of this discussion is addressed
solely to reservations on which the state exercises only the limited
criminal jurisdiction permitted under the McBratney rule.57
Even on reservations not subject to Public Law 280, state police
arrests for off-reservation offenses have been held to be valid. As one
commentator has observed, the identity of the suspect as Native or
non-Native has not been decisive.58 The smattering of authority, to
date, has focused rather upon whether state law enforcement officers
have "the authority to enter a reservation over which the state has no
criminal jurisdiction to arrest an Indian for a misdeed done off the
reservation without first securing the permission of tribal officials to
arrest the offender or otherwise recognizing any interest of the tribal
56. See supra notes 47-50 and accompanying text.
57. See supra notes 36-37.
58. Arrest on the Reservation, supra note 20, at 431-32. With one exception, the few cases ad-
dressing this issue concern on-reservation arrests of Native suspects. See infra note 60. The exception
was the pursuit by state officers across reservation borders and the capture and arrest of a non-Native
suspect on the charge of possession of marijuana for sale. State v. Herber, 123 Ariz. 214, 598 P.2d 1033
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1979). The Arizona court, in affirming the conviction, apparently premised state juris-
diction to make the arrest on the doctrine that even on the reservation, state jurisdiction extends over
crimes between non-Natives. Id. at 216, 598 P.2d at 1035. It is clear, in any case, that where an on-
reservation arrest of a tribal member for an off-reservation crime would be valid, so also would a similar
arrest of a non-Native.
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government in the matter."59 The answer uniformly has been yes.
There appear to be only four relevant authorities, none of them
definitive: three state court decisions and an opinion of the Solicitor of
the Department of the Interior. 6 In the earliest of these authorities,
the Interior Solicitor advised that a county sheriff's arrest of a grand
larceny suspect on the reservation was authorized despite the lack of
state criminal jurisdiction within the reservation boundaries.6 One
year later, the North Dakota Supreme Court, although apparently un-
aware of the Solicitor's opinion, reached the same conclusion regard-
ing an on-reservation felony arrest.62 Both analyses were grounded in
the concept that Native reservations are not extraterritorial to the
states in which they are located.63
The North Dakota court termed the power to arrest for off-reser-
vation offenses "fundamental to the preservation of the state," asking
rhetorically whether the state's failure to assume Public Law 280 juris-
diction should deprive it of its sovereign power to enforce its laws
outside reservation boundaries.' The court framed the issue before it
as: "whether the state courts will be able to be effective in performing
their function, or whether they will become helpless when an offense is
committed off the reservation by an Indian who escapes to the reserva-
tion before he is apprehended." 65 Having stated the question in these
terms, the court readily concluded that the arrest did not infringe
upon tribal sovereignty, nor impair a right granted or reserved to Na-
tive Americans by federal law.66
59. Arrest on the Reservation, supra note 20, at 432. The discussion in this section concerns the
validity of on-reservation arrests where no extradition procedures exist. The validity of arrests not in
compliance with tribal extradition laws is addressed in the next section.
60. In re Little Light, 183 Mont. 52, 598 P.2d 572 (1979); State ex rel. Old Elk v. District Court,
170 Mont. 208, 552 P.2d 1394, appeal dismissed, 429 U.S. 1030 (1976); Fournier v. Roed, 161 N.W.2d
458 (N.D. 1968); Op. Sol. Dep't of Interior M-36717 (1967).
In a fifth case, the court denied habeas corpus relief to a Montana parole violator who was arrested
for an unrelated offense on a South Dakota reservation, surrendered to Montana authorities by the
tribal police, and returned to Montana. High Pine v. Montana, 439 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1971). The
case is not discussed in this section because the court's decision was premised solely on the Ker-Frisbie
rule (see infra section II.C.3.), and contained no Native law analysis.
61. Op. Sol. Dep't of Interior M-36717 (1967).
62. Fournier v. Roed, 161 N.W.2d 458 (N.D. 1968). Both Fournier and the Solicitor's Opinion
are criticized in Arrest on the Reservation, supra note 20.
63. Arrest on the Reservation, supra note 20, at 432.
64. Fournier, 161 N.W.2d at 465.
65. Id. The tone of the court's presentation of its analysis has been called "emotional." Arrest on
the Reservation, supra note 20, at 432.
66. Fournier, 161 N.W.2d at 467. The court's analysis was based on a test articulated in Organ-
ized Village of Kake v. Egan, 369 U.S. 60, 75 (1962): "even on reservations state laws may be applied to
Indians unless such application would interfere with reservation self-government or impair a right
granted or reserved by federal law." This two-tiered analysis forms the basis of the current test for state
jurisdiction within reservation boundaries, discussed infra in section IV. The Kake test, which appears
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More recently, the issue has been twice addressed by the Supreme
Court of Montana in cases relating to arrests on the Crow Reservation
for felonies committed outside reservation borders.67 In finding that
the arrests did not interfere with tribal sovereignty, 68 the Montana
court stressed the absence of any extradition procedures.69 In the ear-
to begin with a presumption in favor of the legitimacy of state jurisdiction, itself reformulated some-
what the now-classic test from Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959): "Essentially, absent gov-
erning Acts of Congress, the question has always been whether the state action infringed on the right of
reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by them."
67. In re Little Light, 183 Mont. 52, 598 P.2d 572 (1979); State ex rel. Old Elk v. District Court,
170 Mont. 208, 552 P.2d 1394, appeal dismissed, 429 U.S. 1030 (1976).
68. Little Light, 183 Mont. at 55, 598 P.2d at 573; Old Elk, 170 Mont. at 216-17, 552 P.2d at
1398.
69. Little Light, 183 Mont. at 55, 598 P.2d at 573; Old Elk, 170 Mont. at 211, 213-16, 552 P.2d at
1395, 1397-98. The concurring opinion in Fournier also noted the absence of an extradition statute in
the Devils Lake Sioux Tribal Code. 161 N.W.2d at 476 (Knudson, J., concurring).
Extradition has been defined as the formal surrender, based upon a reciprocal arrangement, such
as an extradition agreement, "by one nation to another of an individual accused or convicted of an
offense outside its own territory, and within the territorial jurisdiction of the other, which, being compe-
tent to try and to punish him, demands the surrender." Terlinden v. Ames, 184 U.S. 270, 289 (1902).
See also Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 709 (1893). With the exception of civil law
states, the contemporary world view, and that adopted by the United States, is that in the absence of an
agreement or treaty creating an obligation upon a state to extradite, no such obligation exists in interna-
tional law.
But the principles of international law recognize no right to extradition apart from treaty.
While a government may, if agreeable to its own constitution and laws, voluntarily exercise
the power to surrender a fugitive from justice to the country from which he has fled, and it
has been said that it is under a moral duty to do so..., the legal right to demand his
extradition and the correlative duty to surrender him to the demanding country exist only
when created by treaty.
Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276, 287 (1933). Accord Argento v. Horn, 241 F.2d 258, 259 (6th
Cir. 1957)("While Congress might conceivably have authorized extradition in the absence of a treaty, it
has not done so. The law is clear .. "); I MOORE ON EXTRADITION 21 (1891); RESTATEMENT OF
THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (REVISED) § 476 (Tent. Draft No. 7, April
10, 1986). The United States codified its practice in 1948. See 18 U.S.C. § 3181 (1982) (United States
extradition provisions "shall continue in force only during the existence of any treaty of extradition
with [a] foreign government").
Extradition is solely an international law concept. The domestic equivalent - the right of one
state of the United States to demand, and the duty of another state to surrender, fugitives from justice is
called "rendition." Lascelles v. Georgia, 148 U.S. 537 (1893) ("rendition" and not "extradition" was
the proper term to be used in referring to the arrest and surrender of interstate criminals). See also S.A.
SCOTT, LAW OF INTERSTATE RENDITION: TREATISE ON THE ARREST AND SURRENDER OF FUGI-
TIVES FROM THE JUSTICE OF ONE STATE TO ANOTHER 1-5 (1917) (setting out seven "Fundamental
Points of Difference" between international extradition and interstate rendition).
In keeping with the inherent and separate sovereignty retained by America's Native nations, and
because neither the constitutional nor statutory provisions for interstate rendition apply to Native
tribes, see infra note 79, the term "extradition" will be used in the remainder of this article to refer to
the tribal-state surrender of fugitives. State-to-state surrenders will be referred to properly as "rendi-
tion."
The obligation of arrest and interstate rendition imposed upon the states of the United States is not
limited to certain criminal offenses, as is so frequently the case in international law. Most extradition
treaties enumerate selected offenses for which the countries will grant extradition. See, e.g., Treaty on
Extradition, Jan. 21, 1972, United States-Argentina, art. 2, 23 U.S.T. 3501, T.I.A.S. No. 7510. Other
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lier of the two cases, the court specifically noted that the county sheriff
had requested the tribal judge to issue a court order or arrest warrant,
but that the tribal judge had refused, and in fact had no authority to
apprehend or extradite the suspect on behalf of the state.70  Interest-
ingly, the court then observed in dictum that, had the Crow Tribe
enacted and enforced an extradition law, the arrest may well have
infringed on the tribe's right of self-government."
The uniform conclusion of these authorities, that an on-reserva-
tion arrest for an off-reservation crime does not infringe upon tribal
sovereignty, seems premised primarily on the absence of tribal extradi-
tion procedures. While this procedural shortcoming obviously does
not alter a tribe's sovereignty, it does leave a state that is intent upon
treaties require simply that the extraditable offense be punishable in both the releasing and accepting
countries. See, e.g., Extradition Treaty, May 4, 1978, United States-Mexico, art. 2(3), 31 U.S.T. 5059,
T.I.A.S. No. 9656. Such a proviso is called an "eliminative" provision, because it eliminates from
extradition consideration all offenses not meeting the terms of the stipulation. The more recently rene-
gotiated extradition treaties utilize a combination of enumerative and eliminative provisions. For ex-
ample, the Japanese-American extradition treaty, entered into force in 1980, enumerates 47 offenses
and, in a catch-all provision, includes also any crime punishable by "death, imprisonment, or depriva-
tion of liberty for more than one year" under the laws of either country. See Note, Recent Develop-
ments - Extradition Treaty - United States-Japan Extradition Treaty - Ratified on Dec. 13, 1979, S.
Doc. No. P, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979), 21 HARV. INT'L L.J. 540, 542 (1980). Nearly all treaties have a
bar against extradition for "political offenses." Many agreements additionally exempt the asylum
state's nationals from extradition and may subject them instead to domestic prosecution. See, e.g.,
Extradition Treaty, June 9, 1977, United States-Norway, art. 4, 31 U.S.T. 5619, T.I.A.S. No. 9679.
70. Old Elk, 170 Mont. at 210-11, 216, 552 P.2d at 1395, 1398. It is not clear from the court's
opinion whether the tribal judge was unable or unwilling, or both, to assist the sheriff. Id. at 210-11,
216, 552 P.2d at 1395, 1398.
71. Id. at 214, 552 P.2d at 1397. The court referred to the case of Arizona ex rel. Merrill v.
Turtle, 413 F.2d 683 (9th Cir. 1969), discussed infra at text accompanying notes 75-78 and 80-82,
which held that an arrest on the reservation in violation of the Navajo extradition code infringed on the
right of the tribe to make its own laws and be ruled by them. Id. at 685-86. The Montana court stated
that "the tribe must first have codified and exercised its own extradition laws before the rule in Turtle
would apply." Old Elk, 170 Mont. at 214, 552 P.2d at 1397.
Aside from the perceived necessity for tribal codification, see infra note 73, the concept that arrest
in violation of tribal extradition laws interferes with tribal self-governance parallels the analysis in
many decisions on the scope of state-court jurisdiction. Courts have held that state court jurisdiction
over Natives or activities on Native land infringes on the right of tribal governments, through their
court systems, to make their own laws and be ruled by them. See, e.g., Iowa Mutual Ins. Co. v.
LaPlante, 107 S. Ct. 971, 976 (1987); Fisher v. District Court, 424 U.S. 382 (1976) (tribal court jurisdic-
tion exclusive over adoption proceedings involving only reservation Natives); Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S.
217 (1959) (state court jurisdiction over collection action by non-Native against Native arising out of
on-reservation transaction would infringe on right of self-government); R.J. Williams Co. v. Fort Bel-
knap Housing Authority, 719 F.2d 979 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1016 (1985) (state court
determination of dispute that is within the province of tribal court impinges upon tribal self-govern-
ment); Milbank Mutual Ins. Co. v. Eagleman, 705 P.2d 1117 (Mont. 1985) (state court jurisdiction over
action by non-Native against Native arising out of on-reservation incident would infringe on the tribe's
right to establish forum for suit). Cf. Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation v. Wold
Eng'g, 467 U.S. 138 (1984) (state court jurisdiction over action by Native plaintiff against non-Native
defendant does not interfere with tribal sovereignty).
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prosecuting the off-reservation offender with little self-perceived alter-
native but to seek subsequent arrest on the reservation. Yet there re-
mains in such action the abridgement of fundamental territorial
sovereignty. As one commentator points out, the issue is not the
state's ability to prosecute a particular Native American offender, but
rather the state's authority to interfere with the tribe's control over the
territory and inhabitants of its reservation.72 Nonetheless, the lack of
tribal extradition laws has allowed the courts to focus solely on the
state prosecution issue, rather than on the tribal sovereignty interest,
with uniformly adverse consequences for tribal autonomy and self-
government.73
2. Extradition
Native nations and tribes possess sovereign authority to control
extradition from the reservation, at least as to their members, as a
corollary of the governmental powers to administer justice on and con-
trol entry onto the reservation.74 While the existence of the tribal
72. Arrest on the Reservation, supra note 20, at 440: "What is at stake here is not the avoidance by
an Indian from state prosecution for his offenses committed off the reservation, but rather whether the
state must recognize some degree of sovereignty and control of the tribal government over the reserva-
tion's inhabitants."
73. "[Flailure of the tribes to enact extradition measures might be viewed by some courts as a sign
that tribes are not exercising their internal sovereignty. Once a court makes this determination it logi-
cally can follow that state extradition procedures would, therefore, not infringe on tribal self-govern-
ment." NAT'L AM. INDIAN CT. JUDGES ASS'N, 3 JUSTICE AND THE AMERICAN INDIAN: THE EFFECT
OF HAVING No EXTRADITION PROCEDURES FOR INDIAN RESERVATIONS 28 (1974) [hereinafter cited
as 3 JUSTICE AND THE AMERICAN INDIAN]. It can as easily follow that state arrest powers also do not
infringe on tribal sovereignty. The National American Indian Court Judges Association recommends
for this very reason that tribes adopt extradition laws. "From a practical aspect it is easier for a non-
Indian court or legislator to accept adaptations of their own system codified in other cultural settings
than to acknowledge arguments based on cultural distinctions and sovereignty." Id. at 23.
Not all commentary, however, is in agreement on the expediency or necessity of such tribal action.
The Chief Justice of the Wisconsin Supreme Court articulated the counterpoise in dissent: "The power
to regulate, the right to self-government, must include not only the power to decide to enact laws, but
also the power to decide not to enact laws on that subject." County of Vilas v. Chapman, 122 Wis. 2d
211, 221, 361 N.W.2d 699, 704 (1985) (Heffernan, C.J., dissenting).
74. Davis v. O'Keefe, 283 N.W.2d 73, 75 (N.D. 1979) (tribe has "governmental authority to
prescribe procedures for the orderly extradition to state authorities of tribal members suspected of
violating state law"); "Extradition of Indian Fugitives to Reservations Where Offense Was Commit-
ted," M-31194 (1941), I Op. Sol., supra note 20, at 1066, 1068 ("Indian tribes have complete legal
authority to seek and grant extradition").
Powers of extradition routinely were incorporated into Native treaties. Professors Barsh and Hen-
derson, discussing the Oliphant debacle, counted "[t]wenty-two Indian treaties [that] provide for tribal
extradition of non-Indians accused of crimes under federal law, state law, or both. Two treaties provide
for mutual extradition." See Barsh & Henderson, supra note 22, at 623. Tribal extradition authority
over non-member Natives also has been implied by at least one court. See infra note 77; see also the
inclusive language of the Navajo extradition code, infra note 78. Tribes probably possess the authority
to extradite non-Natives, premised on the inherent tribal power to exclude non-Natives from tribal
lands. New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 333 (1983) ("A tribe's power to exclude
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power to extradite has never been contested, attempts to exercise it
have met with mixed results.
nonmembers entirely or to condition their presence on the reservation is equally well established");
Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 144 (1982) (non-members lawfully entering tribal
lands nonetheless remain "subject to the tribe's power to exclude them"); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S.
(6 Pet.) 515, 561 (1832) (non-Natives allowed to enter Cherokee lands only "with assent of the Cher-
okees themselves"); Hardin v. White Mountain Apache Tribe, 761 F.2d 1285, amended, 779 F.2d 476
(9th Cir. 1985) (upholding decision of tribal court to permanently exclude from reservation a non-
member convicted of violations of tribal code). One method of excluding such persons is by delivering
them to the appropriate off-reservation authorities. Quechan Tribe of Indians v. Rowe, 531 F.2d 408,
411 (9th Cir. 1976); Ortiz-Barraza v. United States, 512 F.2d 1176, 1179 (9th Cir. 1975). See generally,
Dillsaver, Land Use: Exclusion of Non-Indians from Tribal Lands - an Established Right, 4 AM.
INDIAN L. REV. 135 (1976).
While the exclusionary power is an acknowledged inherent attribute of Native sovereignty, that
power also is affirmed in treaties, which may provide express methods for exclusion. See, e.g., Treaty
with the Chickasaw, Sept. 20, 1816, art. 7, 7 Stat. 15 (no more peddlers to be licensed to traffic in the
Chickasaw nation); Treaty with the Cherokee, July 2, 1791, arts. 8-9, 7 Stat. 39 ("nor shall any citizen
or inhabitant [of the United States] go into the Cherokee country, without a passport first obtained").
KAPPLER TREATIES, supra note 21, at 30, 161. See also the preamble to the Navajo Nation resolution
amending subchapter five of chapter five of the law and order code, "Exclusion of Persons from Tribal
Land," which states in part that "[tihis right to exclude non-Navajos is both part of the inherent sover-
eignty of the Navajo Nation as well as recognized in the Treaty of 1868 .. " NAVAJO TRIB. CODE tit.
17, ch. 5, subch. 5 (Supp. 1984-85). Moreover, congressional concern with trespassers on Native lands
was, in part, the impetus for the Trade and Intercourse Act of 1793, as well as its successive enact-
ments. See Act of Mar. 1, 1793, ch. 19, § 5, 1 Stat. 329, 330 (repealed by Act of May 19, 1796); Act of
June 30, 1834, ch. 161, §§ 6, 9, 10, 11, 4 Stat. 730 (repealed in part, 1934) (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 179,
180 (1982)).
But the tribal exclusionary power is not plenary. Native reservations have been held subject to
several arrogated federal powers that require reservation lands to remain "open" for general public
usufructuary easements. For example:
[T]he United States retains a navigational easement in the navigable waters lying within the
described [Crow Reservation] boundaries for the benefit of the public, regardless of who
owns the riverbed. Therefore such phrases in the 1868 treaty as 'absolute and undisturbed
use and occupation' and 'no persons, except those herein designated ... shall ever be per-
mitted,' whatever they seem to mean literally, do not give the Indians the exclusive right to
occupy all the territory within the described boundaries.
Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 555 (1981). See also Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, 397 U.S.
620, 636-37 (1970) (Douglas, J., concurring); Cherokee Nation v. United States, 782 F.2d 871, 879
(10th Cir. 1986), rev'd, 107 S. Ct. 1487 (1987). But see Alaska Pac. Fisheries v. United States, 248 U.S.
78 (1918) (ordering removal of a non-Native fish trap located in navigable waters where exclusiveness
of the fishery for Metlakatla Natives was part of reservation's purpose). Cf. Metlakatla Indian Commu-
nity v. Egan, 369 U.S. 45, 56-57 (1962).
Numerous provisions also are provided in federal law for roadway easements across "Indian coun-
try." Reservation roads constructed or maintained with federal monies must be kept open to the pub-
lic. 25 C.F.R. § 170.8 (1987). Further, pursuant to 25 U.S.C. § 311 (1982), the Secretary of the
Interior may "grant permission ... to the proper State or local authorities for the opening and estab-
lishing of public highways ... through any Indian reservation ...." See also 25 U.S.C. §§ 323-328
(1982) (Indian Right-of-Way Act of 1948 authorized Secretary of Interior, with tribal consent, to grant
rights of way for all purposes across trust lands). Moreover, states are authorized to condemn for any
public purpose, including roadways, and without the approval of the Secretary, patented or fee lands
within the reservation in a manner analogous to the condemnation of non-reservation lands in the state.
25 U.S.C. § 357 (1982).
The Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA), Pub. L. No. 92-203, 85 Stat. 688
(1971)(codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1628 (1982)), contains a special provision requiring
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The Ninth Circuit, in the key case of Arizona ex rel. Merrill v.
Turtle,75 held that an attempted extradition from the Navajo Reserva-
tion in violation of tribal extradition procedures was an impermissible
interference "with rights essential to the Navajo's self-government." 76
In that case, the State of Oklahoma applied for an extradition order to
the Navajo Nation, which refused to surrender the suspect"' because
Navajo law provided for extradition only to the states of Arizona,
the reservation of public easements over Native-selected lands "which are reasonably necessary to guar-
antee. . . a full right of public use and access for recreation, hunting, transportation, utilities, docks,"
and other public purposes. ANCSA § 17, 43 U.S.C. § 1616(b) (1982). See Alaska Pub. Easement
Defense Fund v. Andrus, 435 F. Supp. 664 (D. Alaska 1977)(vacating Interior's proposed 25-foot con-
tinuous shoreline and streamside easements).
Finally, a tribe may not exclude non-members from fee lands within its reservation absent a pre-
dominant tribal sovereign interest. Montana, 450 U.S. at 565-66. The mere presence of non-Native
hunters and fishers within the reservation was held insufficient in the Montana instance to meet the
tribal interest test. Id. Tribes nevertheless may refuse entry for hunting and fishing on non-fee reserva-
tion lands. 18 U.S.C. § 1165 (1982). Violation of the federal statute constitutes criminal trespass. Id.;
see also Montana, 450 U.S. at 561-62, 565 n.14.
75. 413 F.2d 683 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1003 (1970).
76. Id. at 685-86. While Turtle is the leading case, it is not the earliest authority. Almost two
decades before Turtle, the Solicitor of the Department of the Interior addressed a situation where Ari-
zona authorities, pursuant to a rendition request from Colorado, arrested a Navajo named Harding on
the Navajo Reservation. The Solicitor commented:
"without specific authority State officers have no power to enter restricted Indian lands for
the enforcement of State laws against Indians .. " 56 I.D. 38, 39 (1936). In the Harding
case, the Arizona sheriff did not request or obtain proper permission to apprehend the
fugitive. Moreover, we are aware of no Federal law or Navajo tribal ordinance authorizing
the apprehension by a State officer of an Indian fugitive where the latter is charged with the
commission of a criminal violation of State law off the Navajo Reservation. Accordingly,
this Department takes the view that the arrest of Mr. Harding was illegal.
Arrest by Sheriff of Navajo Fugitive from Justice on Navajo Reservation for Extradition to Colorado
(1952), II Op. Sol., supra note 20, at 1602, 1603. The Solicitor's opinion appears to presume that either
a tribal enabling statute or a state-tribal agreement is a necessary predicate to a lawful arrest of a Native
on the reservation for a violation of state law committed off the reservation.
77. The suspect sought by Oklahoma was a Cheyenne who resided on the Navajo Reservation
with his Navajo wife. Turtle, 413 F.2d at 683. Beyond mentioning this fact, the court in Turtle shied
away from any potential difficulty arising from the fact that the suspect was not a member of the
Navajo Nation, but framed the issue before it instead as one of "extradition jurisdiction over Indian
residents of the Navajo Reservation." Id. at 685. Throughout the opinion the Court spoke in terms of
"Indian residents of reservations" and "non-Indians" rather than of members and non-members.
While the criminal jurisdictional differences in treatment of Natives and non-Natives are readily
ascertainable, few statutes or cases have addressed directly the criminal jurisdictional status of non-
member Natives residing on reservations of other tribes. See 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (1982) (providing for
general criminal jurisdiction on reservations except for certain "offenses committed by one Indian
against the person or property of another Indian"); United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 383
(1886)(Major Crimes Act requires only that "the offense under the statute is committed by an Indian
... and the fair inference is that the offending Indian shall belong to that or some other tribe"); United
States v. Rogers, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 567, 573 (1846) (statutory antecedent of § 1152 exception "does not
speak of members of a tribe, but of the race generally, - of the family of Indians"). See also Treaty
with the Shawnees, Jan. 31, 1786, art. III, 7 Stat. 26 (providing for federal prosecution of any non-
Native "who shall do an injury to any Indian of the [tribal] nation, or to any other Indian or Indians
residing in their towns, and under their protection") (emphasis added). In at least one instance, a state
court has held that the state does not have jurisdiction to try an enrolled member of one tribe for a
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New Mexico, and Utah78 Oklahoma then sought rendition from the
felony (bribery of a county officer) committed on the reservation of another tribe. State v. Allan, 100
Idaho 918, 920-21, 607 P.2d 426, 428-29 (1980).
These cases and statutes fail to distinguish between tribal member and non-member Natives princi-
pally because of the indiscriminate use by the judiciary and Congress of the term "Indian," see supra
note 1, rather than a term limited to tribal members. See Duro v. Reina, 821 F.2d 1358, 1361 & n.l
(9th Cir. 1987) (noting that neither the Supreme Court nor the Ninth Circuit has "used the terms non-
Indian and nonmember Indian precisely" and adding that even "individual opinions are internally
inconsistent on this point"); Fox v. Bureau of Revenue, 87 N.M. 261, 262, 531 P.2d 1234, 1235 (N.M.
Ct. App. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 933 (1976) (the court had "neither found nor been directed to a
single case where it was regarded crucial that the Indian in question, although located on a reservation,
was not a member of the tribe to which the reservation belonged").
In United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978), however, the Supreme Court first drew a crimi-
nal jurisdictional line between members and non-members rather than between Natives and non-Na-
tives. While there were no non-member Native defendants in that prosecution, the Court fastidiously
spoke of "members" and "non-members" in discussing the powers of Native governments, noting that
tribal governments "have a significant interest in maintaining orderly relations among their members."
Id. at 331. See also Quechan Tribe of Indians v. Rowe, 531 F.2d 408, 410 n.3 (9th Cir. 1976) ("This
opinion is limited in all respects to the relationships between the Quechan Tribe and non-members of
the Tribe."); Ortiz-Barraza v. United States, 512 F.2d 1176, 1179 (9th Cir. 1975) (" 'An Indian tribe
may exercise a complete [criminal] jurisdiction over its members and within the limits of the reserva-
tion.' ") (quoting F. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 148 (1942 ed.)); Davis v. O'Keefe,
283 N.W.2d 73, 75 (N.D. 1979) ("tribal governments have always had the authority to control the
conduct of their members within the exterior boundaries of a reservation" and "a tribe generally pos-
sesses the authority... to deliver to state authorities tribal members who are suspected of committing a
state offense").
The Wheeler Court stated further that Native nations "cannot try non-members in tribal courts."
435 U.S. at 326 (citing Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978)). The holding in
Wheeler, that the double jeopardy clause did not bar federal prosecution of a tribal member previously
convicted of a lesser-included offense in tribal court, was tailored to reflect expressly this member /
non-member bifurcation. The Wheeler statement that tribes "cannot try non-members," however, is
not an accurate rendition of the holding in Oliphant, since the latter case drew no distinction between
tribal members and non-members, but was presented solely in terms of "Indians" and "non-Indians."
See supra note 21. Subsequent federal and tribal court rulings have distinguished Oliphant in the con-
text of criminal prosecutions of nonmembers. See Duro v. Reina, an unpublished habeas decision,
discussed in Administration of Justice, supra note 21, at 8-9, in which a federal district court ordered the
release of a Torrez-Martinez Mission Native convicted in the Pima-Maricopa tribal court of the murder
of a Gila River tribal member. The federal district court ruled that the assertion of criminal jurisdic-
tion by the tribal court over non-members, whether Native or non-Native, was a denial of equal protec-
tion under the Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (1986). The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals,
acknowledging the "uncharted reaches" of this "troubling" jurisdictional question, vacated the lower
court judgment, holding instead that the non-member Native defendant was subject to the criminal
jurisdiction of another tribe's court where the non-member had significant contacts with the foreign
reservation. Duro v. Reina, 821 F.2d 1358, 1360, 1364 (9th Cir. 1987). In reaching its decision, the
court noted that previous opinions in which the terms non-Native and non-member were used without
differentiation, if not synonymously, "are not helpful in resolving this case, in which the distinction
between nonmember Indian and non-Indian is crucial." Id. at 1361 n.1. Accord Miller v. Crow Creek
Sioux Tribe, 12 Indian L. Rep. (Am. Indian Law. Training Program) 6008, 6009 (Intertribal Ct. App.
1984) (close cultural and social ties among modern Sioux tribes, coupled with modern law enforcement
problems, require tribe to continue to assert its historic exercise of criminal jurisdiction over non-mem-
ber Natives). On the member/non-member distinction in treaties, statutes, and case law, see Comment,
Jurisdiction Over Nonmember Indians on Reservations, 1980 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 727.
78. Turtle, 413 F.2d at 686 n.3. The Navajo extradition statute originally was enacted in 1956.
The year following the Turtle decision, that section was amended to delete the language limiting extra-
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State of Arizona,7 9 whose officials had arrested the suspect and held
dition expressly to the states of Arizona, New Mexico, and Utah because the limitation "has allowed
Indians who have committed crimes in other states to use the Navajo Nation as an asylum, and serves
to prevent other states from entering into agreements with the Navajo Tribe on the subject of extradi-
tion." Preamble to Amendment CMY-38-70 (1970), noted at NAVAJO TRIB. CODE tit. 17, § 1951
(1977). The amended and present Navajo extradition statute recites:
Whenever the Chairman of the Navajo Tribal Council is informed and believes that an
Indian has committed a crime outside of Indian Country and is present in Navajo "Indian
Country" and is using it as an asylum from prosecution by the state, the Chairman may
order any Navajo policeman to apprehend such Indian and deliver him to proper state
authorities at the Reservation boundary.
NAVAJO TRIB. CODE tit. 17, § 1951 (1977).
79. The difference between interstate rendition and international extradition is explained supra at
note 69. Interstate rendition is provided for in the Constitution:
A person charged in any State with Treason, Felony, or other Crime, who shall flee
from Justice, and be found in another State, shall on Demand of the executive Authority of
the State from which he fled, be delivered up, to be removed to the State having Jurisdiction
of the Crime.
U.S. CONsT. art. IV, § 2, cl. 2. The constitutional mandate is implemented by 18 U.S.C. § 3182 (1982):
Whenever the executive authority of any State or Territory demands any person as a
fugitive from justice, of the executive authority of any State, District or Territory to which
such person has fled, and produces a copy of an indictment found or an affidavit made
before a magistrate of any State or Territory, charging the person demanded with having
committed treason, felony, or other crime, certified as authentic by the governor or chief
magistrate of the State or Territory from whence the person so charged has fled, the execu-
tive authority of the State, District or Territory to which such person has fled shall cause
him to be arrested and secured, and notify the executive authority making such demand, or
the agent of such authority appointed to receive the fugitive, and shall cause the fugitive to
be delivered to such agent when he shall appear. If no such agent appears within thirty
days from the time of the arrest, the prisoner may be discharged.
Extradition to a reservation, however, cannot be premised on either the constitutional or the statu-
tory provision. Ex parte Morgan, 20 F. 298 (W.D. Ark. 1883). In Morgan, the governor of Arkansas
had honored a requisition issued by the chief of the Cherokee Nation and issued an arrest warrant for
Morgan, who was wanted by the Cherokee Nation for the crime of murder. After Morgan was arrested
by Arkansas authorities, but before he was delivered into the custody of the Cherokee Nation, he
brought an action for habeas corpus relief. The court noted that the status of the Cherokee Nation was
"not as a state or territory, but as the home of the Indian," id. at 305, and held that:
the Cherokee Nation is neither a state nor territory, in the sense to be attached to the words
when used in the clause of the Constitution and in the act of Congress relating to interstate
extradition, and.., therefore, the Governor of Arkansas could not, under the Constitution
and laws of the United States, issue a warrant for the arrest of Morgan upon the demand of
the chief of the Cherokee Nation.
Id. at 307. See also Extradition of Indian Fugitives to Reservations Where Offense Was Committed, M-
31194 (1941), 1 Op. Sol., supra note 20, at 1066, 1067 ("until legislation is obtained authorizing action
by the States in this situation there can be no extradition of Indians from the jurisdiction of a State");
Navajo Tribal Council Resolution CJ-1-56, § 1, noted at NAVAJO TRIB. CODE tit. 17, § 1001 (1977)
(urging the Secretary of Interior to request congressional legislation that would authorize the Navajo
Nation to enter into extradition agreements with states).
Most states have implemented the constitutional provision through enactment of the Uniform
Criminal Extradition Act, which provides state statutory authority for rendition of suspects to other
states. See, e.g., WIs. STAT. ANN. § 976.03 (West 1987), which lists 47 states as well as Puerto Rico
and the Virgin Islands that have adopted the uniform law. As with the constitutional and federal
statutory rendition provisions, however, it is unlikely that state extradition to Native governments is
authorized by the Act. 70 Op. Att'y Gen. Wis. 36, 38 (1981) (finding "no authority [in the Uniform
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him at the Navajo jail. 8' The governor of Arizona issued a writ of
rendition, but before Oklahoma authorities could arrive, the suspect
successfully petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus. 81  The Ninth Cir-
cuit concluded that because the Navajo Nation had codified and was
exercising its sovereign extradition powers, the State of Arizona could
not exercise concurrently its own domestic rendition power without
infringing on the Navajo Nation's right of self-government.8 2 Arizona
Criminal Extradition Act] to allow state law enforcement officers to arrest Menominee Tribe members
who are fugitives from tribal court jurisdiction").
Despite the apparent barriers raised by both federal and state law, states may be empowered,
without federal enabling legislation, to enact separate laws permitting extradition of Native fugitives to
reservations. In 1976, South Dakota enacted a statute that provides in part that "any Indian charged
with an offense by an Indian tribe" may be extradited to the tribe. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 23-
24B-1 (1979). Extradition is only available, however, if the state and the tribe "have mutually and
formally entered into an extradition compact whereby either party may exercise the power of extradi-
tion." Id. at § 23-24B-2. At least one tribe has entered into a reciprocal agreement with the state. State
v. Lufkins, 381 N.W.2d 263, 266 (S.D. 1986) (referencing the Reciprocal Extradition Agreement be-
tween the Sisseton-Wahpeton Sioux Tribe and the State of South Dakota).
Extradition between Native governments also is not governed by constitutional or federal statutory
law. No federal authority is empowered to extradite Natives from one reservation to another. I Op.
Sol., supra note 20, at 1067. Native governments, however, can extradite not only to other Native
tribes, but also to state or federal authorities. Id. As stated by Interior Department Acting Solicitor
Felix S. Cohen:
I have no doubt that part of the unabridged sovereignty and authority of Indian tribes is to
request of other tribes the return of fugitive members and to act upon such requests to the
extent of removing the fugitive from the reservation or of turning over the fugitive to the
proper authorities of the tribe requesting extradition.
Id. Cohen noted, however, that problems may arise where the reservations are not contiguous, because
Native police outside the reservation probably have no authority to hold a Native fugitive in custody.
Id. See also supra note 7. This jurisdictional problem could be addressed either by legislation authoriz-
ing such custody, I Op. Sol, supra note 20, at 1068, or by intergovernmental agreement.
80. The arrest was illegal. The district court concluded "that the Arizona authorities had ex-
ceeded their jurisdiction in arresting appellee on the Navajo Reservation." Turtle, 413 F.2d at 684. The
Ninth Circuit did not reach this issue on appeal.
81. Id. at 683-84.
82. Id. at 686. See also Comment, Tribal Control of Extradition from Reservations, 10 NAT. RE-
SOURCES J. 626 (1970).
This concept that an overlay of state jurisdiction onto existing tribal jurisdiction impinges upon
tribal sovereignty is echoed in both civil court and civil regulatory cases. In the civil court context,
courts have held that where the tribal court exercises civil jurisdiction over Natives and activities on the
reservation, state court adjudication would interfere impermissibly with the tribal self-governing right
to establish forums for dispute resolution. See supra note 71.
In addition, to allow concurrent application of dual regulatory schemes, particularly where the
state scheme is equivalent to or more restrictive than the tribal scheme, essentially would supplant or
eviscerate tribal regulation. The Tenth Circuit has articulated this "mutual dislocation" doctrine as
follows: I
[Hiere a definite conflict exists between the tribal regulatory structure and that of the
State. In Colville [Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation,
447 U.S. 134 (1980)] the tribal and state taxing schemes were purely revenue-raising in
nature, and dual systems of pure taxation are not inherently conflicting. In contrast, dual
regulatory schemes, as the Court implied, necessarily create mutual dislocations. It is be-
cause of this characteristic of regulation that we presume, when Indian tribes under federal
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thus was without authority to exercise rendition jurisdiction over Na-
tive American residents of the Navajo Reservation.
Seven years later the New Mexico Supreme Court agreed with the
Turtle analysis of tribal extradition powers. In Benally v. Marcum,83 a
city police officer pursued a Navajo suspect onto the Navajo reserva-
tion, arrested him for violation of a city ordinance, and returned him
to the jurisdiction of the municipality.8 4 Relying on the holding in
Turtle, the court ruled that the arrest was illegal as violating the sover-
eignty of the Navajo Nation "because it circumvented and was con-
trary to the orderly procedure for extradition from the Navajo
Reservation" provided for by the Navajo Code.15
The cases concerning extradition from the reservation that have
arisen since Benally, however, have not concurred in the Benally-Tur-
te analysis. The Supreme Court of North Dakota, in Davis v. O'Keefe,
refused to issue a writ of prohibition to a Native suspect arrested by a
county sheriff on the Turtle Mountain Reservation and removed from
it in violation of tribal extradition procedures, on the ground that no
irreparable injury arises merely by being required to defend against a
protection seek to regulate their traditional interests, that federal law has preempted state
jurisdiction.
Mescalero Apache Tribe v. New Mexico, 630 F.2d 724, 730 (10th Cir. 1980) (citations omitted) (em-
phasis in original), vacated and remanded, 450 U.S. 1036 (1981). The case was remanded to the circuit
court for reconsideration in light of the Supreme Court's holding in Montana v. United States, 450 U.S.
544 (1981), regarding state regulation of non-member fishing on the Crow Reservation. See supra note
74. On remand, the Tenth Circuit reaffirmed its prior holding, relying on Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache
Tribe, 455 U.S. 130 (1982), rather than Montana, and again invalidated the state regulations. Mes-
calero Apache Tribe v. New Mexico, 677 F.2d 55 (10th Cir. 1982), afl'd, 462 U.S. 324 (1983). Accord,
United States v. Sohappy, 770 F.2d 816, 819 n.4 (9th Cir. 1985); see also Eastern Band of Cherokee
Indians v. North Carolina Wildlife Resources Comm'n, 588 F.2d 75, 77 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. dismissed,
446 U.S. 960 (1980) (prohibiting application of the state license requirements to on-reservation, non-
member fishers because, inter alia, imposition of a $5.50 state fishing license fee on non-members who
also paid a tribal license fee of $2.00 per diem was a "substantial deterrent" to prospective visitors and
prevented the tribe from increasing its own fee). But see Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. Washington Dep't of
Game, 433 U.S. 165, 175 (1977) (dismissing assertion of exclusive tribal regulatory authority over on-
reservation fishing where such control could defeat nontreaty fishers' express right under the treaty to
share of scarce migratory resource). For a discussion of the conflicts of concurrent tribal and state on-
reservation regulation, see Note, New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe: Dueling Sovereigns - When
State and Tribe Clash, 11 OHIo N.U.L. REV. 439 (1984); Woodbury, New Mexico v. Mescalero
Apache Tribe: When Can a State Concurrently Regulate Hunting and Fishing by Non-Members on
Reservation Lands? 14 N.M.L. REV. 349 (1984).
83. 89 N.M. 463, 553 P.2d 1270 (1976).
84. While ostensibly this was a fresh pursuit situation, technically it was not. Fresh pursuit ar-
rests under New Mexico law are permitted only for felonies; Benally was being pursued for violation of
a city ordinance. Id. at 466, 553 P.2d at 1273. Because the pursuit clearly was not authorized under
state law, the Benally court did not address the issue of whether the arrest would have been valid if the
pursuit had been for a felony violation.
85. Id. at 464, 553 P.2d at 1271. The court concluded that if the suspect were to be tried for
violating the city ordinance, "he must be legally arrested through the established extradition process of
the Navajo Tribe, or by other legal means." Id. at 468, 553 P.2d at 1274.
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criminal charge.8 6 The court noted, however, that by refusing to grant
the writ, it was not attempting to resolve the issue of the lawfulness of
either the arrest or the extradition.87 Subsequently, the federal court
refused to grant a writ of habeas corpus to the same suspect.88 The
Eighth Circuit distinguished its case from the situation in Turtle by
stating: "if we were presented with a claim filed to protect the extradi-
tion process prior to surrender of the individual petitioner to the de-
manding state, considerations of comity and concern for tribal
sovereignty might well dictate exercise of federal jurisdiction."89
Here, by contrast, the suspect was already in state custody and subject
to a pending state prosecution in which his rights "may be" recog-
nized.9 ° Moreover, the Eighth Circuit concluded, the state court
maintained personal jurisdiction over the suspect even though he was
brought before it by illegal means.9"
The dissent, in accord with the reasoning of Turtle, termed the
state's refusal to comply with tribal extradition procedures "a classic
86. Davis v. O'Keefe, 283 N.W.2d 73, 76 (N.D. 1979). The court specifically noted that: "We
have not been told exactly why an extradition hearing was not held." Id. at 74.
87. Id. at 76. "It would be an undesirable precedent for this court to attempt to resolve a question
as difficult as state jurisdiction over Indians within Indian lands, without any transcript of factual
evidence or sworn affidavits of facts adequate to support any conclusions the court might reach." Id. at
75. In this context, the court expressly recognized tribal "governmental authority to prescribe proce-
dures for the orderly extradition to state authorities of tribal members suspected of violating state law."
Id.
88. Davis v. Muellar, 643 F.2d 521 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 892 (1981).
Both Davis cases concerned state violations of tribal extradition procedures, and both Davis courts
denied habeas corpus relief to the defendant. There is some indication, however, that courts may be
willing to enforce the substantive provisions of tribal extradition law. In State v. Lufkins, 381 N.W.2d
263 (S.D. 1986), the South Dakota Supreme Court rejected the defendant's contention that a state-
tribal extradition agreement could be used to compel the presence at trial of witnesses resident on a
reservation. "(Tihe Reciprocal Extradition Agreement between the Sisseton-Wahpeton Sioux Tribe
and the State of South Dakota... only concerns the extradition of'fugitives from justice.' " Id. at 266-
67. A similar dichotomy between enforcement of substantive statutory provisions and leniency toward
violations of procedures is seen in the courts' treatment of fresh pursuit cases. See infra notes 143-49
and accompanying text.
89. Davis v. Muellar, 643 F.2d at 526. The court's distinction appears to have little practical
application. As the Second Circuit noted in an international context: "The existence of an extradition
treaty provides an individual with certain procedural protections only when he is extradited." United
States v. Reed, 639 F.2d 896, 902 (2d Cir. 1981). Most violations of extradition laws involve merely
ignoring them: simply arresting and removing the suspect as though no extradition procedures existed.
See infra note 99 and accompanying text. Seldom will an on-reservation suspect have the luxury of
time between the arrest and the removal to protest violations of tribal law. The effect of the Muellar
court's distinction is that state officers may violate tribal extradition laws with impunity if only they act
quickly enough.
90. Davis v. Muellar, 643 F.2d at 526.
91. Id., relying on the Ker-Frisbie rule discussed infra at notes 95-97 and accompanying text.
"[W]e are unable to find that the United States has by policy, by treaty, by statute or by court decision
decreed North Dakota's loss of personal jurisdiction over appellant as a penalty for having arrested
appellant in violation of the tribal extradition ordinance here involved." Id. at 527.
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example of state interference with tribal sovereignty."92 The dissent-
ing judge agreed with the majority that the suspect's rights were not
the primary issue; the focus, rather, should be on the tribe's sovereign
powers over the reservation's inhabitants.93  Extradition, the dissent
asserted, creates rights only in the sovereign and does not confer asy-
lum upon the individual.94 Hence, once the court's attention is cen-
tered on the injury to the sovereign, in this instance a Native tribe, it
should become irrelevant whether the extradition proceeding is initi-
ated before or after the suspect is removed. But as in the cases where
no tribal extradition laws exist, the focus on the individual's rights
permits courts to disregard the issue of tribal sovereignty.
3. The Effect of Illegal Arrest or Extradition
As a further consequence of the improper concentration by courts
on the suspect rather than the sovereign, state court jurisdiction over
the suspect invariably is upheld, even when the illegality of the state
arrest or extradition is recognized. The judicially-created Ker-Frisbie
rule, developed in the context of non-Native criminal law, provides
that a court's personal jurisdiction over a defendant is not impaired by
the fact that the defendant has been brought before the court ille-
gally. 95 The doctrine has been applied in cases involving both illegal
interstate arrest and the violation of international extradition proce-
dures.96 The United States Supreme Court has justified its rule on the
92. Id. (McMillian, J., dissenting).
93. "The issue is not whether an Indian can avoid state prosecution for crimes committed off the
reservation, but whether the state must recognize some degree of sovereignty and control of the tribal
government over the reservation's inhabitants." Id.
94. Id. at 529. The dissent's argument, in this sense, premises its notion of tribal sovereignty on
an international law analogue. It is a tenet of international law that failure to observe extradition
procedures is a violation of that law only when the offended nation objects. United States ex rel. Lujan
v. Gengler, 510 F.2d 62, 66-68 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1001 (1975). See also United States v.
Rosenthal, 793 F.2d 1214, 1232 (1 th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1377 (1987) ("Under interna-
tional law it is the contracting foreign government that has the right to complain about a violation" of
an extradition treaty); United States v. Reed, 639 F.2d 896, 902 (2d Cir. 1981) ("absent protest or
objection by the offended sovereign, [a defendant] has no standing to raise violation of international law
as an issue").
95. The name of the doctrine is taken from the cases of Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1886), and
Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519 (1952). See also United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463 (1980); Rose v.
Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545 (1979). Professor LaFave presents a succinct discussion of the origin, formula-
tion, and due process implications of the Ker-Frisbie rule in W. LAFAVE, I SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A
TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 1.9 (2d ed. 1987).
96. For example, Frisbie concerned allegations that the suspect was in Illinois when "Michigan
officers forcibly seized, handcuffed, blackjacked and took him to Michigan." 342 U.S. at 520. Ker
involved a defendant who was abducted illegally from Peru and brought to the United States. 119 U.S.
at 438.
The Wisconsin Attorney General recently released an opinion on the subject of fresh pursuit across
reservation boundaries, which concluded that fresh pursuit arrests were not federally preempted and
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ground that "[t]here is nothing in the Constitution that requires a
court to permit a guilty person rightfully convicted to escape justice
because he was brought to trial against his will."'97 The only exception
to the Ker-Frisbie rule was created by the Second Circuit in United
States v. Toscanino, which held that the facts of that particular case
"shocked the conscience" of the court. 98
With one exception, the Ker-Frisbie rule has been applied whole-
sale to Natives arrested on the reservation. Courts have held that
neither arrests in violation of tribal extradition laws nor on-reservation
arrests for off-reservation offenses, even if illegal when made, divest
the state courts of jurisdiction over the Native suspects.99 The sole
would not impair tribal sovereignty. 74 Op. Att'y Gen. Wis. 245, 257-58 (1985). The opinion contin-
ued, however, by stating:
Even if one assumes that some aspect of Menominee tribal sovereignty is at least mini-
mally impaired by a state officer's on-reservation arrest following a fresh pursuit, it is
doubtful that the state is thereby deprived of personal jurisdiction over a defendant thus
arrested. The general rule, cited above, is that failure to observe established extradition
procedures does not deprive a state of personal jurisdiction over a defendant.
If the failure to comply with constitutional and statutory extradition requirements
does not deprive a demanding state of jurisdiction, it is difficult to conclude that a state's
failure to follow tribal extradition procedures would do so.
Id. at 258 (citations omitted). The Wisconsin Attorney General, in essence, gives state law enforcement
officers carte blanche to violate tribal territorial sovereignty at will, on the theory that whether state
officers obey the law or not, no penalty will attach to their conduct.
97. Frisbie, 342 U.S. at 522. See also Crews, 445 U.S. at 478-79 (White, J., concurring). This
formulation of the rule, as not invalidating a subsequent conviction, helps explain the different results
reached in the Turtle and Davis v. Muellar Native extradition cases. See supra text accompanying
notes 75-82 and 88-94. The suspect in Turtle was not yet in state custody, and so not yet subject to
state court jurisdiction, when he petitioned for relief. Consequently, the Ker-Frisbie rule was not before
the court. See Davis v. Muellar, 643 F.2d 521, 526 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 892 (1981), dis-
cussed supra at notes 88-94. The Ker-Frisbie rule was invoked also to deny habeas corpus relief to a
Native parole violator who was arrested on a South Dakota reservation and surrendered to Montana
authorities by tribal police. See supra note 60.
98. 500 F.2d 267, 274-79 (2d Cir. 1974) (defendant allegedly was abducted forcibly at gunpoint
and subsequently was subjected incessantly for 17 days to intensive interrogation and brutal torture,
including denial of sleep, minimal intravenous nourishment, kickings and beatings, alcohol flushes of
the eyes and nose, and electric shock treatments to his ears, toes, and genitalia; all by or at the direction
of United States agents). See, Comment, United States v. Toscanino: An Assault on the Ker-Frisbie
Rule, 12 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 865 (1975).
The Toscanino exception expressly was limited only to similarly egregious situations by the same
circuit in United States ex rel. Lujan v. Gengler, 510 F.2d 62, 65 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1001
(1975) (Toscanino did not extend to defendant's non-violent kidnapping and subsequent placement on
plane for United States by foreign police as paid agents of U.S. agents). See also United States v.
Herrera, 504 F.2d 859, 860 (5th Cir. 1974) (distinguishing Toscanino, in part, on grounds of torture).
Other circuits have stated that they would apply the Toscanino exception, if at all, only in its limited
form. See, e.g., United States v. Rosenthal, 793 F.2d 1214, 1232 (11th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S.
Ct. 1377 (1987); United States v. Wilson, 732 F.2d 404, 411 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1009
(1984); United States v. Marzano, 537 F.2d 257, 272 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1038 (1976); and
cases cited in Lujan, 510 F.2d at 65 n.4.
99. Davis v. Muellar, 643 F.2d 521, 526-27 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 892 (1981) (upheld
arrest in violation of tribal extradition law); Weddell v. Meierhenry, 636 F.2d 211, 214-15 (8th Cir.
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exception was the Benally decision of the New Mexico Supreme
Court, which ruled that an arrest in violation of the Navajo extradi-
tion law fell within the Toscanino exception, "particularly when the
actions of the law enforcement officers come into conflict with the
well-established right to self-government conferred upon Indians by
treaty, laws and U.S. Supreme Court decisions.' These cases
demonstrate that once the courts focus upon the suspect, the Ker-Fris-
bie rule provides an additional basis for validating on-reservation ar-
rests by state officers for off-reservation crimes. A proper inquiry into
the infringement of tribal sovereign rights, on the other hand, would
render the Ker-Frisbie rule irrelevant.
4. Summary
Arrests by state law enforcement officers of Native suspects on
the reservation for offenses committed off the reservation generally
have been upheld by the courts. In the absence of tribal extradition
procedures, lower courts uniformly have legitimated the authority of
state officers to arrest within reservation boundaries for off-reservation
crimes. Even where tribes have enacted extradition laws, arrests in
violation of those codes usually have been held to be valid. In either
case, judicial recognition that the arrests are illegal does not affect the
result: the suspect remains subject to state court jurisdiction. The sole
exceptions are the Turtle case, where the suspect brought a habeas
corpus action prior to the state's assumption of jurisdiction, and
Benally, where the arrest was invalidated as an infringement on the
tribal right of self-government.
These two cases are unique also in their focus on tribal sover-
eignty, rather than on the rights of the suspect.' '° If courts formulate
the issue as one of tribal sovereignty, many of the arguments for vali-
dating the arrests become irrelevant. In effecting an illegal arrest
within reservation boundaries, the state clearly has injured the individ-
ual suspect; yet the greater injury is to the tribe, whose sovereign pow-
ers to administer justice and control extradition within its territorial
boundaries are trenched upon by every illegal state arrest.
1980), cert. denied; 451 U.S. 941 (1981) (denied suspect's claim that arrest was invalid because he was
not extradited); High Pine v. Montana, 439 F.2d 1093, 1094 (9th Cir. 1971) (denied habeas corpus
relief, even assuming petitioner was illegally arrested by tribal police and extradited from reservation);
Fournier v. Roed, 161 N.W.2d 458, 476-77 (N.D. 1968) (Knudson, J., concurring) (even if tribe had an
extradition law, suspect's arrest would still be valid).
100. Benally v. Marcum, 89 N.M. 463, 467, 553 P.2d 1270, 1274 (1976).
101. This also is the argument advanced by the dissenting judge in Davis v. Muellar, 643 F.2d at
527 (McMillian, J., dissenting), who would have granted a writ of habeas corpus for failure to comply
with tribal extradition laws.
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Which of these injuries the courts focus on has affected not only
the outcomes of the arrest and extradition cases, but will affect as well
the determination of fresh pursuit issues. Judicial concentration on
the rights of the individual defendant forces courts to decide the cases
based on principles of personal jurisdiction and the post-hoc impor-
tance of procedural irregularities. Focus on the rights of the sover-
eign, conversely, would require the courts to address the issues,
common to all sovereigns, of territorial integrity and criminal justice
administration. Using various cross-jurisdictional models, section III
will discuss these common concerns of sovereigns. Section IV then
will demonstrate that the only judicial approach to the fresh pursuit
issue consistent with tribal sovereignty is recognition of the injury to
and the rights of the sovereign, and consequent invalidation of fresh
pursuit arrests made on the reservation without the authorization of
the governing tribe.
III. THE DOCTRINE OF FRESH PURSUIT
Fresh pursuit is the common law right of law enforcement officers
to cross jurisdictional boundaries to arrest fleeing felons. 102 The right
at common law is an extension of the power of police officers to arrest
without a warrant for felonies committed in their presence or when
they have reasonable grounds to believe that the suspect committed a
felony.'03 What constitutes fresh pursuit is determined from all the
circumstances," 4 but the elements of immediacy and continuousness
are universal.10 5 This section, which examines the common patterns
of transjurisdictional fresh pursuit, will explore the issues of sover-
eignty that arise when law enforcement officers cross jurisdictional
boundaries in pursuit of a fleeing suspect.
A. Three Models of Cross-Jurisdictional Pursuit
The doctrine of fresh pursuit traditionally has arisen in three
cross-jurisdictional situations: pursuit across municipal boundaries,
102. Carson v. Pape, 15 Wis. 2d 300, 308, 112 N.W.2d 693, 697 (1961); 5 AM. JUR. 2DArrest § 51
(2d ed. 1962). For an explanation of the difference between "fresh pursuit," which crosses jurisdic-
tional boundaries, and the better-known term "hot pursuit," see supra note 4.
103. 5 AM. JUR. 2D Arrest § 25 (2d ed. 1962). At common law fresh pursuit was sanctioned only
in cases of felonies. Gattus v. State, 204 Md. 589, 600, 105 A.2d 661, 666 (1954); 5 AM JUR. 2D Arrest
§ 51 (2d ed. 1962).
104. White v. State, 70 Miss. 253, 258, 11 So. 632, 632 (1892).
105. See infra text accompanying notes 116-19 (intrastate), 139-42 (interstate), and 152 (interna-
tional). See also 5 AM. JUR. 2D Arrest § 51 (2d ed. 1962) ("Where arrest in another jurisdiction on hot
pursuit is permissible, the pursuit must be immediate and continuous, but the continuity is not broken
by the mere fact that the officer may temporarily lose sight of the fugitive."); Fresh Pursuit, in LEGAL
PoINTs 1-2 (1976) (Int'l Ass'n of Chiefs of Police).
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across state borders, and across national frontiers. While none of
these models is directly analogous to fresh pursuit onto a Native reser-
vation, an examination of the legal principles of each may inform the
Native law analysis.
First, a tribe cannot be equated with a municipality. Unlike a
local government, a Native nation is not a creature of the state, exer-
cising only those powers that the state grants to it, nor is it subject to
the authority of the state except as Congress expressly has provided.' 6
A tribe, rather, is a separate sovereign, subject to state jurisdiction
only in narrowly defined, congressionally-authorized circumstances.
Neither, however, is Native sovereignty commensurate with that of a
state. 10 7 On the one hand, Native nations sometimes are held subject
106. The status of municipal governments is directly subordinate to the state:
A municipal corporation is generally regarded by the courts as a subordinate branch of the
government of the state, and therefore municipal administration is an instrumentality of
state administration. It exercises delegated powers of government, and charters are granted
for the better government of the particular areas or districts. It is a political division of the
state and generally a creature of the [state] legislature . . . . While it has been variously
stated . . . that a municipal corporation is, for the purpose of its creation, a government
possessing to a limited extent sovereign power, it has also been declared that a municipal
corporation is not itself sovereign.
E. MCQUILLIN, 1 THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 2.08a, at 160-61 (3d ed. 1987) (citations
omitted). See also United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 320 (1978) ("cities are not sovereign enti-
ties").
In contrast to the subordinate governmental status of municipal communities:
tribes are wholly distinct from, and not subject to, the authority of any state, unless Con-
gress expressly curtails traditional tribal sovereignty in favor of state jurisdiction. As gov-
erning bodies, tribes are complete unto themselves. Indeed, in issues of self government, a
tribe is not even subordinate to the federal government because, so long as it retains its
sovereignty, it governs independently.... Accordingly, an Indian tribe cannot fit within
the definition of a "local" governmental agency because a tribe is not a "subdivision" of any
entity.
It is not a "subordinate" self-government; it is a sovereign.
United States v. Barquin, 799 F.2d 619, 621 (10th Cir. 1986) (citations omitted). See also Washington
Dep't of Ecology v. E.P.A., 752 F.2d 1465, 1469 (9th Cir. 1985)(noting that despite federal statute's
definition of "municipality" as including "an Indian tribe or authorized tribal organization," such refer-
ence indicates only that tribes are regulated federal entities, since "municipality" is included in the
statutory definition of "person"); 72 Op. Att'y Gen. Wis. 132 (1983)(state statute did not authorize
joint sewerage commissions to include tribal governments because "a tribal government is not a 'gov-
ernmental unit' [of the state] within the meaning of the statute").
107. The unique legal status of tribes is reflected in the congressional power to regulate commerce
with "foreign Nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian Tribes." U.S. CONST. art. I,
§ 8, cl. 3. Chief Justice John Marshall called America's indigenous peoples "domestic dependent na-
tions." Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831). A later Supreme Court formulation
described tribal status as:
semi-independent position ... not as States, not as nations ... but as a separate people, with
the power of regulating their internal and social relations, and thus far not brought under
the laws of the Union or of the State within whose limits they resided.
United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 381-82 (1886). Accord Chischilly v. General Motors Accept-
ance Corp., 96 N.M. 264, 266, 629 P.2d 340, 342 (N.M. Ct. App. 1980), rev'd, 96 N.M. 113, 628 P.2d
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to the jurisdiction of the state in which they are situated. On the other,
tribes are accounted sovereign entities, exercising greater powers of
self-government than states, whose sovereignty is subject to the con-
cerns of federalism. 108 Finally, under the current domestic law of the
United States, Native American tribes are not considered to be sepa-
rate nations."19 While tribes are deemed to retain many of the attrib-
683 (1981). Courts have been unequivocal in their assertions that Native tribes are not to be equated
with states. See, e.g., White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracket, 448 U.S. 136, 143 (1980) ("Tribal
reservations are not States ...."); Confederated Tribes of Warm Springs Reservation v. Kurtz, 691
F.2d 878, 880 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1040 (1983) (a "Tribe is not a political subdivision
of the State... ; it derives no authority from the state .... The state and Tribe each functions within
its proper sphere. Neither is a creature of the other.") (citations omitted); Native Am. Church of N.
Am. v. Navajo Tribal Council, 272 F.2d 131, 134 (10th Cir. 1959) ("Indian tribes are not states. They
have a status higher than that of states."); Ex parte Morgan, 20 F. 298, 305 (W.D. Ark. 1883) ("the
Cherokee Nation maintains the same status to-day in its relations to the federal government as it did
when first set apart by such government,-not as a state or territory, but as the home of the In-
dian.")(emphasis in original); Lohnes v. Cloud, 254 N.W.2d 430, 433 (N.D. 1977) ("Indian tribes are
not States, but rather hold a unique legal status .... ). See also Wounded Head v. Tribal Council of
Oglala Sioux Tribe, 507 F.2d 1079, 1081 (8th Cir. 1975); Barta v. Oglala Sioux Tribe, 259 F.2d 553, 556
(8th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 932 (1959); Iron Crow v. Oglala Sioux Tribe, 231 F.2d 89 (8th
Cit. 1956). As noted in a recent en banc decision of the usually hostile state Supreme Court of
Washington:
While Indian Tribes do possess some powers and characteristics akin to those of states,
territories, and possessions, they are truly sui generis. As we noted in Anderson v. O'Brien,
"Indian tribes are unique entities which do not fit into neat pigeonholes of the law."
Queets Band of Indians v. State, 102 Wash. 2d 1, 4, 682 P.2d 909, 911 (1984) (citation omitted).
108. Unlike states, Native governments are not circumscribed by constitutional provisions such as
the Free Exercise, Commerce, or Privileges and Immunities Clauses. U.S. CONST. amend. I; art. I, § 8,
cl. 3; and art. IV, § 2, cl. 2. For example, while the Free Exercise Clause is made applicable to the states
through the Fourteenth Amendment, the clause does not apply to Native tribes in the same manner.
Native Am. Church of N. Am. v. Navajo Tribal Council, 272 F.2d 131, 134-35 (10th Cir. 1959). Fur-
ther, a tribe may prohibit non-members from hunting and fishing on tribal land. Montana v. United
States, 450 U.S. 544, 557 (1981). A state's power in this regard is more limited. While a state arguably
may prohibit non-resident recreational hunting and fishing, it may not control its wildlife and resources
in a way that interferes with a non-resident's right to pursue a livelihood, Baldwin v. Fish & Game
Comm'n of Montana, 436 U.S. 371, 385-88 (1978), nor may it accord its residents a preferred right of
access to its natural resources. City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 627 (1978). More-
over, a Native nation may expel its own citizens and exclude non-members from tribal territory. See
supra notes 23, 27, and 74. A state, however, may not close its borders to residents of other states.
Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 173 (1941).
109. Chief Justice John Marshall recognized early-on that America's indigenous peoples were
self-governing nations with full attributes of sovereignty:
The very term "nation," so generally applied to them, means "a people distinct from
others." The Constitution, by declaring treaties already made, as well as those to be made,
to be the supreme law of the land, has adopted and sanctioned the previous treaties with the
Indian nations, and consequently admits their rank among those powers who are capable of
making treaties. The words "treaty" and "nation" are words of our own language, selected
in our diplomatic and legislative proceedings, by ourselves, having each a definite and well
understood meaning. We have applied them to Indians, as we have applied them to the
other nations of the earth. They are applied to all in the same sense.
Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 559-60 (1832). Nearly a score of years later the Cherokee
were still held to be in many respects a "foreign and independent nation," being governed by their own
laws and leaders, chosen by themselves. Parks v. Ross, 52 U.S. (II How.) 362, 374 (1850). Within
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utes and inherent powers of a sovereign nation, they arguably have
another two decades, however, this acknowledgement of Native sovereignty and independent status was
reversed abruptly when a rider was tacked onto a congressional appropriations bill: "[H]ereafter no
Indian nation or tribe within the territory of the United States shall be acknowledged or recognized as
an independent nation, tribe, or power with whom the United States may contract by treaty .... " Act
of Mar. 3, 1871, ch. 120, 16 Stat. 566 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 71 (1982)). Proponents of the 1871
legislation argued that:
The relation of the Indian tribes to the United States . . . is continuously changing, and
nations of Indians that might have been so recognized years ago may now be well regarded
as having deteriorated to such an extent as to justify the adoption of this declaration ....
CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 3d Sess. 1824 (1871)(remarks of Sen. Harlan). Justice Stewart, writing for
the Court in DeCoteau v. District County Court, 420 U.S. 425, 432 (1975), observed of this appropria-
tions rider that "[a]fter 1871, the tribes were no longer regarded as sovereign nations," thus implying
that before 1871 they were so accounted. The United States Congress and Supreme Court continue to
this day to give a nodding acquiescence to Native American sovereignty. See supra notes 19-20. See
also Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658, 675
(1979), modified sub. nom Washington v. United States, 444 U.S. 816 (1979) ("[a] treaty, including one
between the United States and an Indian tribe, is essentially a contract between two sovereign na-
tions"); Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 56 (1978) (Indian tribes are "separate sovereigns
pre-existing the Constitution"); C. BUTLER, THE TREATY-MAKING POWER OF THE UNITED STATES
§§ 110-16, 160 (1902).
Evidence of Native American belief in their own independence is exemplified by a letter of July 26,
1976 from the Lakota (Sioux) Treaty Council to the United Nations Subcommittee on Prevention of
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities of the U.N. Commission on Human Rights, which at that
time was investigating alleged human rights violations in the United States towards the indigenous
peoples:
We the Native peoples of this continent, individually and collectively reject the patently
false assertions that we are citizens of the United States of America. We are citizens of our
respective Native Nations ... we are sovereign people who have received our mandates
from the Creator and we have not deviated nor have we forgotten the original instructions.
Coulter, United Nations Representatives Study Discrimination Against Indigenous People, 2(9) AM. IN-
DIAN J. 2, 8 (1976). See also Oglala Sovereignty Reaffirmed, 5(1) AKWESASNE NOTES 32 (1973). A
similar letter from representatives of the Haudenosaunee (Six Nations Iroquois) Confederacy to the
same U.N. Subcommittee states: "The [Haudenosaunee] rejected this [unilateral imposition of U.S.
citizenship as an] incursion into our sovereignty. To this day we do not see ourselves as subjects of
another government." Coulter, supra, at 6.
The Haudenosaunee persistently have asserted their independent sovereign status. In 1923, the Six
Nations petitioned the League of Nations for international recognition. A BASIC CALL TO CONSCIOUS-
NESS 13-18 (Akwesasne Notes ed. 1981). For a thorough and historic overview of the Haudenosaunee
pursuit of international recognition, see generally id.
In his last speech on behalf of his Native people, in 1925, Deskaheh, then Speaker of the Six
Nations Council, attacked as "tyranny" the enforced, attempted dominance of both the Canadian and
United States cultures:
If this must go on to the bitter end, we would rather that you come with your guns and
poison gases and get rid of us that way. Do it openly and above board. Do away with the
pretense that you have the right to subjugate us to your will.
Your governments do that by enforcing your alien laws upon us. That is an under-
handed way .... We want none of your laws and customs that we have not willingly
adopted for ourselves.
Id. at 19. See also the 1967 speech of Clyde Warrior, speaking on behalf of the National Indian Youth
Council, in which he descried the "elitist" and paternalistic bureaucracies and policies of both federal
and tribal IRA governments, reprinted in A. JOSEPHY, RED POWER 83-89 (1971), and the 1970 resolu-
tion of the Pitt River Tribal Council demanding a return of all of their confiscated lands and reaffirming
their separate sovereignty to determine "their own affairs," id. at 243-46. For a similar but Canadian
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been divested by the federal courts and Congress of certain fundamen-
tal aspects of national sovereignty"'t and their powers have been held
consigned to complete defeasance by the federal government.I"
indigenist view of separate sovereignty, see the Declaration of First Nations, reprinted in As LONG AS
THE SUN SHINES AND WATER FLOWS 337-39 (A.L. Getty & A.S. Lussier eds. 1985).
There are several Native American movements organized to assert independent indigenous sover-
eignty. One such organization, the International Indian Treaty Council (IITC) was formed to en-
courage other nations of the world to recognize the sovereignty of Native American nations. The IITC
was formed in 1974 when chiefs, spiritual leaders, and other tribal leaders from 98 Native American
nations met and adopted a founding Declaration of Continuing Independence. At the June 1976 IITC
conference, the membership of 103 Native nations resolved that the IITC seek admission to the Organi-
zation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cul-
tural Organization (UNESCO), and the World Health Organization (WHO). Further, with the
awareness that the United States Supreme Court and the Indian Claims Commission disregard their
sovereignty, admission also is being sought to the International Court of Justice. 8(4) AKWESASNE
NOTES 17 (1976). See also D. SANDERS, THE FORMATION OF THE WORLD COUNCIL OF INDIGENOUS
PEOPLES (1977). On the growing Native movement over the last two decades to reestablish tribal
nationalism, see generally R. ORTIZ, INDIANS OF THE AMERICAS: HUMAN RIGHTS AND SELF-DETER-
MINATION 127-89 (1984); S. STEINER, THE NEW INDIANS (1968).
Vine Deloria, a leading advocate of Native American independence, notes the current attitude
toward tribal self-determination:
The modern Indian movement for national recognition thus has its roots in the tireless
resistance of generations of unknown Indians who have refused to melt into the homogene-
ity of American life and accept American citizenship. The idea that Indian problems are
some exotic form of domestic disturbance will simply not hold water in view of the persis-
tent attitude of Indians that they have superior rights to national existence which the
United States must respect.
V. DELORIA, BEHIND THE TRAIL OF BROKEN TREATIES 20 (1974).
110. Specifically, Native tribes have been stripped under domestic law of the sovereign powers to
freely alienate land, engage in foreign relations, and try non-members in tribal courts. United States v.
Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 326 (1978); Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 208-12 (1978).
A noted jurist and authority on Native law recently has observed that:
Oliphant poses an enormous potential threat to the [sovereign] power of tribes, because
it permits the fashioning of new limitations on tribal power by the Court itself. Congress
has always had power to limit tribal sovereignty, but Oliphant invites the Court to discover
additional limitations that are inherent in the status of the tribes.
Canby, The Status ofIndian Tribes in American Law Today, 62 WASH. L. REV. 1, 9 (1987). As Judge
Canby notes, his horror for the future of tribal sovereignty, while derived from the canvas of Oliphant,
was confirmed in Rice v. Rehner, 463 U.S. 713 (1983). Canby, supra, at 16. Justice O'Connor in Rice
added a fourth particular, that of liquor regulation, to the expanding list of inherent tribal powers
divested by judicial contrivance: "the tribes have long ago been divested of any inherent self-govern-
ment over liquor regulation by both the explicit command of Congress and as a 'necessary implication
of their dependent status.' " 463 U.S. at 726. Justice O'Connor's statement concerning tribal divesti-
ture by "explicit command" of Congress is central to her preemption analysis. Her use of implicit
divestiture to buttress the preemption argument, however, is a mere and unfortunate appendage. Un-
like Justice Rehnquist, the author of Oliphant, who went to some length in an attempt to fashion and
justify his dependency theory, Justice O'Connor merely asserts it in Rice as a casual fiat. She provides
no ratio decidendi for her conclusion.
11. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978) ("The sovereignty that the Indian tribes
retain is of a unique and limited character. It exists only at the sufferance of Congress and is subject to
complete defeasance."); Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 56 (1978) ("Congress has plenary
authority to limit, modify or eliminate the powers of local self-government which the tribes otherwise
possess."); Stephens v. Cherokee Nation, 174 U.S. 445, 484-86 (1899) (since federal government con-
trols the "Indian" tribes, they cannot be considered sovereign independent states). See also Muscogee
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Consequently, the settled law governing fresh pursuit across any
particular boundary - whether municipal, state, or national - may
not be wholly applicable to Native tribes. Elements common to the
law of fresh pursuit in each of these cross-jurisdictional situations,
rather, must be extracted and the differences among the various appli-
cations of the doctrine examined for their pertinence to an analysis of
the sovereignty possessed by Native tribes.
1. Intrastate Fresh Pursuit
In general, a municipality may not exercise police power outside
its boundaries unless specifically authorized to do so by state stat-
ute.' 12 The common law doctrine of fresh pursuit, however, has been
held to extend local police authority elsewhere within the municipal-
ity's state, 1 3 although not beyond the state borders."l4  The fresh pur-
(Creek) Nation v. Hodel, 670 F. Supp. 434, 440 (D.D.C. 1987) (under its plenary power, Congress was
authorized to abolish the Creek Nation tribal court and "to alter or suspend the provisions of earlier
treaties (guaranteeing self-government] by duly enacted legislation").
Domestic judicial decisions routinely deprecate indigenous sovereignty, relegating it subject to ut-
ter defeasance by congressional action. For example, the Supreme Court repeatedly has held that Con-
gress can abrogate treaties unilaterally without the consent of or even consultation with the tribe.
Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584, 594 (1977); Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 556
(1903). For criticism, see Chambers, Judicial Enforcement of the Federal Trust Responsibility to Indi-
ans, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1213, 1227-29 (1975); Note, Indian Land Claims - A Question of Congress'
Right to Unilaterally Abrogate Indian Treaty Provisions: Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 21 How. L.J.
625 (1978). Congress also may terminate unilaterally its federal relationship with a tribe, and liquidate
and distribute the tribal property. See supra note 38; United States v. Seminole Nation, 299 U.S. 417
(1937); United States v. Rogers, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 567, 572 (1846) (Native tribes "hold and occupy
[reservations] with the assent of the United States, and under their authority."). Moreover, Native
lands may be taken by Congress without compensation. Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348
U.S. 272, 278, 288-89 (1955). "No case in this Court has ever held that taking of Indian title or use by
Congress required compensation.... Generous provision has been willingly made to allow tribes to
recover for wrongs, as a matter of grace, not because of legal liability." Id. at 281-82 (emphasis added).
For an extensive discussion and criticism of the Tee-Hit-Ton rule, see Newton, At the Whim of the
Sovereign: Aboriginal Title Reconsidered, 31 HASTINGS L.J. 1215 (1980).
112. Love v. State, 687 S.W.2d 469, 471 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985); State v. Cochran, 372 A.2d 193,
195 (Del. 1977); Curtiss, Extraterritorial Law Enforcement in New York, 50 CORNELL L. REV. 34, 35
(1964).
A number of states, for example, statutorily extend municipal police authority to one mile beyond
the boundaries of the municipality. See, e.g., State v. Melvin, 53 N.C. App. 421, 428, 281 S.E.2d 97,
102 (1981); Francis v. State, 498 S.W.2d 107, 114 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1973); Callands v. Common-
wealth, 208 Va. 340, 342, 157 S.E.2d 198, 200 (1967). Montana permits its municipalities to extend
their arrest authority within five miles of the city limits. State v. McDole, 734 P.2d 683, 684 (Mont.
1987).
113. Poss v. State, 167 Ga. App. 86, 87, 305 S.E.2d 884, 886 (1983) (fresh pursuit is a "recog-
nized" common law exception to state statute limiting municipal police power to corporate limits of the
municipality); Morris v. Combs' Adm'r, 304 Ky. 187, 191, 200 S.W.2d 281, 283 (1947) (police officer
"had the right to pursue [the suspect] beyond the city limits" to make a fresh pursuit arrest); State v.
Foster, 60 Ohio Misc. 46, 396 N.E.2d 246, 254 (1979) (fact that police officer's pursuit was fresh "ex-
tended his authority to act beyond his original jurisdiction").
114. Minor v. State, 153 Tex. Crim. 242, 249-51, 219 S.W.2d 467, 472 (1949) (on motion for
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suit exception to municipal limitations is based on judicial reluctance
to permit suspects to escape by crossing jurisdictional lines, and the
perceived absurdity of requiring pursuing officers to cede their arrest
authority in the midst of exercising it. 15
Intrastate fresh pursuit is defined as "pursuit instituted immedi-
ately and with intent to recapture or reclaim, as where a thief is fleeing
with stolen goods. It is a relative term and has reference to time or
distance, or both, depending on the facts of the case."' t 6 The concept
of a "fresh" pursuit is characterized by certain essential elements.
First, the police must act without unnecessary delay.1" 7 Further, the
pursuit must be both continuous and uninterrupted, although the sus-
rehearing). It follows that if a state may not unilaterally authorize pursuit across state borders, see
infra notes 134-35, a municipality certainly could not do so.
115. State v. Bickham, 404 So.2d 929, 932-33 (La. 1981); State v. Foster, 60 Ohio Misc. 46, 396
N.E.2d 246, 254 (1979); Francis v. State, 498 S.W.2d 107, 114 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1973); Minor v. State,
153 Tex. Crim. 242, 247, 219 S.W.2d 467, 470 (1949).
Judicial statements extending arrest authority beyond municipal boundaries tend to assume the
same tone of overweening reasonableness. For example: "Surely it cannot be said with reason that the
authority of city policemen to arrest one committing public offenses in their sight and presence is termi-
nated and they become helpless and barred from arresting such an offender if he succeeds in outrunning
them to the city limits .... Francis, 498 S.W.2d at 114.
The apparent rationality of such a justification for extending the arrest authority of local police is
undermined markedly by the fact that, although the same rationale could be applied as easily to inter-
state or international fresh pursuit, neither is permitted absent specific legal authorization. See infra
notes 135 and 157-59 and accompanying text. No judicial explanation has been forthcoming as to why
municipal authority cannot be terminated at the jurisdictional boundary, but state and national author-
ity can.
116. Reyes v. Slayton, 331 F. Supp. 325, 327 (W.D. Va. 1971) (citations omitted). See also Cal-
lands v. Commonwealth, 208 Va. 340, 342-43, 157 S.E.2d 198, 201 (1967).
For example, the doctrine of fresh pursuit is not applicable if the suspect is not fleeing and does not
know he is being pursued. "While pursuit does not imply a fender-smashing Hollywood style chase
scene, it does connote something more than mere casual following." City of Wenatchee v. Durham, 43
Wash. App. 547, 551-52, 718 P.2d 819, 822 (1986).
117. Charnes v. Arnold, 198 Colo. 362, 365, 600 P.2d 64, 66 (1979); State v. Carey, 412 A.2d
1218, 1222 (Me. 1980); State v. Boardman, 264 N.W.2d 503, 507 (S.D. 1978).
For example, police act without unnecessary delay when they pursue a fleeing automobile. See,
e.g., McLarty v. State, 176 Ga. App. 433, 433, 336 S.E.2d 273, 274 (1985); Windschitl v. Commissioner
of Pub. Safety, 355 N.W.2d 146, 147-48 (Minn. 1984); Minor v. State, 153 Tex. Crim. 242, 243-44, 219
S.W.2d 467, 468 (1949); Banks v. Bradley, 191 Va. 598, 600-01, 66 S.E.2d 526, 527 (1951).
For other examples, see United States v. Bishop, 530 F.2d 1156, 1157 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 848 (1976) (police began tracking signal from "bait money" taken in bank robbery "very shortly"
after the robbery); Molan v. State, 614 P.2d 79, 80 (Okla. Crim. App. 1980) (police went in search of
robbers after "a few questions" at scene of crime); Commonwealth v. Brown, 298 Pa. Super. 11, 19, 444
A.2d 149, 153 (1982) (police began search for identified suspect immediately upon hearing broadcast of
robbery).
Maine has an apparently unique statutory system of determining unnecessary delay. In cases of
felonies, there must be "pursuit without unreasonable delay," while in cases of misdemeanors and traf-
fic offenses, law enforcement officers must engage in "instant pursuit." State v. Harding, 508 A.2d 471,
472 n.I, 473 (Me. 1986).
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pect need not be under actual surveillance the entire time.' 18  More-
over, the relationship in time between the crime, the commencement
of the pursuit, and the arrest is considered. There are no absolutes
here, but the greater the length of time, the less likely the courts are to
find that the pursuit is "fresh." ' ' 9
The common law doctrine in the majority of states was applicable
only to felony arrests,1 20 although a few state courts have noted that
the felony limitation was not universal. 21 Most states, however, have
superseded the common law doctrine by enacting statutory authority
for intrastate fresh pursuit.1 22 Some of these state laws adhere to the
majority common law rule limiting the right of intrastate fresh pursuit
118. Charnes v. Arnold, 198 Colo. 362, 365, 600 P.2d 64, 66 (1979); Commonwealth v. Brown,
298 Pa. Super. 11, 19, 444 A.2d 149, 153 (1982).
See, e.g., United States v. Getz, 381 F. Supp. 43, 46 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (police "proceeded dili-
gently.. and there was no hiatus or interruption in their efforts"); Reyes v. Slayton, 331 F. Supp. 325,
327 (W.D. Va. 1971) ("not fatal" to fresh pursuit that police did not see suspect until outside jurisdic-
tion where search was unbroken and clues indicated direction of suspect's flight); Commonwealth v.
Reddix, 355 Pa. Super. 514, 521, 513 A.2d 1041, 1044 (1986) (fresh pursuit doctrine is applicable "even
though the [arresting] officers were not originally at the scene of the crime but initiated their pursuit in
response to a radio broadcast to aid a fellow officer"); Commonwealth v. Phillips, 338 Pa. Super. 274,
277, 487 A.2d 962, 964 (1985) (no fresh pursuit where officer comes across suspects' vehicle by accident
after resuming routine patrol); Minor v. State, 153 Tex. Crim. 242, 245, 219 S.W.2d 467, 469 (1949)
(suspects were never out of pursuing officers' sight).
119. Charnes v. Arnold, 198 Colo. 362, 365, 600 P.2d 64, 66 (1979).
120. Op. Att'y Gen. Idaho 4 (1980); Banks v. Bradley, 192 Va. 598, 602-03, 66 S.E.2d 526, 528-29
(1951).
121. State v. Baldwin, 140 Vt. 501, 508, 438 A.2d 1135, 1138-39 (1981); People v. Sandoval, 65
Cal. 2d 303, 312, 419 P.2d 187, 192, 54 Cal. Rptr. 123, 128 (1966). See also Op. Att'y Gen. Idaho 4
(1980).
The California Supreme Court noted: "We can find no reason, either in the historical origins of the
doctrine or in its contemporary rationale, to impose these limitations." Sandoval, 65 Cal. 2d at 312,
419 P.2d at 192, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 128 (footnotes omitted). The court went on to state, however, that
despite the felony limitation, fresh pursuit authority should not be denied "[s]o long as officers reason-
ably believe, as did the officers in this case, that a felony has recently been committed within their
jurisdiction and that the felon might escape unless promptly apprehended .. " Id. at 313, 419 P.2d at
193, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 129.
122. A somewhat dated listing of intrastate fresh pursuit statutes is found in Wagner, Patterns of
State Laws Relating to "Fresh Pursuit": Preliminary Draft (Workshop in Political Theory and Policy
Analysis, Indiana University, 1975)(at tables I & 3).
In some states, fresh pursuit statutes have been interpreted to authorize not only pursuit in order
to arrest, but also pursuit for the purpose of conducting a Terry stop [Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)].
State v. Merchant, 490 So.2d 336, 339 (La. Ct. App. 1986); State v. Dahlheimer, 413 N.W.2d 255, 257
(Minn. Ct. App. 1987); Commonwealth v. Montgomery, 513 Pa. 138, 144, 518 A.2d 1197, 1201 (1986),
cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1579 (1987). The justification generally given is that police need not have
probable cause to arrest at the time they cross their jurisdictional limits, but only at the time they make
the arrest. Montgomery, 513 Pa. at 144-46, 518 A.2d at 1200-01. One court has noted also its belief
that a close pursuit stop is within the "spirit" of the state fresh pursuit statute. State v. Bickham, 404
So.2d 929, 932 (La. 1981). In dissent, one justice has argued that investigation should not justify fresh
pursuit because the purpose of a Terry stop is to prevent presently occurring criminal activity, whereas
the purpose of fresh pursuit is the apprehension of a suspect where a crime has already been committed.
Montgomery, 513 Pa. at 147-49, 518 A.2d at 1202 (Zappala, J., dissenting).
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to felonies,' 2 3 while others authorize the right in cases of "criminal
offenses," '124 crimes and misdemeanors, 125 or the full range of felonies,
misdemeanors, and traffic offenses. 126  In addition, it generally is rec-
ognized that law enforcement officers in fresh pursuit may arrest the
suspect not only for the original offense, but also for violations com-
mitted during the course of the pursuit, even if those violations occur
outside the arresting officer's jurisdiction.127
The intrastate fresh pursuit doctrine contains within it major
stumbling blocks to its application on Native reservations. First, the
doctrine is governed largely by state statute, and, absent Public Law
280 jurisdiction, 121 state criminal laws have no force or effect within
reservation boundaries.1 29 Second, the extent of the right as defined by
123. Op. Att'y Gen. Ark. No. 87-347 (1987); Reyes v. Slayton, 331 F. Supp. 325, 327 (W.D. Va.
1971); State v. Foster, 60 Ohio Misc. 46, 396 N.E.2d 246, 254 (1979); State v. Boardman, 264 N.W.2d
503, 507 (S.D. 1978).
124. People v. Hamilton, 666 P.2d 152, 154-55 (Colo. 1983); State v. Melvin, 53 N.C. App. 421,
428, 281 S.E.2d 97, 102 (1981).
125. State v. McCarthy, 123 N.J. Super. 513, 520, 303 A.2d 626, 630 (1973) (high misdemeanors
and criminal offenses); State v. Baldwin, 140 Vt. 501, 508-12, 438 A.2d 1135, 1139-41 (1981) (criminal
or "other laws" held to include misdemeanors).
126. State v. Cochran, 372 A.2d 193, 195 (Del. 1977); Edwards v. State, 462 So.2d 581, 582 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1985); State v. Carey, 412 A.2d 1218, 1219 (Me. 1980).
As noted earlier, while Maine permits fresh pursuit for all violations, the standard for determining
whether the pursuit is "fresh" differs between felonies ("pursuit without unreasonable delay") and mis-
demeanors and traffic offenses ("instant pursuit"). See supra note 117.
127. State v. Cochran, 372 A.2d 193, 196 (Del. 1977) (upon immediate and continuous fresh
pursuit, a "pursuing officer may arrest for any violation which occurs during the pursuit regardless of
the place of the offense"); McLarty v. State, 176 Ga. App. 433, 435, 336 S.E.2d 273, 276 (1985) ("any
other offense observed at the time of the stop, when the officer was lawfully in a place he was authorized
to be, would be permissible to be added to the original offense which authorized" the pursuit); Delude
v. Raasakka, 391 Mich. 296, 302-03, 215 N.W.2d 685, 689 (1974) (if fresh pursuit is justified, police
officers assaulted during arrest for initial offense also have the right to arrest without warrant for the
assault); Windschitl v. Commissioner of Pub. Safety, 355 N.W.2d 146, 148 (Minn. 1984) ("when the
conduct of the offender during the course of the pursuit and arrest furnishes separate and distinct
grounds for arrest, the police officer may arrest the offender for the additional offense").
128. Public Law 280 (see supra section II.B.2.a.) renders the question moot by extending state
criminal jurisdiction over reservations. On Public Law 280 reservations, municipal law enforcement
officers apparently would have the same right to cross into the reservation as to cross any other jurisdic-
tional boundaries. And county sheriffs going onto the reservation may not be crossing any judicially-
recognized criminal jurisdiction boundary at all.
129. An opinion on fresh pursuit authority by the Wisconsin Attorney General set up the follow-
ing syllogism: (I) Wisconsin statutorily has extended municipal fresh pursuit authority to the entire
state; (2) there is "no persuasive evidence" of congressional intent to exempt from the intrastate fresh
pursuit doctrine Natives who flee onto reservations; and therefore (3) local officers may make fresh
pursuit arrests within reservation borders. 74 Op. Att'y Gen. Wis. 245, 247-48, 257 (1985). This rea-
soning, however, does not survive the fact that, outside of Public Law 280, Wisconsin has no power
unilaterally to extend its municipal officers' jurisdiction over the territory of Native reservations. See
supra notes 39-41, 48, and 50-53. Neither should it survive the oft-cited rule that state laws apply only
where Congress expressly has so provided. This aspect of the Wisconsin opinion is discussed infra at
note 198.
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statute generally extends throughout the county or state; 3 ° in the ab-
sence of more restrictive statutory territorial limits, the right has been
restricted expressly to the confines of the state."'3 This limitation rep-
resents a recognition that the laws of the state can have no force where
the state has no jurisdiction. Just as a state may not authorize its mu-
nicipal law enforcement officers to engage in fresh pursuit into another
state, because the authorizing state has no criminal jurisdiction in the
bordering state, so a state cannot authorize its officers to cross the
jurisdictional boundaries of the reservation. 32  Moreover, the intra-
state doctrine of fresh pursuit authorizes officers to arrest not only for
the original violation, but also for offenses that occur during the pur-
suit, even if the later offenses take place outside the officer's territorial
jurisdiction. 33 Application of this doctrine to Native reservations
would lead to the exercise of unauthorized state criminal jurisdiction
within reservation boundaries. A municipal police officer pursuing a
suspect onto the reservation would be empowered to arrest for a crime
occurring on the reservation during the pursuit, even though under
other circumstances the officer would have no jurisdiction to arrest for
on-reservation crimes.
130. For example, Wisconsin's intrastate fresh pursuit statute is set out at WIs. STAT. § 175.40
(1985):
Any peace officer, as defined in s. 939.22(22) may, when in fresh pursuit, follow anywhere
in the state and arrest any person or persons for violation of any law or ordinance the officer
is authorized to enforce.
The term "state," for purposes of Wisconsin criminal jurisdiction, is defined at Wis. STAT. § 939.03(2)
(1987), as "includ[ing] [all] area within the boundaries of the state, and area over which the state
exercises concurrent jurisdiction under art. IX, section 1, of the [Wisconsin] constitution."
Other jurisdictional limits on the right of intrastate fresh pursuit are listed in Wagner, supra note
122, at table 1.
131. Minor v. State, 153 Tex. Crim. 242, 249-51, 219 S.W.2d 467, 472 (1949) (on motion for
rehearing).
132. The Kansas Supreme Court held recently that a state statute authorizing police to arrest
within city limits or "in any other place.,. when in fresh pursuit" validated an arrest following pursuit
onto a federal military reservation. City of Junction City v. Riley, 240 Kan. 614, 731 P.2d 310, cert.
denied, 107 S. Ct. 3191 (1987). The court found that although Kansas had ceded to the United States
exclusive jurisdiction over the reservation, there was "no controlling federal statute or regulation with
regard to criminal jurisdiction on the Fort Riley military reservation" and no federal common law. Id.
at -, 731 P.2d at 313. In the absence of federal law, the court stated, the applicable law within the
military reservation was Kansas law, which in this case permitted the fresh pursuit arrest. Id. at -,
731 P.2d at 312-13.
The exact rationale of the Kansas court is difficult to cull from its opinion. Nevertheless, the Riley
decision should have no bearing on the validity of similar fresh pursuit arrests on Native reservations.
There is within Native reservations controlling tribal as well as federal law with regard to criminal
jurisdiction. Absent an affirmative grant of criminal jurisdiction to the state, jurisdiction within Indian
country "is in the tribe and the Federal Government." DeCoteau v. District County Court, 420 U.S.
425, 427 n.2 (1975). The law applicable to a fresh pursuit arrest on a Native reservation, therefore, is
tribal and federal law, not the law of the pursuing state.
133. State v. Cochran, 372 A.2d 193, 196 (Del. 1977); COUNCIL OF STATE GOv'TS, THE HAND-
BOOK ON INTERSTATE CRIME CONTROL 151 (1978 ed.).
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Use of the intrastate doctrine to justify fresh pursuit arrests on
the reservation, therefore, raises the initial pungent aroma of the state
camel under the sovereign tribal tipi. Reliance on this model of fresh
pursuit would permit the state to exercise an unwarranted degree of
criminal jurisdiction within reservation boundaries, thereby increasing
the likelihood of further domestic encroachments on tribal
sovereignty.
2. Interstate Fresh Pursuit
A state has no inherent authority to extend its police powers or its
criminal jurisdiction into another state.1 34  Officers of one state are
permitted to arrest a suspect following fresh pursuit into another state
only if that authority exists at common law or has been granted to
them by enactment by the host state of the Uniform Act on Fresh
Pursuit. 3 ' The validity of an arrest following interstate fresh pursuit
is determined by the law of the state where the arrest occurs, rather
than that of the state where the crime is committed. 36
The Uniform Act on Fresh Pursuit is designed to protect the citi-
zens of the state of arrest by ensuring more rapid apprehension of po-
134. McLean v. Mississippi ex. rel. Roy, 96 F.2d 741, 745 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 623
(1938) ("The State of Mississippi has no power to extend the authority of its sheriffs into another
State."); United States v. Trunko, 189 F. Supp. 559, 563 (E.D. Ark. 1960)(county deputy sheriff "had
no right to [arrest and] seize [defendant] in Arkansas and remove him to Ohio"); Kirkes v. Askew, 32
F. Supp. 802, 804 (E.D. Okla. 1940)(warrant of arrest cannot be executed in a state other than that in
which issued); Six Feathers v. State, 611 P.2d 857, 861 (Wyo. 1980)(at common law, law enforcement
officer cannot effect arrest in another jurisdiction unless in fresh pursuit of suspected felon). See also
COUNCIL OF STATE Gov'Ts, supra note 133, at 97 ("Each state border... marks the territorial limita-
tion on the execution of the state's policy on criminal justice expressed in its criminal and penal
statutes.").
135. United States v. Holmes, 380 A.2d 598, 600 (D.C. App. 1977); District of Columbia v.
Perry, 215 A.2d 845, 847 (D.C. App. 1966); People v. Fenton, 154 III. App. 3d 152, 506 N.E.2d 979,
980 (1987); People v. Jacobs, 67 Ill. App. 3d 447, 449, 385 N.E.2d 137, 139 (1979).
The text of the Uniform Act on Fresh Pursuit is reprinted in COUNCIL OF STATE GOV'Ts, supra
note 133, at 147-48. Forty-two states and the District of Columbia have adopted some variation of the
Act. See, e.g., listing at Wis. STAT. § 976.04 (Supp. 1987). The now somewhat dated information in
Wagner, supra note 122, at table 6, indicates that of the 41 states that had then enacted the uniform
law, eight had amended it to require reciprocity and two to permit pursuit for any offense.
136. Crawford v. State, 479 So.2d 1349, 1353 (Ala. Crim. App. 1985); People v. Jacobs, 67 IIl.
App. 3d 447, 449, 385 N.E.2d 137, 139 (1979); People v. Clark, 46 I1. App. 3d 240, 243, 360 N.E.2d
1160, 1163 (1977); Hutchinson v. State, 38 Md. App. 160, 166, 380 A.2d 232, 235 (1977); Boddie v.
State, 6 Md. App. 523, 531, 252 A.2d 290, 294 (1969).
The result can be confusing for law enforcement officers. For example, Kansas borders on Colo-
rado, Oklahoma, Nebraska, and Missouri. The "uniform" laws of Kansas and Colorado permit a fresh
pursuit arrest of a person suspected of committing "a crime" in the originating jurisdiction, while the
statutes of the other three states permit a fresh pursuit arrest only of a person suspected of committing a
felony. As a result, Kansas law enforcement officers may pursue some suspects into Colorado, but not
into Oklahoma, Nebraska, or Missouri. Op. Att'y Gen. Kan. 87-80 (1987).
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tentially dangerous suspects. 37  In virtually all states, the Uniform
Act authorizes a law enforcement officer to enter another state "in
fresh pursuit of a person in order to arrest him on the ground that he
is believed to have committed a felony in such State."' a The Act de-
fines fresh pursuit both statutorily and by incorporating the common
law definition, and seeks to avoid the Hollywood car chase syndrome
by stating that fresh pursuit does not necessarily mean instant pursuit
but rather pursuit without unreasonable delay.' 39
The substantive requirements that the Uniform Act imposes on
foreign police are reasonable grounds to believe the suspect committed
a felony, pursuit within a reasonable period of time, and continuous
and uninterrupted pursuit. II Other factors concerning the exigencies
of the particular situation also are important in determining whether
the pursuit is "fresh.""'' In addition, the suspect must be fleeing for
137. Swain v. State, 50 Md. App. 29, 38, 435 A.2d 805, 810 (1981):
The D.C. city limit is an artificial political border which criminals do not respect and use to
their own advantage when committing crimes. In many cases the effect of the statute will
be a much quicker apprehension of the suspect, who is potentially dangerous to D.C. citi-
zens, than would occur if the foreign police were required to stop at the D.C. border and
notify the D.C. police....
138. District of Columbia Fresh Pursuit Act, D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-901 (1973) (quoted in Swain,
50 Md. App. at 36, 435 A.2d at 809) (current codification at D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-901 (1981)).
The felony giving rise to the pursuit must be a felony in the originating jurisdiction. See State v.
Malone, 106 Wash. 2d 607, 608-10, 724 P.2d 364, 365-66 (1986), where the court held that an Idaho
officer who pursued a suspect into Washington for an offense that was a felony in Washington, but not
in Idaho, lacked fresh pursuit jurisdiction to arrest.
In some states the Uniform Act applies also to misdemeanors. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38,
para. 107-4(b) (Smith-Hurd 1980) ("an offense in [an]other State"); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-2404(2)
(1981) ("crime in [an]other state"); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-6-411 (1987) ("a crime"). The practical
difficulties that can arise, particularly where the originating jurisdiction is surrounded by states with
differing requirements, have been addressed by the Kansas attorney general. See supra note 136.
139. A typical example is the South Dakota statute, S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 23A-3-14
(1979 and Supp. 1986), which provides:
The term "fresh pursuit" as used in secs. 23A-3-10 to 23A-3-14, inclusive, shall include
fresh pursuit as defined by the common law, and also the pursuit of a person who has
committed a felony or who is reasonably suspected of having committed a felony. It shall
also include the pursuit of a person suspected of having committed a supposed felony,
though no felony has actually been committed, if there is reasonable ground for believing
that a felony has been committed. Fresh pursuit as used in this title shall not necessarily
imply instant pursuit, but pursuit without unreasonable delay.
140. Swain v. State, 50 Md. App. 29, 38-40, 435 A.2d 805, 810-11 (1981). See also State v. Till-
man, 208 Kan. 954, 957-58, 494 P.2d 1178, 1182 (1972).
141. A number of these factors were enumerated in Six Feathers v. State, 611 P.2d 857, 861
(Wyo. 1980):
Immediate or fresh pursuit does not require the pursuer to keep the pursued in sight. It
does not require recognition by the pursued that he is being pursued. But it does require (as
recited in the South Dakota statute) the pursuit to be undertaken without unreasonable
delay. The nature of the crime, the activities and location of the pursuer after receiving a
report of the commission of the crime, the activities and location of the pursued after com-
mission of the crime, whether or not the pursued had been identified or would escape, the
extent and nature of the evidence connecting the pursued with the crime, and the potential
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the purpose of avoiding arrest, although the suspect need not be aware
of the pursuit.42
These substantive provisions of the Uniform Act generally are en-
forced on behalf of suspects. Where interstate fresh pursuit arrests for
misdemeanors or traffic offenses are not authorized by the Act, for
example, the arrests have been deemed invalid or evidence has been
suppressed. 4 3 On the other hand, where the pursuit is triggered by a
misdemeanor, but the pursuing officer learns of a felony during the
chase, the felony will validate the subsequent arrest, at least where the
felony was committed in the pursuing officer's jurisdiction. 1"
By contrast, the procedural aspects of the Uniform Act seldom
are enforced on behalf of the suspect. The basic procedure mandated
by the Act is that the suspect is entitled to a hearing in the state of
arrest, prior to being returned to the state where the violation oc-
curred, to determine the lawfulness of the arrest. 45 Almost without
exception, state courts have denied relief for the arresting state's fail-
for the pursued to cause immediate and additional injury or damage to others are examples
of the circumstances to be considered in the determination as to whether or not the pursuit
was without unreasonable delay.
142. People v. Wolfbrandt, 127 I11. App. 3d 836, 841, 469 N.E.2d 305, 310 (1984); State v. Fer-
rell, 218 Neb. 463, 466, 356 N.W.2d 868, 870 (1984); State v. Goff, 174 Neb. 548, 555, 118 N.W.2d 625,
630 (1962); Six Feathers v. State, 611 P.2d 857, 861 (Wyo. 1980).
143. District of Columbia v. Perry, 215 A.2d 845, 847 (D.C. 1966); People v. Fenton, 154 Ill.
App. 3d 152, 506 N.E.2d 979, 981 (1987); Op. Att'y Gen. I11. No. 82-057 (1982). But see supra note
138.
The courts also have deemed invalid, as outside an officer's fresh pursuit authority, an arrest for an
offense that was a felony in the host jurisdiction, but not in the originating jurisdiction. State v. Ma-
lone, 106 Wash. 2d 607, 608-10, 724 P.2d 364, 365-66 (1986).
144. Crawford v. State, 479 So.2d 1349, 1353 (Ala. Crim. App. 1985). An Alabama officer in
fresh pursuit of a suspect for the misdemeanor of reckless driving learned during the chase that the tag
number of the suspect's car belonged to a stolen truck. The court noted:
Since the appellant was stopped only one-quarter of a mile into Florida, it is most likely
that this information was obtained during the chase while still in Alabama. Thus, when
[the officer] stopped the appellant, he did have reason to suspect the appellant had commit-
ted a felony in the State of Alabama and was empowered to arrest the appellant according
to [the Florida Uniform Act].
145. The Wisconsin law is typical. WIS. STAT. § 976.04(2) (1986), provides that an officer effect-
ing an arrest following interstate fresh pursuit:
... shall without unnecessary delay take the person arrested before a judge of the county in
which the arrest was made, who shall conduct a hearing for the purpose of determining the
lawfulness of the arrest. If the judge determines that the arrest was lawful he shall commit
the person arrested to await for a reasonable time the issuance of an extradition warrant by
the governor of this state or admit him to bail for such purpose. If the judge determines
that the arrest was unlawful he shall discharge the person arrested.
In other states, the presiding judicial officer is authorized, pending a determination of lawful arrest,
to commit the suspect, not to custody to await the issuance of a warrant of extradition, but "to the
custody of the officer making the arrest, who shall without unnecessary delay take him to the state from
which he fled." See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-6-411(2) (1987). Although Montana has enacted
the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act, MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 46-30-201 et seq. (1987), that Act appar-
ently is limited to situations not involving the exigencies of fresh pursuit.
UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59
ure to comply with the procedure, generally relying upon the Ker-Fris-
bie rule146 that the illegality of the defendant's arrest does not divest
the court of personal jurisdiction over the suspect. 147  A few courts
have indicated discomfort with the notion of unchecked procedural
violations,' 48 but apparently only one court has reversed a conviction
because of failure to comply with the Uniform Act's procedures.149
146. See supra section II.C.3.
147. Soles v. State, 16 Md. App. 656, 670, 299 A.2d 502, 511 (1973); Boddie v. State, 6 Md. App.
523, 534-35, 252 A.2d 290, 296 (1969); People v. Bacon, 84 Misc. 2d 679, 682, 376 N.Y.S.2d 839, 841
(1975); People v. Walls, 35 N.Y.2d 419, 424, 321 N.E.2d 875, 876, 363 N.Y.S.2d 82, 83-84 (1974), cert.
denied, 421 U.S. 951 (1975); State v. Ferrell, 218 Neb. 463, 468-69, 356 N.W.2d 868, 871-72 (1984).
The Maryland court noted that the hearing requirement "is essentially procedural in nature,"
explaining:
[W]e do not mean to imply that Maryland officers making arrests in the District of Colum-
bia under that jurisdiction's Uniform Act on Fresh Pursuit may with impunity ignore the
provisions of Section 502. We hold, however, under the circumstances of this case, that the
arrest of appellants and the search of their vehicle were lawful when made and that they are
not voided by failure of the Maryland officers to comply with the procedural provisions of
Section 502.
Boddie, 6 Md..App. at 534-35, 252 A.2d at 296. The court appears to imply, despite its caveat, that
officers making an otherwise lawful arrest may in fact ignore with impunity the act's procedural re-
quirements.
The state's failure to comply with the correct procedures also has been deemed not to void the
arrest when the defendant either returned voluntarily to the pursuing jurisdiction or waived extradition.
Crawford v. State, 479 So.2d 1349, 1353-54 (Ala. Crim. App. 1985) ("since the appellant returned
voluntarily to Alabama with Officer Hutcheson, the fact that he was not taken before a judge in Florida
does not render his arrest illegal") (emphasis in original); United States v. Holmes, 380 A.2d 598, 601-
02 (D.C. App. 1977) (evidence suppressed in criminal trial where suspect's "consent to accompany the
Maryland officers without an extradition hearing was not voluntary," in part because police did not
explain to suspect his right to a hearing to determine the lawfulness of his arrest) (emphasis in original);
Six Feathers v. State, 611 P.2d 857, 862 (Wyo. 1980) (although suspect was not taken before a South
Dakota magistrate for a hearing, "[iun this instance appellant waived extradition, and the purpose of the
hearing was nullified"). Cf. State v. Tillman, 208 Kan. 954, 958, 494 P.2d 1178, 1182 (1972) (suspects
were taken before a Missouri magistrate, where "[b]oth appellants voluntarily waived extradition and
they were returned to the State of Kansas. The record establishes a full compliance with the require-
ments of the Missouri Uniform Law on Fresh Pursuit.").
148. State v. Goff, 174 Neb. 548, 555, 118 N.W.2d 625, 631 (1962) (noting with disapproval the
state's failure to comply with procedures); People v. Walls, 35 N.Y.2d 419, 424, 321 N.E.2d 875, 876,
363 N.Y.S.2d 82, 83 (1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 951 (1975) (noting that "(i]n a proper case" relief
may be granted); State v. Bonds, 98 Wash. 2d 1, 653 P.2d 1024 (1982). In Bonds, the Washington
Supreme Court noted that:
Unauthorized police excursions into neighboring states would certainly be deterred by a
refusal to admit evidence obtained as a result of such activities. However, we feel that in
this case alternative deterrents are available. The police officers concede that they were
acting as private citizens in Oregon and therefore may well be exposed to civilian criminal
or civil liability for unlawful arrest under Oregon law. ... If such potential liability does
not constitute sufficient deterrence of police officers' making unauthorized excursions into
another jurisdiction, let it be understood that we will not hesitate in the future to use our
supervisory power to exclude the fruits of such unauthorized excursions.
Id. at 13, 653 P.2d at 1031 (citations omitted).
149. People v. Jacobs, 67 Ill. App. 3d 447, 450-51, 385 N.E.2d 137, 140 (1979). The Jacobs court
reversed the defendant's convictions for murder and robbery, and remanded for a new trial in which the
defendant's confessions were to be suppressed as the fruits of an illegal arrest. The court noted: "None
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At first blush, the doctrine of interstate fresh pursuit has features
attractive to the development of principles governing fresh pursuit
onto Native reservations."' 0 Principally, the Interstate Act recognizes
of the mandates set forth in the Uniform Fresh Pursuit Law of Iowa were complied with by the arrest-
ing officer from Illinois. They were both blithely and summarily ignored ..... Id.
Despite the courts' reluctance to invalidate arrests, suspects whose procedural rights are violated
may have a cause of action for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982), which addresses violations of
civil rights under color of state law. Compare Draper v. Coombs, 792 F.2d 915, 921-22 (9th Cir. 1986)
(technical violations of Oregon fresh pursuit statute may state a claim under § 1983; nominal damages
are available even if defendant suffers no actual damages), with Cole v. Williams, 798 F.2d 280, 283 (8th
Cir. 1986) (affirmed grant of judgment n.o.v. from jury award of $5000 for procedural violations of
Arkansas fresh pursuit statute, on ground that suspects "suffered no damages").
150. The National American Indian Court Judges Association has recommended that the Uni-
form Act on Fresh Pursuit be amended to include tribal police, and that laws consistent with the Act be
enacted by tribes. NAT'L AM. INDIAN CT. JUDGES ASS'N, 4 JUSTICE AND THE AMERICAN INDIAN:
EXAMINATION OF THE BASIS OF TRIBAL LAW AND ORDER AUTHORITY 68-71 (1974) [hereinafter
cited as 4 JUSTICE AND THE AMERICAN INDIAN]. See also infra note 183.
A second, albeit potentially more cumbersome, solution to the unchecked border incursions of
state officers onto reservations may lie in tribal-state compacts or agreements. These may be akin to the
existing cross-deputization agreements presently in effect between Native-state sovereigns in several
areas of the country. See supra note 31. While such a criminal pursuit agreement doubtlessly could be
negotiated successfully to the mutual advantage of the contiguous sovereigns, it may be that existing
domestic law would not permit such an agreement to be implemented simply on the accession of the
tribe and state inter se.
Under federal law, any jurisdictional change in the tribal-state relationship can be accomplished
solely through the formal process prescribed by Congress in the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968. See
discussion and text supra notes 42-43. See also Kennerly v. District Court, 400 U.S. 423, 427 (1971)
(unilateral action by Blackfoot tribal council attempting to grant state concurrent jurisdiction over civil
suits failed because state jurisdiction was not assumed in a manner consistent with Pub. L. 280, which
required affirmative legislative act); White v. Califano, 437 F. Supp. 543, 551 (D.S.D. 1977) (state could
not act on tribal court involuntary commitment order for reservation resident because "there would be
a point where the state [impermissibly] would be vested with jurisdiction with tribal consent");
Blackwolf v. District Court, 158 Mont. 523, 493 P.2d 1293 (1972) (tribal court transfer, in conformity
with Cheyenne tribal law, of jurisdiction over nonconsenting reservation juvenile to state court for
placement in off-reservation detention/treatment facility was void because state court lacked jurisdic-
tion to accept tribal court order).
It is not clear, however, that a grant by a tribe to the state of authority to engage in fresh pursuit
across reservation boundaries alters the jurisdictional relationship between the two sovereigns. Hence,
it is equally uncertain that federal approval of such an arrangement would need be sought. States are
encumbered by the compact clause of the Constitution to obtain congressional approval for any inter-
state or state-foreign power agreement, regardless of form or formality, that would tend to increase the
political power of the state at the expense of federal supremacy. U.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax
Comm'n, 434 US. 452, 470-71 (1978); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3 ("No State shall, without the
Consent of Congress... enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State, or with a foreign
Power."). While the "foreign Power" language of the clause may limit a state's ability to treat with a
Native nation, the applicability of the Compact Clause to state-tribal agreements has not been ad-
dressed directly by the courts. Compare United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407, 414 (1886) (extradi-
tion agreement between a state and a foreign nation violates the Compact Clause), with the Reciprocal
Extradition Agreement between the Sisseton-Wahpeton Sioux Tribe and the State of South Dakota,
discussed supra note 79, which apparently was concluded without congressional involvement.
Conceptually, even if the constitutional constraint on state cooperation does apply to state-tribal
compacts, the tribes themselves are not bound by the Compact Clause. In the Cherokee cases, Chief
Justice Marshall held that tribes had lost their sovereign power to treat with foreign governments other
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the sovereignty of state borders: crossing a state line in fresh pursuit is
permissible only if and as authorized by the law of the asylum state.
Application of the interstate doctrine to Native reservations necessar-
ily would represent state acknowledgement of tribal sovereignty over
both the territory of the reservation and the subject matter of criminal
justice. Significantly too, defendants arrested in violation of the Act's
substantive provisions generally have been granted relief, ensuring that
Native suspects pursued across reservation boundaries could not be
validly arrested for misdemeanors or traffic offenses unless the tribe's
law expressly permitted such fresh pursuit arrests. On the negative
side, however, the interstate fresh pursuit doctrine generally disre-
gards procedural violations, and thus effectively would permit state
officers to violate tribal sovereignty with virtual impunity by simply
conveying the suspect off the reservation and into the personal juris-
diction of the state courts. As a consequence of judicial tolerance of
procedural neglect, the recognition of tribal sovereignty promised by
the interstate doctrine is ultimately a mirage.
3. International Hot Pursuit
The basic elements of the doctrine of hot pursuit in international
law t t are identical to the components of intra- and interstate fresh
pursuit: the pursuit must be immediate, continuous, and uninter-
rupted. 5 2 Recognition of the right of hot pursuit is grounded in the
juridical fiction that the arrest occurs in the country where the offense
is committed, although in fact the arrest takes place in another
jurisdiction. t'
Most writings on international hot pursuit have concentrated on
the right of pursuit from the pursuing nation's territorial waters onto
than the fledgling United States, Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17-18 (1831), and
Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 559 (1832), but Native nations never have been divested
expressly of their inherent sovereign power to enter into agreements with the lesser sovereigns within
the federal system. Thus, while consent of the Congress arguably is necessary for a state legitimately to
enter into a tribal-state compact, no similar procedural impediment constrains the inherent powers of
Native nations.
151. In international law, at least as reflected in the literature, the doctrine generally is referred to
as "hot" pursuit. Consequently, that term will be used in this section.
152. Note, The Right of Hot Pursuit from Exclusive Fishery Zones: United States v. "F/V Taiyo
Maru, No. 28," 15 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 336, 346 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Right of Hot Pur-
suit]; N. POULANTZAS, THE RIGHT OF HOT PURSUIT IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 1-2 (1969).
153. Williams, The Juridical Basis of Hot Pursuit, 20 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 83, 84 (1939):
Where an arrest or seizure is effected upon fresh pursuit, it is, in general, deemed to have
been effected both at the time at which, and at the place from which, the pursuit began.
[Tlhe general rule is that the culprit is not allowed to derive any legal advantage from his
vain attempts at escape. He is in the same position as if he had been arrested at the
beginning.
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the high seas. This customary right,154 as an exception to the histori-
cal maritime doctrine of freedom of the high seas,155 is premised on
the fact that pursuit on the high seas does not infringe on the territo-
rial sovereignty of any state. 15 6 There is, however, no customary right
of hot pursuit on land as there is at sea.157 Hot pursuit on land,
154. Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice outlines four sources from
which international "rules" may be derived: treaties, international custom, general principles of law,
and juridical writings and those of highly qualified academic authorities. "Custom" then is a primary
source of international law. A norm rises to the level of interna tional custom when there is "evidence
of a general practice accepted as law." STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE art.
38(l)(b); 1 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 26 (H. Lauterpacht ed. 8th ed. 1955) (defining cus-
tom as "a clear and continuous habit of doing certain actions [which] has grown up under the aegis of
the conviction that these actions are... obligatory or right"); RESTATEMENT OF THE FOREIGN RELA-
TIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (REVISED) § 102(2) (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1985).
The requirement that a rule command the "general assent of civilized nations" to become
binding upon them is a stringent one. Were this not so, the courts of one nation might feel
free to impose idiosyncratic legal rules upon others, in the name of applying international
law.
Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 881 (2d Cir. 1980). The formation of customary international law
thus is comprised of two essential elements: "a general practice of States, and the acceptance by States
of this general practice as the law." H. THIRLWAY, INTERNATIONAL CUSTOMARY LAW AND CODIFI-
CATION 46 (1972) (quoting G. SCHWARTZENBERGER, MANUAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 32 (1967)).
A brief but excellent precis of international customary law is presented by Sohn, "Generally Accepted"
International Rules, 61 WASH. L. REV. 1073 (1986).
155. "Hot pursuit" of unauthorized foreign vessels from territorial coastal waters onto the high
seas is an ancient doctrine of the law of nations. See M. WHITEMAN, 4 DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW 677-87 (1965) [hereinafter cited as DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW], and the discussion of early
Canadian and American cases presented in P. JESSUp, THE LAW OF TERRITORIAL WATERS AND MAR-
ITIME JURISDICTION 106-11 (1927). For reference, see "Freedom of the High Seas," RESTATEMENT OF
THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (REVISED) § 521 (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1985).
156. The S.S. Lotus Case, 1927 P.C.I.J. (Ser. A) No. 10, at 25 (reprinted in part in J.-G. CASTEL,
INTERNATIONAL LAW 621 (3d ed. 1976)):
It is certainly true that - apart from certain special cases which are defined by interna-
tional law - vessels on the high seas are subject to no authority except that of the State
whose flag they fly. In virtue of the principle of the freedom of the seas, that is to say, the
absence of any territorial sovereignty upon the high seas, no State may exercise any kind of
jurisdiction over foreign vessels upon them.
See also Maidment, Historical Aspects of the Doctrine of Hot Pursuit, 46 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 365, 380-
81 (1972-73); POULANTZAS, supra note 152, at 39.
The right of hot pursuit at sea was codified in 1958 in the Convention on the High Seas:
The hot pursuit of a foreign ship may be undertaken when the competent authorities of the
coastal State have good reason to believe that the ship has violated the laws and regulations
of that State. Such pursuit must be commenced when the foreign ship or one of its boats is
within the internal waters or the territorial sea or the contiguous zone of the pursuing State,
and may only by continued outside the territorial sea or the contiguous zone if the pursuit
has not been interrupted.
Geneva Convention on the High Seas, April 29, 1958, art. 23, 13 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 450
U.N.T.S. 82, reprinted in part in CASTEL, supra, at 604. See generally Maidment, supra; Right of Hot
Pursuit, supra note 152; POULANTZAS, supra note 152, at 39-238. Of the three possible international
hot pursuit situations-land, sea, and air--only the right at sea has been codified. POULANTZAS, supra
note 152, at 1.
157. Williams, supra note 153, at 89 ("...Bynkershoek [writing in the year 1737] conceded the
same right of hot pursuit on land as he did on sea; no one would do so to-day."); POULANTZAS, supra
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rather, is permitted across international borders only with the express
consent of the countries involved.' 58
As an "exceptional prerogative," the right of hot pursuit across
national boundaries is sanctioned by international law only where an
agreement exists between the nations concerned. 59 The necessity of
an agreement arises because of the violation of national sovereignty
represented by the unauthorized crossing of a frontier. 6 ° In the ab-
note 152, at 11-12, 14-15. Poulantzas states that "hot pursuit on land did not succeed in crystallizing
into a definite and independent right in international law relying on custom." Id. at 15. He cites a
number of sources in support, but notes: "We cannot see therefore, why J. Verplaetse [citation omitted],
in his otherwise excellent article takes for granted the existence of a right of hot pursuit on land." Id. at
15 n.24. Accord 5 DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 155, at 216 (police in "hot pursuit"
may not cross an international border and arrest a fugitive in the territory of another state); RESTATE-
MENT OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (REVISED) § 432(2) (Tent. Draft
No. 6, 1985) ("A state's law enforcement officers may exercise their functions within the territory of
another state only with the consent of the other state.")
In a Native context, the absolute bar of national frontiers to the continued pursuit of fleeing "hos-
tiles" is reflected in the following anecdote:
Again and again Blackfeet warriors fleeing northward after a raiding attack watched with
growing amazement as the pursuing troops of the United States Army came to a sudden,
almost magical stop. Again and again, fleeing southward, they saw the same thing happen
as the Canadian Mounties reined to an abrupt halt. The tribes of the Blackfeet Confeder-
acy living along what is now the United States-Canadian border came to refer to that potent
but invisible demarcation as the "Medicine Line." It seemed to them almost a supernatural
manifestation. The Confederacy members had hunted, roamed, prayed and allied with
tribes from northern Alberta and Saskatchewan all the way down to Yellowstone. For
these Indian Nations, the "Medicine Line" was nearly impossible to comprehend: Man did
not divide a land; rather rivers and mountains interrupted the land's unity.
O'Brien, The Medicine Line: A Border Dividing Tribal Sovereignty, Economies and Families, 53 FORD-
HAM L. REV. 315, 315 (1984).
158. POULANTZAS, supra note 152, at 15-16. One commentator, however, has suggested that hot
pursuit across a land frontier might be justified, "if at all," by necessity. Williams, supra note 153, at
91. Another has indicated that the international principle of self-defense, "superior in the particular
circumstances to the right of territorial inviolability," may justify hot pursuit across national borders.
12 DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 155, at 75 (citing D. BOWEr, SELF-DEFENSE IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 38-41 (1958)). Bowett specifically referred to an incident in 1836 in which U.S.
troops pursued "marauding Indians" into Mexico, and which American diplomats justified based on
the principle of self-defense.
159. POULANTZAS, supra note 152, at 2. "[flor the crossing of the boundaries of a State in
pursuit of wrongdoers the express consent of that State is necessary." Id. at 3 n. 18.
For example, in 1882 the United States and Mexico concluded the Treaty on Reciprocal Consent
to Pursue Savage Hostile Indian Marauders Across the Border. See id. at 13; Williams, supra note 153,
at 91 n.3. This bilateral convention was renegotiated several times over the next II years to provide
"for the reciprocal crossing, in the unpopulated or desert parts of the international boundary line, by
the regular federal troops of the respective Governments, in pursuit of savage hostile Indians .. " 9
TREATIES AND OTHER AGREEMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: 1776-1949, at 847, 854,
881, 884, 889 (C.I. Bevans ed. 1972). These "Indians" were led by an Apache named "Kid" who had
been leading raids along the Arizona and New Mexico border and "evad[ing] pursuit made by troops of
the United States, by crossing the frontier of Mexico." Id. at 884. After repeated extensions of the
agreements, each for fixed periods of several years, the final treaty was to remain in effect "until Kid's
band of hostile Indians shall be wholly exterminated or rendered obedient to one of the two Govern-
ments." Id. at 890.
160. POULANTZAS, supra note 152, at 11-12:
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sence of a treaty or other agreement, the movement of a country's
States are very sensitive to incidents involving violations of their sovereignty by the
unauthorized crossing of their frontiers. A serious breach of international law arises when
a State sends its agents into the territory of another State to apprehend offenders ...
Therefore, pursuit on land has not succeeded in acquiring the character of a right in cus-
tomary international law, as is the case with hot pursuit in the international law of the sea.
This is the reason why a network of treaties between various States was necessary permit-
ting and expressly providing for hot pursuit on land on a basis of reciprocity and only under
special conditions.
See also 12 DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 155, at 75 (referring to hot pursuit on land as
a "derogation from the state's territorial sovereignty").
The principle of inviolability of territorial frontiers is central to international sovereignty. "It is a
fundamental principle of the law of nations that a sovereign state is supreme within its territorial do-
main and that it and its nationals are entitled to use and enjoy their territory and property without
interference from an outside source." Trail Smelter Arbitration (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R. Int'l Arb. Awards
1905 (1941), reprinted in 35 AM. J. INT'L L. 684 (1941). See also The Schooner Exchange v.
M'Faddon, 1I U.S. (7 Cranch) 116,136 (1812); 2 J.B. MOORE, A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 4-
16 (1970). All persons within a state's boundaries, except those foreign emissaries receiving diplomatic
immunity, are subject to the exclusive power of that state. As a general rule, no state may exert juris-
diction over questions arising within another's boundaries. G. DAVIS, ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW 35 (1916). Moreover, a person within the territory of a state generally is subject only to the in
personam jurisdiction of that state. T. LAWRENCE, THE PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 199
(7th ed. 1923). Sovereignty in the international law context thus signifies a state's independence and
right to be free from external interference. DAVIS, supra, at 36. See also Isle of Palmas Case (Neth. v.
U.S.), 2 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 829, 838 (1928), reprinted in 22 AM. J. INT'L L. 867, 875 (1928) ("Sover-
eignty in the relations between states signifies independence. Independence in regard to a portion of the
globe is the right to exercise therein, to the exclusion of any other state, the functions of a State."). Cf
United Nations Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and
Cooperation Among States, G.A. Res. 2625, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No.28) at 121, U.N. Doe. A/8028
(1970) ("Every state has the duty to refrain from threat or use of force to violate the existing interna-
tional boundaries of another State .... )
Nonetheless, while territoriality is the predominant empirical basis of the current international
system, and the legal orders of sovereign states are anchored to defined territories, modern develop-
ments have rendered sovereignty a more relative concept. A myriad of elements, once the concern only
of the domestic nation-state, now demonstrate substantial transterritorial effects: international econo-
mies and multinational corporations, communications, terrorism, human rights, and pollution of the
global environment. To be sure, political sovereignty within a state's territorial frontiers is considered
still to be a requisite absolute and unfettered element of a state's self-determination; yet, a state's legal
sovereignty may be bound to international norms of conduct and in that sense is merely relative. See,
e.g., Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 881 (2d Cir. 1980)("U.N. Charter... makes it clear that in
this modern age, a state's treatment of its own citizens is a matter of international concern")(citation
omitted). For exemplary discussions of the restricted sovereignty doctrine, see Singer, Abandoning
Restrictive Sovereign Immunity: An Analysis in Terms of Jurisdiction to Prescribe, 26 HARV. INT'L L.J.
1 (1985); Fleiner-Gerster & Meyer, New Developments in Humanitarian Law: A Challenge to the Con-
cept of Sovereignty, 34 INT'L & COMp. L.Q. 267 (1985); Amato, The Concept of Human Rights in
International Law, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1110 (1982).
Sovereignty also creates a corollary duty upon every state to refrain from attempting to exercise its
sovereign powers within the territory of another state. 5 DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note
155, at 7. This duty, as it relates to the apprehension of fugitives, forbids one state from dispatching its
agents into the territory of another state to effect capture. Id. at 184 (citing 1 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 251 (4th ed 1928)). Under the United Nations Charter, all states must "refrain ... from
the threat or use of threat against the territorial integrity" of another state. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para.
4. This article has been interpreted broadly to mean that signatories are obligated not to violate the
territorial sovereignty of other states. United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267, 275-78 (2d Cir. 1974).
Similarly, article 17 of the Charter of the Organization of American States (OAS) provides that "the
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officers across a national frontier to apprehend a suspect entails a "se-
rious breach" of international law. 1 ' Virtually every treaty providing
for a transnational right of hot pursuit has mandated that suspects be
delivered to authorities of the nation where they are arrested, to await
extradition hearings."' 62 Violations of either national frontiers or
treaty provisions presumably confer on the injured state the right of
complaint to and redress by an international forum.' 63
The doctrine of hot pursuit in international law is the most auspi-
territory of a state is inviolable" and may not be subject to any measure of force by another state.
Charter of the OAS, Apr. 30, 1948, 2 U.S.T. 2394, T.I.A.S. No. 2361, 119 U.N.T.S. 3. This multilat-
eral agreement also is violated when a criminal defendant is abducted by foreign agents. Toscanino, 500
F.2d at 276.
Because of national sensitivities to unauthorized border intrusions, international agreements sanc-
tioning hot pursuit on land generally condition the right on reciprocity and adherence to strict and
specific conditions. POULANTZAS, supra note 152, at 347.
161. POULANTZAS, supra note 152, at 11. In a case presaging World War II, a German refugee
journalist living and working in Switzerland was abducted by Nazi agents and returned to Germany for
trial for treason. The Swiss government vehemently protested the gross violation of its territorial sover-
eignty and demanded a return of the dissident journalist. The matter was scheduled to be presented to
an international arbitral tribunal, but before the issue could be adjudicated, the public rancor of the
Swiss proved sufficient to force Germany to accede to its neighbor's demand. 5 DIGEST OF INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW, supra note 155, at 7 (Berthold Jacob Case (1935)). For an accounting of the incident, see
Preuss, Settlement of the Jacob Kidnapping Case, 30 AM. J. INT'L L. 123 (1936).
More recently, in June 1960 Argentina lodged a vigorous protest with the United Nations Security
Council that the abduction of Adolf Eichmann by Israeli agents in Argentina constituted an outrageous
violation of its sovereignty. The Security Council, careful not to condone the criminal acts allegedly
perpetrated by Eichmann and indicating that he should be brought to trial, resolved that such abduc-
tions, even of the most heinous of criminals, were incompatible with the U.N. Charter and could not be
tolerated as a precedent that would create an international atmosphere of insecurity and distrust detri-
mental to world peace. See 15 U.N. SCOR (868th mtg.) at 1, U.N. Doc. S/p.v. 868 (1960). Israel and
Argentina subsequently reached an agreement in which Israel apologized for its violation of Argen-
tina's territorial integrity, but was not requested to return Eichmann to his state of asylum. See gener-
ally Silving, In re Eichmann: A Dilemma of Law and Morality, 55 AM. J. INT'L L. 307 (1961).
162. POULANTZAS, supra note 152, at 13:
All these cases of pursuit on land, permitted by special treaties, had the specific charac-
teristic that the arrested offenders had to be delivered to the authorities of the State on
whose territory they were apprehended. The recovery of the fugitive offenders by the State
where the commission of the offence occurred might follow through the process of
extradition.
163. A comment to the draft Restatement of Foreign Relations section dealing with "External
Measures in Aid of Enforcement of Criminal Law" notes:
If a state's law enforcement officers exercise their functions in the territory of another state
without the latter's consent, that state is entitled to protest and, in appropriate cases, to
receive reparation from the offending state. If the unauthorized action includes seizure or
abduction of a person, the state from which the person was abducted may demand return of
the person. If that state does not object to the continued detention of the person, the pre-
vailing view is that the state to which the person was taken may hold him for prosecution
according to its laws. If the state from whose territory the person was abducted objects to
the abduction and insists on his return, international law requires that he be returned.
RESTATEMENT OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (REVISED) § 432 com-
ment c (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1985). See also Williams, supra note 153, at 91. This corresponds to the
international law of extradition, which recognizes a right of the asylum state to object to violations of
its extradition laws. See supra note 94.
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cious of the cross-jurisdictional models for the development of fresh
pursuit principles for Native reservations. First, international law rec-
ognizes an absolute sovereignty on the part of the state to which the
suspect has fled; frontiers can be crossed only in the event of an ex-
press agreement, and then only under the conditions imposed by the
agreement. Second, where either sovereign borders or the provisions
of the agreement are violated, the injured sovereign has a cause of ac-
tion against the offending state. The significance of these factors for
Native law lies in their focus on the injury to, and right of redress by,
the sovereign. The international law focus on the violation of territo-
rial integrity, rather than on the injury to the suspect, increases the
likelihood that domestic courts will recognize and vindicate tribal sov-
ereignty in a fresh pursuit situation. As one commentator noted, in
the international arena "expediency should not be permitted to let
politics prevail over law.""
B. Summary
The three cross-jurisdictional models of fresh pursuit have varied
implications for Native reservations. The doctrine of intrastate fresh
pursuit is derivative of state organic powers and thus involves princi-
ples inimical to Native sovereignty. Application of this model would
result in an unwarranted extension of state criminal jurisdiction across
reservation frontiers. Some acknowledgement of tribal territorial sov-
ereignty would inhere in the application of interstate fresh pursuit
principles, if only to the extent of recognizing the substantive limita-
tions placed on fresh pursuit arrests by tribal law. The failure of do-
mestic courts to redress procedural violations, however, ultimately
negates any promise of the interstate doctrine for Native law. Only
the principles of international hot pursuit fully address sovereign con-
cerns. International law recognizes both an absolute sovereign right to
inviolate borders and a right of redress on the part of the sovereign for
injury to its territorial integrity. As such, the international law doc-
trine of hot pursuit offers greater protection for tribal sovereign inter-
ests than either of the domestic cross-jurisdictional models.
IV. STATE AUTHORITY TO PURSUE ONTO THE RESERVATION
The authority of a state law enforcement officer to follow a sus-
pect across reservation boundaries in fresh pursuit and effect a valid
arrest depends upon a synthesis of the principles discussed in the pre-
vious sections, considered against the background of federal Indian
164. POULANTZAS, supra note 152, at 349.
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law. A number of competing doctrines are involved. First, although
arrest following fresh pursuit is a precept of criminal law, existing
principles of Native criminal jurisdiction seemingly are incapable of
resolving the question. The state may have complete jurisdiction over
the suspect at the time and place of the crime, but no jurisdiction over
the suspect within the territorial bounds of the reservation. The gen-
eral lack of state criminal jurisdiction over Native Americans within
reservation boundaries, however, is premised on the reservation as the
situs of the crime. Whether the prohibition against state jurisdiction
on the reservation will be extended by the courts to fresh pursuit and
arrest within Native territory is speculative.
Second, the few cases addressing the issues of on-reservation
arrest for off-reservation crimes and extradition from the reservation
where no fresh pursuit is involved are generally unhelpful. In the ab-
sence of tribal extradition procedures, lower domestic courts uni-
formly have held that on-reservation arrests for crimes committed
outside the reservation do not violate tribal sovereignty. Even where
tribal extradition laws would appear to protect a suspect's rights, the
courts generally have validated arrests made in violation of the extra-
dition procedures. With rare exceptions, the superordinate sovereign
injury to the tribe, as opposed to the injury to the individual suspect,
has not been considered. These cases, then, can serve only as tenuous
judicial benchmarks in the area of on-reservation arrest following
transborder pursuit, since on the whole they do not address in sub-
stance the issue of tribal sovereignty.
Finally, the several jurisdictional configurations of the fresh pur-
suit doctrine offer various possibilities. Principles of intrastate fresh
pursuit, attractive to states that do not view reservations as extraterri-
torial to the states in which they are located, would permit the omnifa-
rious exercise of state criminal jurisdiction within reservation
boundaries in ways now prohibited. Interstate fresh pursuit offers
some recognition of sovereign status, but procedural violations seldom
are enforced, and illegal arrests often are validated by the subsequent
fact of the state court's personal jurisdiction over the suspect. Interna-
tional hot pursuit provides the most protective model for tribal sover-
eignty, including a right of redress on behalf of the injured sovereign,
but at the present time the application of international law to tribal-
state issues is uncertain. 65
165. That international law has been and continues to be assimilated into domestic United States
law is undisputed. "When the United States declared their independence, they were bound to receive
the law of nations, in its modern state of purity and refinement." Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199,
281 (1796). The participation of United States courts in applying and clarifying international law, how-
ever, is incidental to the usual court business of applying domestic law to domestic parties. Use of
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Principles of Native law criminal jurisdiction offer little guidance,
international law in domestic courts traditionally has been limited largely to the application and en-
forcement of treaties to which the United States is a party. By article VI of the Constitution, treaties
made under the authority of the United States, together with the Constitution and laws of the United
States, are declared the supreme law of the land. But general or "customary" international law, see
supra note 154, carries no such explicit constitutional seal of approval.
Because international law currently is considered "positivist" in nature, most substantive interna-
tional law is codified in international instruments drafted by governments acting in their capacity as
member states of international organizations. Many of these instruments purport to codify or clarify
customary international law by reducing to written rules the norms derived from custom; the instru-
ments then may become authoritative evidence of international law. RESTATEMENT OF THE FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (REVISED) § 103 (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1985).
These customary rules of international law can be incorporated into domestic law. The classic
exposition on the American incorporation of international law is Justice Gray's opinion in The Paquete
Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900):
International law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered by the
courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction, as often as questions of right depending upon it
are duly presented for their determination. For this purpose, where there is no treaty, and
no controlling executive or legislative act or judicial decision, resort must be had to the
customs and usages of civilized nations ....
The Paquete Habana remains still the authoritative statement on the subject. See, e.g., Filartiga v.
Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 880-81 (2d Cir. 1980); RESTATEMENT, supra, at § 131. It is apparent, how-
ever, that where there exists a treaty or "controlling executive or legislative act or judicial decision," the
political and judicial organs of the United States reserve the power to disregard customary international
law. See, e.g., Brown v. United States, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 110, 128 (1814) (President can disregard
customary international law); Tag v. Rogers, 267 F.2d 664, 666 (D.C. Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S.
904 (1960)("it has long been settled in the United States that the federal courts are bound to recognize
any one of these three sources of law [treaties, statutes, and the Constitution] as superior to canons of
international law .... There is no power in this Court to declare null and void a statute adopted by
Congress . . . merely on the ground that such provision violates a principle of international law.").
Courts generally will apply domestic law instead of international law in any situation in which a con-
trolling domestic law exists. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 423 (1964) ("the
public law of nations can hardly dictate to a country ... how to treat [a] wrong within its domestic
borders"); Diggs v. Schultz, 470 F.2d 461 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 931 (1973) (later
congressional legislation specifically authorizing importation of Rhodesian chrome held to override
United States international obligations under United Nations Security Council embargo on that mate-
rial from Rhodesia).
Nonetheless, the courts early-on began to assume that Congress did not intend to violate interna-
tional law and construed domestic statutes accordingly. See, e.g., Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416
(1920); Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 117-18 (1804). See also RE-
STATEMENT, supra, at § 134. More recently, the 1985 draft of the Restatement of the Foreign Rela-
tions Law of the United States elevates customary international law to the same status as treaty law:
established international custom supercedes inconsistent state and local laws and prior, inconsistent
federal laws. RESTATEMENT, supra, at §§ 102, 131(1), 135(1) reporter's note 1. See also discussion
supra note 155. For an excellent historical overview of the United States domestic enforcement or
incorporation of international customary human rights norms, see Morgan, Internalization of Custom-
ary International Law: An Historical Perspective, 12 YALE J. INT'L L. 63 (1987). For recent conflicting
interpretations of the incorporation doctrine of international law into domestic United States law, com-
pare Henkin, International Law as Law in the United States, 82 MicH. L. REV. 1555 (1984)(positing
that later customary law, as federal law equivalent in constitutional status to international treaties,
overrides preexisting and inconsistent domestic law), with Goldklang, Back on Board the Paquete Ha-
bana: Resolving the Conflict Between Statutes and Customary International Law, 25 VA. J. INT'L L. 143
(1984).
As customary international law issues arise more frequently in domestic tribunals, the question of
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and the courts appear never to have developed a specific test for deter-
mining when the intrusion of state criminal jurisdiction into Native
territory may be warranted. Most courts that have addressed the is-
sues of on-reservation arrest or extradition from Native reservations
have adopted as an analytical tool the standard for the exercise of state
authority within reservation borders articulated in Williams v. Lee, a
civil case. '66 While the Williams test focuses on the tribal right of self-
government, in recent years the Supreme Court's emphasis in civil ju-
risdictional analysis has shifted away from tribal sovereignty and to-
ward the issue of federal preemption. 167 Assuming that the courts will
what role international law should play in the absence of controlling domestic law increasingly will be
scrutinized. The issue recently has generated much controversy in the field of human rights litigation.
See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980)(torture of Paraguayan conducted under color of
Paraguayan law in Paraguay was a violation of international law and gave rise to a cause of action in
United States courts); Rodriguez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 505 F. Supp. 787, 795 (D. Kan. 1980), af'd
on other grounds, 654 F.2d 1382 (10th Cir. 1981) ("machinery of domestic law utterly fail[ed] to oper-
ate to assure protection" of illegal alien against arbitrary, indeterminate detention; but such was con-
trary to customary international human rights which provided basis for prisoner's release); Lareau v.
Manson, 507 F. Supp. 1177, 1187-89 (D. Conn. 1980), and Sterling v. Cupp, 290 Or. 611,622, 625 P.2d
123, 131 (198 1)(both stressing that in adjudication of domestic law cases, courts legitimately and prop-
erly may be aware of and conform to international law standards). For a discussion of recent human
rights cases in general, and the applicability of international law to their resolution, see Bilder, Integrat-
ing International Human Rights Law Into Domestic Law - U.S. Experience, 4 HOUSTON J. INT'L L. 1
(1981); Lillich, The Role of Domestic Courts in Enforcing International Human Rights Law, 1980 AM.
SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 20.
166. 358 U.S. 217 (1959). In Williams, the Court reversed a holding of the Arizona Supreme
Court that Arizona courts had jurisdiction over civil suits against Navajos for goods sold to them by a
non-Native who operated a store on the Navajo Reservation. The Court articulated the test for state
jurisdiction within reservation borders as follows: "Essentially, absent governing Acts of Congress, the
question has always been whether the state action infringed on the right of reservation Indians to make
their own laws and be ruled by them." Id. at 220. While the opinion in Williams dealt only with the
absence of state jurisdiction, the Supreme Court, in a subsequent decision, interpreted the case as "hold-
ing that the authority of tribal courts could extend over non-Indians, insofar as concerned their transac-
tions on a reservation with Indians .... See United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 558 (1975).
167. Rice v. Rehner, 463 U.S. 713, 718 (1983) (citing McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n,
411 U.S. 164, 172 (1973)); Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation v. Wold Eng'g, 476
U.S. 877, 884 (1986) (citing Rice). Like Williams, none of these was a criminal case. Rice concerned
state control of private on-reservation liquor transactions, McClanahan involved the imposition of the
state income tax on reservation Natives, and Wold dealt with the ability of Native plaintiffs to bring suit
against non-Natives in state court.
One apparent exception to this trend is found in determinations of state court jurisdiction, where
the infringement test still is applied to bar state action. As the Supreme Court has recently stated: "If
state-court jurisdiction over Indians or activities on Indian lands would interfere with tribal sovereignty
and self-government, the state courts are generally divested of jurisdiction as a matter of federal law."
Iowa Mutual Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 107 S. Ct. 971, 976 (1987). See also supra note 71. But cf. Wold,
which examined state court jurisdiction under both the preemption and infringement tests.
The prevalence of the Williams infringement test in the lower court cases addressing on-reserva-
tion arrest and extradition from the reservation may be a reflection of two factors. First, most of the
cases discussed supra in section II.C. were decided either prior to McClanahan or during the transition
years between that case and Rice, when the primacy of the preemption analysis was being fully estab-
lished. Second, the emphasis on the Williams test in these cases, as in the state-court jurisdiction cases,
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continue to use available tools rather than develop an analysis specific
to criminal law, the following subsections will examine the question of
fresh pursuit onto Native reservations in light of this current jurisdic-
tional analysis.
A. Overview of the Current Analytical Framework
The current Supreme Court analysis begins with the proposition
that even on reservations, state law may be applied unless its imposi-
tion would interfere with tribal self-government or impair a right
granted or reserved by federal law.'68 From this base arises the do-
mestic juridical doctrine that there are "two independent but related
barriers" to state jurisdiction within Indian reservations: federal pre-
emption of state authority, and infringement of the tribal right to self-
may be a function of judicial recognition of the central role of tribal sovereignty in determining issues of
state criminal jurisdiction within reservation borders.
168. Rice, 463 U.S. at 718 (citing Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 148 (1973)). In
Rice, the Court adopted but retuned slightly the Rehnquistian paradigm that state jurisdiction must be
preempted expressly, whereas tribal sovereign powers may be lost by implication. A foremost observer
and authority of Native law in the United States has observed that: "In the extreme, so much tribal
jurisdiction is lost by the general implication of 'dependent status' that assertions of tribal law must be
supported by express delegations from Congress." Barsh, Merrion: False Hopes for Clear Thinking,
8(1) AM. INDIAN J. 6, 7 (1982).
The jurisdictional test in Rice propounds a new and ahistoric concept in federal Indian law: the
doctrine is unfounded, its reasoning is fallacious, and its precedent is pernicious to tribal self-govern-
ment. The Wisconsin Supreme Court has noted in passing, and in understatement: "The Rice Court
appears to have significantly modified the established rule that '[s]tate laws generally are not applicable
to tribal Indians on an Indian reservation except where Congress has expressly provided that State laws
shall apply.'" State v. Webster, 114 Wis. 2d 418, 433, 338 N.W.2d 474, 481 (1983)(citation omitted).
Fortunately, the Court itself appears in later decisions to be somewhat disconcerted by the Rice
articulation. In Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation v. Wold Eng'g, 476 U.S. 877,
885 (1986), the Court reasserted that its decisions have "rejected the proposition that pre-emption
requires 'an express congressional statement to that effect.' " Similarly, in Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v.
LaPlante, 107 S. Ct. 971, 978 (1987), the Court reaffirmed its language from Merrion v. Jicarilla
Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 149 n. 14 (1982): "'Because the [Navajo] Tribe retains all inherent attrib-
utes of sovereignty that have not been divested by the Federal Government, the proper inference from
[congressional] silence... is that the sovereign power... remains intact.'" Most recently, in California
v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 107 S. Ct. 1083 (1987), the Court disavowed the Rice eisegesis
even more plainly. The Court noted that state jurisdiction over tribes and their members, while not per
se precluded in the absence of express congressional consent, could be asserted only in " 'exceptional
circumstances.'" Id. at 1091 (quoting New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 331-32
(1983)). In a footnote, the Court then contrasted the position of the dissent:
Justice Stevens appears to embrace the opposite presumption-that state laws apply on
Indian reservations absent an express congressional statement to the contrary. But, as we
stated in White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 151... (1980), in the
context of an assertion of state authority over the activities of non-Indians within a reserva-
tion, "[tihat is simply not the law." It is even less correct when applied to the activities of
tribes and tribal members within reservations.
Id. at 1092 n.18. The Court further appears to restrict Rice to its facts-that is, to the specific subject
matter of liquor transactions within Native territory. Id. at 1094. It is noteworthy that Justice
O'Connor, who wrote for the majority in Rice, joined the dissent in Cabazon.
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government.169 Of these two barriers, the courts presently place al-
most total reliance on that of federal preemption, 170 demonstrating an
ever-increasing reluctance to apprehend the central and historic role of
tribal sovereignty as a bar to state jurisdiction.
The judicial test for federal preemption is a dual one. The first
step is an assessment of the "backdrop" of tribal sovereignty through a
two-part analysis: a determination whether the tribe has a tradition of
self-government in the particular area in question, and a balancing of
the tribal, state, and federal interests involved. Against this "back-
drop," the courts determine whether the federal government has pre-
empted the state's exercise of jurisdiction.171
Preemption in domestic Indian law differs in several material re-
spects from the standard preemption analysis based on the Supremacy
Clause of the Constitution. 172  For example, unlike the usual preemp-
tion analysis, Native preemption takes account of the sovereign inter-
169. See, e.g., Rice, 463 U.S. at 718-19. The initial formulation of this analytical doctrine ap-
peared in White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 142 (1980), where the entire juris-
dictional test articulated in Williams v. Lee, see discussion supra note 166, was reduced to mere support
for the second of the two judicial barriers.
170. Rice, 463 U.S. at 718 ("our recent cases have established a 'trend ... away from the idea of
inherent Indian sovereignty as a bar to state jurisdiction and toward reliance on federal preemp-
tion.' ")(quoting McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 172 (1973)). The apparent
exception to this "total reliance" is judicial determination of state court jurisdiction over Natives and
activities within reservation borders. See supra notes 71 and 167.
171. Rice, 463 U.S. at 718-20.
172. The use of the term "federal preemption" in Native law has a meaning separate and distinct
from the use of that term in the familiar context of federal-state relations. "The unique historical
origins of tribal sovereignty make it generally unhelpful to apply to federal enactments regulating In-
dian tribes those standards of preemption that have emerged in other areas of the law." White Moun-
tain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 143 (1980). See also Rice, 463 U.S. at 718; New Mexico v.
Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 334 (1983); HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note
38, at 270-79. At the federal-state interface, excepting those enumerated powers wholly invested in the
federal government by the Constitution, the states retain full powers of regulatory control over their
jurisdictions. Thus, only when Congress acts pursuant to an enumerated power can it withdraw or
"preempt" state legislation in a given field. Federal preemption is the exception and not the rule.
[Flederal regulation of a field of commerce should not be deemed preemptive of state regu-
latory power in the absence of persuasive reasons - either that the nature of the regulated
subject matter permits no other conclusion, or that the Congress has unmistakably so
ordained.
Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142 (1963). Federal preemption in
domestic Indian law, on the other hand, classically has been attended by the converse presumption: that
absent a clear congressional delegation of jurisdiction to the states, federal control is plenary.
James Madison, the principal architect of the Indian Commerce Clause, reported that the framers
fully intended the clause "to commit the exclusive power over Indian affairs to the federal govern-
ment." Clinton, supra note 14, at 435 (citing J. MADISON, JOURNAL OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION
190, 549, 585, 654-56 (E. Scott ed. 1898)). The Supreme Court, at least prior to Rice, gave effect to the
framers' intent: "State laws generally are not applicable to tribal Indians on an Indian reservation
except where Congress has expressly provided that State laws shall apply." McClanahan v. Arizona
State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 170-71 (1973) (quoting U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, FEDERAL
INDIAN LAW 845 (1958)). "Thus, if the federal government was silent on an issue of state jurisdiction,
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ests of three separate governments in determining whether the exercise
of jurisdiction by one of them, the state, has been preempted. In addi-
tion, Native preemption carries no requirement that Congress affirma-
tively preempt the assertion of state authority. 73 On the contrary, in
most areas of domestic law as applied to Native Americans, the fact
that Congress has not acted affirmatively to grant jurisdiction to the
states denotes that state authority has been preempted. 74
The second barrier to the exercise of state jurisdiction is tribal
sovereignty itself: infringement on the tribal right to self-government.
In the last few years, tribal sovereignty as a separate barrier in domes-
tic law has declined drastically in significance, although the courts
have failed to explain their reluctance to rely on the infringement doc-
trine. While a number of recent cases that found state jurisdiction
preempted also indicated that the state action infringed on tribal sov-
ereignty,175 no major recent case has premised a denial of state regula-
it was presumed that the federal government retained jurisdiction either in itself or in the tribal govern-
ment." State v. Webster, 114 Wis. 2d 418, 433, 338 N.W.2d 474, 481 (1983).
173. The articulation of this point in Rice was couched in somewhat tentative terms: "We do not
necessarily require that Congress explicitly pre-empt assertion of state authority insofar as Indians on
reservations are concerned .. " 463 U.S. at 719. More recently, however, the Court has reverted in
some measure to its previous, stronger position. California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 107 S.
Ct. 1083, 1091 (1987) (while there is no "inflexible per se nile precluding state jurisdiction over tribes
and tribal members in the absence of express congressional consent," such state jurisdiction may be
asserted only in "exceptional circumstances"); Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation
v. Wold Eng'g, 476 U.S. 877, 885 (1986) (quoting New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S.
324, 334 (1983) (citation omitted)) (Supreme Court case law has "rejected the proposition that pre-
emption requires 'an express congressional statement to that effect.' ").
174. An obvious example is state criminal jurisdiction for crimes involving Natives committed
within reservation boundaries. As a rule states have no authority over such crimes absent a grant of
jurisdiction pursuant to Public Law 280 or other jurisdictional statute. See supra section II.B.2.a. But
see North Carolina's assertion of criminal jurisdiction pursuant to treaty, discussed supra note 50. An-
other example is state taxation of Native interests on the reservation, which is preempted in the absence
of a specific grant of authority by Congress. See, e.g., California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians,
107 S. Ct. 1083, 1091 n. 17 (1987) (declaring a "per se rule" precluding state taxation on the reservation
absent express congressional consent); Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 759, 768
(1985)("In the absence of clear congressional consent to taxation, we hold that the State may not tax
Indian royalty income from leases issued pursuant to the 1938 [Indian Mineral Leasing] Act."); Mc-
Clanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 165 (1973)("by imposing [a personal income]
tax ... the State has interfered with matters which the relevant treaty and statutes leave to the exclusive
province of the Federal Government and the Indians themselves").
175. See, e.g., Crow Tribe of Indians v. Montana [Crow 11, 650 F.2d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 1981),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 916 (1982), which held that the Tribe's allegations concerning state taxation of
coal mining stated a cause of action under both the preemption and the sovereign infringement barriers.
In reversing the district court's dismissal of the tribe's complaint, the court of appeals stated in part:
We find that the Tribe's complaint adequately states a claim that the Montana taxes
infringe on its right to govern itself. To support the claim at trial, the Tribe must show that
the taxes substantially affect its ability to offer governmental services or its ability to regu-
late the development of tribal resources, and that the balance of state and tribal interests
renders the state's assertion of taxing authority unreasonable.
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tory jurisdiction exclusively on the sovereignty argument., 76
Nonetheless, sovereign status remains a valuable and essential, if dor-
mant, tenet of domestic Native law.
Of the two independent barriers to state jurisdiction within reser-
vation borders, that of tribal sovereignty is the more compelling in the
area of fresh pursuit. Nevertheless, given the Court's present bias to-
ward dependence on federal preemption at the expense of the self-gov-
ernment doctrine, the following subsection will discuss fresh pursuit in
the context of preemption, noting actions tribes could take to increase
the likelihood of a judicial finding of preemption. Following the pre-
emption discussion, the article will address Native American tribal
Id. at 1117.
On remand, the district court upheld the application of the state taxes, but the Ninth Circuit
reversed. Crow Tribe of Indians v. Montana (Crow I], 819 F.2d 895 (9th Cir. 1987), aff'd mer., 108 S.
Ct. 685 (1988). After holding that the state severance taxes were preempted by federal law, the appeals
court found also that "the Montana tax is invalid because it erodes the Tribe's sovereign authority." Id.
at 903. The court's reasoning rests not on inherent tribal sovereignty, however, but on prevailing fed-
eral policy promoting tribal sovereignty.
By taking revenue that would otherwise go towards supporting the Tribe and its programs,
and by limiting the Tribe's ability to regulate the development of its coal resources, the state
tax threatens Congress' overriding objective of encouraging tribal self-government and eco-
nomic development.
Id. at 902-03. The value of Crow II as buttressing the infringement barrier to state incursions thus is
questionable.
176. A prime example of judicial reluctance to address the infringement barrier is Rice itself, the
decision responsible for the current tenuous articulation of the jurisdictional analysis. The question in
Rice was whether a federally-licensed Native owner of a store on the reservation was required to obtain
a state liquor license in order to sell alcohol for off-premises consumption. Justice O'Connor, writing
for the majority, produced a lengthy and detailed preemption analysis, concluding that there was no
federal preemption of state jurisdiction over liquor transactions on Indian reservations. But there the
analysis stopped. The second supposedly "independent" barrier to state jurisdiction-tribal sover-
eignty-was dismissed summarily in a footnote. 463 U.S. at 720 n.7. And yet the decisions of where,
when, and under what conditions to permit liquor transactions within reservation boundaries seem
peculiarly governmental functions.
A further example is a recent opinion of the Wisconsin Attorney General addressing the legality of
fresh pursuit arrests by state law enforcement officers on the Menominee Indian Reservation. 74 Op.
Att'y Gen. Wis. 245 (1985). In the manner of the Rice opinion, the attorney general's opinion delivered
an extended preemption analysis, and then summarily concluded that fresh pursuit arrests were not
only not preempted, but also did not "impair Menominee tribal sovereignty." Id. at 257. The only
sovereignty analysis contained in the opinion was addressed to the "backdrop" component of preemp-
tion; the attorney general's conclusion that self-government did not present an independent barrier to
fresh pursuit arrests was based on absolutely no consideration of sovereignty as an independent barrier.
Nevertheless, even as the preemption analysis flourishes, courts occasionally still will deny state
court jurisdiction solely on the grounds that it infringes on tribal sovereignty. See, e.g., R.J. Williams
Co. v. Fort Belknap Housing Auth., 719 F.2d 979, 983 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1016
(1985) (holding that state court jurisdiction over a dispute within the province of tribal courts "would
impinge upon the tribe's right to adjudicate controversies arising within it"); Milbank Mutual Ins. Co.
v. Eagleman, 705 P.2d 1117, 1119 (Mont. 1985) (denying state court jurisdiction over a suit by a non-
Native against a tribal member because it would infringe on tribal sovereignty, and expressly refusing to
apply the preemption analysis "[b]ecause recent federal cases are not clear.").
1988] "SAVAGE HOSTILE INDIAN MARAUDERS"
sovereignty as an independent barrier to state fresh pursuit jurisdiction
within reservation borders.
B. Federal Preemption
Preemption, the barrier to state jurisdiction currently more
credited by domestic courts, involves a two-pronged analysis. Ini-
tially, the court ascertains the "backdrop" of tribal sovereignty by as-
sessing both the tribal tradition of self-government and the balance of
federal, state, and Native interests in the area in question. Against this
"backdrop" of Native sovereignty, the courts then determine whether
state jurisdiction has been preempted by the federal government.
1. Backdrop of Tribal Sovereignty
a. Tradition of Self-Government
The first component in the preemption analysis is the "backdrop"
of tribal sovereignty, and the first issue in determining that "back-
drop" is whether the tribe has a tradition of self-government in the
area over which the state is attempting to assert jurisdiction. 77 In the
177. Justice O'Connor, writing for the Court in Rice, noted within the particularized inquiry of
that case that "tradition simply has not recognized a sovereign immunity or inherent authority in favor
of liquor regulation by Indians." 463 U.S. at 722. While the Pala Tribe had authorized by tribal
resolution the sale and possession of liquor on their reservation as early as 1960, the tribe had no
licensure requirements in place as of 1978. May, Alcohol Beverage Control: A Survey of Tribal Alcohol
Statutes, 5 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 217, 225 (1978). Accordingly, the Court's assessment in Rice that
tribes "cannot be said to 'possess the usual accouterments of tribal self-government'" in the area of
liquor regulation, 463 U.S. at 724 (citation omitted), arguably is correct in the limited context of the
Pala Tribe. For over 30 years, however, since the repeal of federal prohibition in 1953, several other
tribal governments have imposed tribal licensure requirements for the on-reservation sale of liquor: the
Cheyenne River Sioux since 1953; the Blackfoot Nation, Red Cliff Band of Chippewa, and Lower Brule
Sioux, since 1954; and the Minnesota Chippewa since 1955. May, supra, at 224-27.
The decision in Rice appears to be the first time that the Court employed such a narrow definition
of what tribal sovereign interests it would consider. Rather than look at the possible interference with
tribal sovereignty as a general concept, the Court chose to focus on the specific tribal sovereign interest
in liquor regulation. Prior to Rice, the courts had not insisted that Native governments be able to
establish a tradition of tribal sovereignty in the particular subject matter at issue in order to demon-
strate an existing backdrop of tribal sovereignty. The very particularity of the holding in Rice, how-
ever, may permit the Court, now uncomfortable with the ramifications of the analysis as articulated in
that case, to limit Rice to its facts. See California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 107 S. Ct. 1083
(1987), which held that state and county gambling regulations could not be applied to bar bingo opera-
tions on the Cabazon Reservation. In reaching this decision, the Court rejected California's reliance on
Rice by noting that the holding in that case was predicated on an historic congressional view that states
would exercise concurrent regulatory authority over liquor transactions in Indian country. Id. at 1094.
The measure of the Cabazon Court's dissociation from Rice is highlighted further by the dissent, in
which Justice O'Connor, author of the majority opinion in Rice, joined. The dissent, in an obvious
effort to broaden the holding of Rice far beyond the strictures of the Rice facts, surmised that in that
case "we recognized the State's authority over transactions, whether they be liquor sales or gambling,
between Indians and non-Indians." Id. at 1096 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The Cabazon majority, how-
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area of fresh pursuit onto the reservation, a number of factors appear
to be consequential to the concept of a self-governing tradition.
The fundamental parameter is the general sovereign power to ad-
minister criminal justice within reservation boundaries. 7 ' This tradi-
tion of criminal authority over tribal members within tribal territory is
central to the sovereign right of Native governments to make their
own laws and be ruled by them.'79 The greater the outward, visible
manifestations of this sovereign power, and the more these manifesta-
tions conform to the preconceptions of the dominant United States
legal system, the more likely domestic courts are to recognize the tri-
bal exercise of sovereignty.' 8 ° In the area of fresh pursuit, for exam-
ple, a tribal court or alternative tribal criminal justice system is
essential to preserving the tribe's interests in a post-arrest hearing pro-
ever, refused to accede to this unsupported attempt to reify the holding in Rice as having universal
application to all interactions between Natives and non-Natives within reservation borders.
178. See supra note 20.
179. See supra notes 19 and 25-28 and accompanying text.
180. Native American self-government, however, is not, and should not be, dependent upon out-
ward evidence of its existence.
[W]hat is required is not that the tribe have a history of regulation and enforcement in a
particular area, but that it have a historical right of autonomy or self-regulation in that
area. According to the majority-and I agree-the [Lac du Flambeau] Band has the power
to regulate civil traffic matters. I disagree with the majority's test of self-government. Its
test is whether the Band has enacted laws on a particular subject matter. The power to
regulate, the right of self-government, must include not only the power to decide to enact
laws, but also the power to decide not to enact laws on that subject. Consequently, I believe
that the majority's conclusion, that the Lac du Flambeau Band has no historical tradition
of sovereignty in traffic regulation simply because it had no traffic regulations or motor
vehicle code at the time of Chapman's offense, is irrelevant to the self-governing preroga-
tives of the Band to not regulate a particular activity.
County of Vilas v. Chapman, 122 Wis. 2d 211, 221, 361 N.W.2d 699, 704 (1985) (Heffernan, C.J.,
dissenting) (emphasis in original). In Chapman, the Wisconsin Supreme Court found that the absence
of tribal traffic regulations for reservation highways evinced a lack of tribal interest and permitted
application of the state's enforcement mechanisms.
Similarly, Justice Marshall, writing for a six to three majority in Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe,
455 U.S. 130, 148 (1982), previously had stated that:
Without regard to its source, sovereign power, even when unexercised, is an enduring pres-
ence that ... will remain intact unless surrendered in unmistakable terms.
To presume that a sovereign forever waives the right to exercise one of its sovereign powers
unless it expressly reserves the right to exercise that power .. turns the concept of sover-
eignty on its head ....
See also Segundo v. City of Rancho Mirage, 813 F.2d 1387, 1393 (9th Cir. 1987) ("Although tribal rent
control ordinances have not been enacted, failure of the Tribe to legislate does not constitute a relin-
quishment of its authority to do so."); United States v. Jackson, 600 F.2d 1283, 1288 (9th Cir. 1979)
(argument that federal government had authority to prosecute tribal member for violating tribal hunt-
ing regulations because tribe had no mechanism in place to deal with such violations "confuses jurisdic-
tion with enforcement procedures. The fact that the Tribe had not set up a system to punish certain of
its members does not mean that it lacked the power to do so. It merely failed to exercise its
jurisdiction.").
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cedure. 8 t Of substantial importance also are tribal police and a tribal
or shared off-reservation jail facility that can hold suspects within tri-
bal jurisdiction while awaiting post-arrest hearings.
A judicial finding of traditional control, however, may require in-
dicia of self-government more closely tailored to the particular area in
question. 18 2 A major factor, therefore, presumably would be the exist-
ence of a tribal statute governing fresh pursuit arrests, although it is
doubtful whether any tribes have enacted such laws.1 3 A tribal extra-
dition law would constitute another specific indication of tribal self-
government in this area, in part because extradition generally is the
legally-acknowledged post-arrest procedure t84 and in part because ex-
tradition laws indicate an assertion of tribal control over persons pres-
ent on the reservation and suspected of off-reservation crimes.' 8
5
181. The sovereign tribal power to administer criminal justice on the reservation is only meaning-
ful if tribes retain the power to enforce tribal law. Enforcement in turn is dependent upon such mecha-
nisms as a tribal court system, police force, and jail facility. See supra notes 30 and 32-34 and
accompanying text.
182. See Rice, 463 U.S. at 719, 724-25. "The role of tribal sovereignty in pre-emption analysis
varies in accordance with the particular 'notions of sovereignty that have developed from historical
traditions of tribal independence.'" Id. at 719. And again: "The court below erred in thinking that
there was some single notion of tribal sovereignty that served to direct any pre-emption analysis involv-
ing Indians." Id. at 725 (emphasis in original).
For example, see State v. Webster, 114 Wis. 2d 418, 338 N.W.2d 474 (1983), which found that the
Menominee Tribe had a tradition of self-government in the area of traffic regulation because it had a
tribal traffic code, police department, court system, and jail. Id. at 434-35, 338 N.W.2d at 482.
While there is some recent indication that Rice may be confined to its facts, see supra note 177,
there is no reason to believe that the Court has retreated fully from its position in that case that the
appropriate inquiry is to scrutinize the sovereign interest in the specific area at question, not sovereign
interests in general.
183. "A limited search of tribal codes has failed to turn up an ordinance authorizing fresh pursuit
arrests. It is doubtful that any tribe has enacted such an ordinance." 4 JUSTICE AND THE AMERICAN
INDIAN, supra note 150, at 82 n.8. The National American Indian Court Judges Association (NA-
ICJA) has suggested sample tribal legislation, as well as enabling federal legislation and a proposed
revision of the state Uniform Act on Fresh Pursuit. Id. at 67-71. The NAICJA proposals are included
as Appendix B to this article.
184. See supra notes 145 and 162 and accompanying text.
185. Tribal extradition codes, unlike the laws governing interstate rendition, may be limited ex-
pressly to suspected felons. Interstate rendition may be requested for any crime, felony or misde-
meanor. Kentucky v. Dennison, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 66, 99 (1860):
The words 'treason, felony, or other crime,' [in the second clause of the second section of
the fourth article of the Constitution] in their plain and obvious import, as well as in their
legal and technical sense, embrace every act forbidden and made punishable by a law of the
State [where the offense is committed]. The word 'crime' of itself includes every offense,
from the highest to the lowest in the grade of offenses, and includes what are called 'misde-
meanors' as well as treason and felony.
By contrast, tribal extradition is not tied to the constitutional or federal statutory provisions. See supra
note 79. Hence tribal extradition laws may be limited, as befits a Native sovereign's prerogative, to
more serious crimes or even to selected enumerated offenses as is frequently the case in international
extradition treaties. But see supra note 78 (Navajo extradition code apparently effective for any "crime"
committed outs.ide Navajo country). Since this same restriction is asserted in many bilateral interna-
tional extradition treaties, it should not affect domestic courts' perception of the self-governing power
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The greater the number of these elements that are present in any
particular case, the more likely domestic courts are to find a tradition
of Native self-government in the area of fresh pursuit regulation.
Where the courts determine that such a tradition of sovereignty exists,
they generally are reluctant to authorize the exercise of state authority
unless Congress expressly has provided for it. t"6 An implied repeal of
established tribal self-governance is particularly disfavored.18 7
b. Balance of Interests
The second component of the tribal sovereignty "backdrop" is
the balance of state, federal and tribal interests involved in the particu-
lar area over which the state is asserting jurisdiction. As a rule, courts
approach this component as a balance of the federal and tribal inter-
ests on the one hand, and the state interests on the other.1
88
The state's interests in fresh pursuit jurisdiction within reserva-
tion borders are relatively easy to identify. The primary interest of the
state is the apprehension of persons suspected of off-reservation
crimes. Unquestionably the state has a strong interest in bringing to
justice violators of state law, and, as a corollary of that interest, a con-
cern that reservation boundaries not represent a safe haven for sus-
pects in off-reservation offenses.1 89 In a fresh pursuit situation, where
inherent in the tribal law. Neither should any limitation on the states to which the tribe will extradite.
For example, extradition from the Menominee Reservation is limited to Wisconsin, the state in which
the reservation is situated. Menominee Nation, Menominee Tribal Legislature, Ordinance No. 81-22,
§§ 1(a) & 2(a). See also the discussion of the Navajo extradition code, supra note 78. These statutory
restrictions simply represent the individual tribe's exercise of its sovereign powers to determine the
extent of its own laws, and should not be viewed as a limitation of the tribe's sovereign power to
extradite.
As in the area of fresh pursuit, see supra note 183, the National American Indian Court Judges
Association has developed and proffered sample state and tribal legislative proposals for extradition and
for the transportation and confinement of prisoners being extradited. See 3 JUSTICE AND THE AMERI-
CAN INDIAN, supra note 73, at 23, 35-54 (Appendix B)(advocating that "tribes might want to act
promptly to adopt such provisions"). While the NAICJA proposals provide the essential minimums to
vest some powers of extradition in a tribal government, the authors encourage tribes considering the
adoption of an extradition code to review and consider the more flexible and comprehensive provisions
and framework provided for in international bilateral extradition treaties. See supra note 69. Selective
provisions of these treaties may be modified and adopted unilaterally as tribal law.
186. Rice v. Rehner, 463 U.S. 713, 719-20 (1983) (citing McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax
Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 171 (1973)).
187. Rice, 463 U.S. at 720 (citing Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 392 (1976)).
188. Rice, 463 U.S. at 719 (citing Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Res-
ervation, 447 U.S. 134, 156 (1980)).
189. The U.S. Supreme Court has noted that the state's interests generally are substantial where
there is "spillover" from the on-reservation conduct and consequent off-reservation effects. Rice, 463
U.S. at 724 (upholding state licensure requirement for on-reservation general store where "distribution
of liquor [for off-premises consumption) has a significant impact beyond the limits of the . . .
[r]eservation"); New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 336 (1983) ("State's regulatory
interest will be particularly substantial if the State can point to off-reservation effects that necessitate
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the suspect's identity may be unknown or unascertainable and alter-
nate methods of apprehension such as extradition therefore inapplica-
ble, the state's interests, at least from its own perspective, may take on
a compelling character.
It is difficult, however, to argue that the state's interest in appre-
hending suspects who flee across reservation boundaries is greater
than the interest in apprehending suspects who flee across state or na-
tional borders. The same concerns are present: unidentified suspects,
unless apprehended immediately, may escape arrest altogether. Yet
the state is not empowered to pursue suspects across state or national
boundaries without the express consent of the host sovereign as em-
bodied in legislation or agreement. Consequently, the state's interest
in pursuing unidentified fleeing suspects across reservation boundaries,
while strong, is at most no more compelling than the interest of the
pursuing government in any intersovereign situation.
The basic federal interest in fresh pursuit across reservation bor-
ders derives from general federal Indian policy. For the past decade
or two, federal policy has articulated a firm commitment to encourag-
ing tribal self-government and promoting reservation self-suffi-
ciency. 190 Tribal independence, central to the federal interest in
state intervention."); Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S.
134, 155 (1980) ("principles of federal Indian law... [do not] authorize Indian tribes thus to market an
exemption from state taxation to persons who would normally do their business [off-reservation]"). See
also Comment, The Most Dangerous Branch: An Institutional Approach to Understanding the Role of the
Judiciary in American Indian Jurisdictional Determinations, 1986 Wis. L. REV. 989, 1032 (Supreme
Court's balancing of competing tribal and state interests in spillover situations is specious as the Court
"has not shown a capacity to consider ... [and] is not sensitive to tribal interests"). As Professor Barsh
has noted, an equally valid argument can be advanced by a tribe to regulate the off-reservation sale of
selected commodities to Natives: "[s]pillovers spill over both ways." Barsh, Is There Any Indian "Law"
Left? A Review of the Supreme Court's 1982 Term, 59 WASH. L. REv. 863, 875 (1984).
In the area of fresh pursuit, of course, the spillover effect is the potential for non-apprehension of
persons suspected of off-reservation crimes. As noted in the text, however, this spillover effect is no
different than the effect of suspects fleeing into another state or country. In the context of interstate and
international law, the spillover effect is addressed through legislation or treaties on the subject of fresh
pursuit. No jurisdiction has the power unilaterally to extend its authority into another jurisdiction
merely because of a spillover effect.
190. California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 107 S. Ct. 1083, 1092-93 and nn.19 & 20
(1987) (emphasizing "the congressional goal of Indian self-government, including its 'overriding goal'
of encouraging tribal self-sufficiency and economic development"); Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort
Berthold Reservation v. Wold Eng'g, 476 U.S. 877, 890 (1986) (noting "Congress' jealous regard for
Indian self-governance"); White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 143-44 n.10
(1980)(quoting the congressional policy statements from the Indian Financing Act of 1974, 25 U.S.C.
§§ 1451 et seq. (1982), the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act of 1975, 25 U.S.C.
§§ 450 et seq. (1982), and the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, 25 U.S.C. §§ 461 et seq. (1982)).
President Reagan's federal policy statement of January 24, 1983 supported the primary role of
Native governments in matters affecting reservations. Reagan's policy emphasized two interrelated
themes: (1) that the federal government would pursue the principle of Indian "self-government," and
(2) that the federal government would work directly with Native governments on a government-to-
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Native affairs, would be undermined by the unauthorized intrusion of
state criminal jurisdiction onto reservations where tribe members are
subject only to tribal and federal law.
The federal government also has an interest in maintaining uni-
form access across internal boundaries, so that no territory within na-
tional borders becomes a haven for fugitives. This interest is reflected
in constitutional and statutory interstate extradition provisions,' 91 in-
tended to prevent any state from becoming a sanctuary and thus "bal-
kanizing" criminal justice among thp states. 92 The federal interest
appears confined to extradition, however, since no federal law, consti-
tutional or statutory, governs interstate fresh pursuit. Each state,
rather, is free to control fresh pursuit intrusions across its borders, to
permit them or not, and under such conditions as the state sees fit. In
the fresh pursuit situation, apparently, the sovereignty of internal ter-
ritorial borders outweighs the federal interest in forestalling the devel-
opment of sanctuaries. Particularly in light of the federal policy of
promoting tribal self-government, the federal interest in ensuring fresh
pursuit access across reservation boundaries is no more compelling
than its interest in ensuring such pursuit across state lines. Hence, the
federal interest in furthering Native self-government eclipses any la-
tent federal interest in deterring territorial balkanization.
The third element in the balance of interests is the interest of the
tribes themselves in fresh pursuit jurisdiction. Native sovereign inter-
ests include the desire to keep reservations from becoming havens for
fugitives from state law, and a concern to provide mechanisms for the
mutual return of suspects who have fled across state-reservation fron-
tiers.'93 To those ends, a number of Native governments have enacted
government basis. Statement of the President on Indian Policy, I PUBLIC PAPERS OP RONALD REA-
GAN 96, 99 (Jan. 24, 1983). Notwithstanding expressions of such good intent, implementation of the
administration's much touted "government-to-government" policy has been subject to considerable
criticism by leaders of the nation's Native community. See, e.g., Fiscal Year 1988 Budget, Hearing
before the Senate Select Comm. on Indian Affairs, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 182-83, 188-91 (1987) (resolu-
tion and press release of the National Congress of American Indians demanding the resignation of Ross
0. Swimmer, Interior Assistant Secretary for Indian Affairs, the principal architect of the President's
Native policy); id. at 27 (statement of Alaska Federation of Natives expressing fear that Swimmer's
fiscal year 1988 budget proposal would undermine the federal-Alaskan Native trust relationship and is
tantamount to "a further step toward termination of Alaska Native tribes in regard to Bureau of Indian
Affairs and Indian Health Service").
191. See supra note 79.
192. Michigan v. Doran, 439 U.S. 282, 287 (1978). See also Puerto Rico v. Branstad, 107 S. Ct.
2802 (1987) (commands of Extradition Clause are mandatory and can be enforced against states by
federal courts); California v. Superior Court, 107 S. Ct. 2433, 2437 (1987) ("The obvious objective of
the Extradition Clause is that no State should become a safe haven for the fugitives from a sister State's
criminal justice system.").
193. See Menominee Nation, Menominee Tribal Legislature, Ordinance No. 81-22 (cited in 74
Op. Att'y Gen. Wis. 245, 251 (1985)); Benally v. Marcum, 89 N.M. 463, 464-65, 553 P.2d 1270, 1271-
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extradition laws, detailing when and under what conditions suspects
present on the reservation may be returned to state jurisdiction.' 94 A
more fundamental tribal interest, however, lies in maintaining the
traditional sovereign power over criminal matters involving Natives
within reservation boundaries. To the extent that state law enforce-
ment officers may cross reservation borders against the wishes of the
tribes, arrest tribal members, and remove them from the tribe's juris-
diction, the inherent power of Native governments "to make their own
laws and be ruled by them"195 correspondingly is diminished.
In balancing these several sovereign interests in fresh pursuit ju-
risdiction, the tribal interests, bolstered by federal policy fostering Na-
tive self-government, must prevail. The state's interest in
apprehending suspects doubtlessly is a strong one, but it is addressed
adequately in many instances by tribal extradition laws. Furthermore,
where fresh pursuit is necessary to apprehend a suspect, the state's
interest cannot be said to be greater than it is in any other cross-juris-
dictional situation, where a fresh pursuit arrest is lawful only if and as
expressly authorized by the sovereign in whose territory the arrest oc-
curs. The concomitant federal interest in avoiding territorial balkani-
zation of criminal justice, evident in federal extradition laws,
apparently is subordinate to the internal sovereigns' interest in con-
trolling fresh pursuit intrusions across their borders. Consequently,
the state's interest in pursuing suspects across reservation boundaries
should not outweigh the Native government's interests in the integrity
of its borders and its sovereign authority over its territory and people.
72 (1976)(quoting NAVAJO TRIB. CODE tit. 17, § 1001 (1970), currently codified at NAVAJO TRIB.
CODE tit. 17, § 1951 (1977)).
At least one mutual extradition agreement has been entered into between a tribe and a state. See
State v. Lufldns, 381 N.W.2d 263, 266 (S.D. 1986) (referencing the Reciprocal Extradition Agreement
between the Sisseton-Wahpeton Sioux Tribe and the State of South Dakota).
194. See supra notes 78 and 183. Navajo extradition practice requires that a Native American
apprehended at the request of a foreign jurisdiction be taken to the nearest Court of the Navajo Nation
to determine whether there is probable cause to believe the suspect guilty of the crime alleged and
whether it appears the detainee will receive "a fair trial in the state court." NAVAJO TRIB. CODE tit.
17, § 1952 (1977). "IN NO EVENT shall any Navajo Policeman turn over or deliver any Navajo to
state, county or city authorities except under order of a court of the Navajo Tribe following an appro-
priate extradition hearing." Chairman's Order of October 10, 1967, Navajo Tribal Council (reprinted
at NAVAJO TRIB. CODE tit. 17, § 1952 (1977)). See also 3 JUSTICE AND THE AMERICAN INDIAN, supra
note 73, at 23-25, referencing extradition laws of the Turtle Mountain Tribe (providing for extradition
from the reservation to the state for violations of state law committed outside the jurisdiction of the
Turtle Mountain Tribal Court) and Pueblo of Laguna (providing for extradition, pending notification of
an intent to exercise jurisdiction by a court of the requesting sovereign, to federal, state, and other tribal
governments for offenses over which they may have lawful jurisdiction).
195. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959).
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c. Summary
These, then, are the factors that comprise the "backdrop" of tri-
bal sovereignty which informs the judicial preemption analysis. The
position of tribes, in relation to both the tradition of self-government
and the balance of interests, manifestly would be improved by the en-
actment of tribal extradition and fresh pursuit laws, or by concluding
agreements in those areas with bordering states. The existence of tri-
bal laws and intergovernmental agreements could only strengthen
both the perceived tradition of tribal self-government, by providing
concrete manifestations for the propitiation of domestic courts, and
the argument that tribal interests in territorial integrity and the ad-
ministration of criminal justice on the reservation outweigh the inter-
ests of the state in the fresh pursuit situation.
2. Preemption
Since the earliest days of the republic, state criminal jurisdiction
within Native reservations has been extremely limited.' 96 Tribes tradi-
tionally have enjoyed a sovereign immunity concerning the exercise of
state criminal jurisdiction over Native Americans on the reserva-
tion.' 97 Where such a tradition of sovereign immunity is present, do-
mestic courts usually are reluctant to infer state jurisdiction 'except
where Congress. has expressly provided that State laws shall
196. See supra section II.B.2. Even state criminal jurisdiction over non-Natives present on the
reservation was prohibited initially. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832). Chief Justice
Marshall stated:
The Cherokee nation, then, is a distinct community, occupying its own territory, with
boundaries accurately described, in which the laws of Georgia can have no force, and which
the citizens of Georgia have no right to enter, but with the assent of the Cherokees them-
selves or in conformity with treaties and with the acts of Congress.
Id. at 561.
As the Supreme Court subsequently has noted, however: "The conceptual clarity of Mr. Chief
Justice Marshall's view in Worcester v. Georgia [citation omitted] has given way to more individualized
treatment of particular treaties and specific federal statutes, including statehood enabling legislation, as
they, taken together, affect the respective rights of States, Indians, and the Federal Government." Mes-
calero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 148 (1973). See also White Mountain Apache Tribe v.
Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 141 (1980).
197. Once land is determined to be "Indian country" under 18 U.S.C. § 1151(a) (1982), state
criminal jurisdiction is preempted by both federal protection of tribal self-government and federal stat-
utes on subjects relating to Natives, tribes, their property, and federal programs. See supra note 51. See
also United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 555 (1975) (noting "Congress' authority to define 'Indian
country' so broadly, and to supersede state jurisdiction within the defined area"). Federal protection of
tribal self-government precludes criminal jurisdiction of state courts over Native Americans or their
property absent consent of Congress. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832)(Georgia could
not punish non-Native, licensed by federal government to practice as a missionary among the Cherokee,
for his refusal to leave Cherokee lands). Cf Fisher v. District Court, 424 U.S. 382, 387-89 (1976) (state
civil court jurisdiction over tribal adoption proceeding would interfere with Native self-government).
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apply.' "198
Congress, on occasion, has provided expressly that state criminal
laws shall apply on Native reservations. Public Law 280,199 enacted in
1953, conferred mandatory criminal jurisdiction on six states, and
served as enabling legislation for other states that wished to assume
criminal jurisdiction over the reservations within their borders.
Notwithstanding a subsequent amendment requiring tribal consent
before a state could assume such jurisdiction, 2°° Congress has pro-
vided a clear and unequivocal roadmap for state assumption of crimi-
nal jurisdiction within reservation territory.2 °1
Congress also unmistakably provided for state criminal jurisdic-
tion in the iniquitous termination legislation of the 1950s. 20 2 When a
Native government was "terminated" by Congress, it lost its federally-
recognized status as a tribe; a consequential corollary was the exten-
sion of state jurisdiction over the territory that formerly had been the
tribe's reservation.
20 3
Both Public Law 280 and the termination enactments establish
that where Congress has intended to permit the state to exercise crimi-
198. Rice v. Rehner, 463 U.S. 713, 719-20 (1983) (quoting McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax
Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 171 (1973)).
The only analysis that has considered the issue of fresh pursuit within the preemption framework
concluded that fresh pursuit by state law enforcement officers onto the Menominee Reservation is not
preempted by federal law. 74 Op. Att'y Gen. Wis. 245 (1985). That conclusion was grounded in the
statement that "there is no persuasive evidence of congressional intent to make individual Indians who
flee to the reservation to escape imminent arrest exceptions to the [intrastate] fresh pursuit doctrine or
immune from ordinary state arrest authority." Id. at 257. Leaving aside the fundamental issue
whether intrastate fresh pursuit principles could ever apply to Native governments, see supra notes 106
and 128-33 and accompanying text, this formulation of the preemption doctrine wholly reverses the
historic preemption analysis. It has never been a part of the "Indian" preemption doctrine that Con-
gress must indicate what aspects of state jurisdiction it does not want applied on reservations. The
result would be absurd: Congress would be reduced to legislating a laundry list of negatives. It has
always been the rule, rather, that states have no criminal jurisdiction over Natives on the reservation
absent express congressional consent. See supra notes 50-53 and accompanying text.
199. See supra section II.B.2.a.
200. See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
201. The details of the roadmap were not always so clear however. See supra note 41.
202. See, e.g., Menominee Termination Act, Pub. L. No. 83-399, 68 Stat. 250 (1954); Klamath
Termination Act, Pub. L. No. 83-587, 68 Stat. 718 (1954) (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 564 et seq. (1982));
Alabama & Coushatta Termination Act, Pub. L. No. 83-627, 68 Stat. 768 (1954) (codified at 25 U.S.C.
§§ 721 et seq. (1982)); Paiute Indian Tribe of Utah Termination Act, Pub. L. No. 83-762, 68 Stat. 1099
(1954) (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 741 et seq. (1982)).
203. The statutory language terminating the federal trust responsibility and announcing the impo-
sition of state laws generally read:
[A~ll statutes of the United States which affect Indians because of their status as Indians
shall no longer be applicable to the members of the tribe, and the laws of the several States
shall apply to the tribe and its members in the same manner as they apply to other citizens
or persons within their jurisdiction.
Paiute Indian Tribe of Utah Termination Act, 68 Stat. at 1103 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 757(a) (1982)).
See also supra notes 38 and 44.
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nal jurisdiction on the reservation, it has expressly so provided. With
the "backdrop" of tribal sovereignty relative to fresh pursuit demon-
strating a strong tribal immunity to state authority in on-reservation
criminal jurisdiction and territorial integrity, Congress' failure to pro-
vide expressly that states may intrude onto the reservation in fresh
pursuit situations demonstrates a federal intent to preempt state au-
thority to effect fresh pursuit arrests within reservation boundaries.
C. Tribal Sovereignty
The second independent barrier to the exercise of state jurisdic-
tion within reservation boundaries, often articulated but seldom relied
upon, is infringement on tribal sovereignty. 2" If state jurisdiction in-
terferes with the tribe's right to govern itself, to make its own laws and
be ruled by them, then the assertion of state authority is unlawful.205
Many of the relevant sovereign powers of the tribes already have
been addressed.2"6 Native American tribes are sovereign entities, re-
taining rights of self-government over both their territory and their
members.2" 7 Among the rights of self-government are the specific
powers to make their own laws208 and to administer criminal justice
204. Despite the recent judicial favoring of preemption, tribal self-government is still posited by
domestic courts as an independent barrier to state intrusions. See, e.g., Segundo v. City of Rancho
'Mirage, 813 F.2d 1387, 1390 (9th Cir. 1987) ("either can be a sufficient basis for holding state law
inapplicable"). In the case that first espoused the "two independent but related barriers" language, the
Supreme Court explained: "The two barriers are independent because either, standing alone, can be a
sufficient basis for holding state law inapplicable to activity undertaken on the reservation or by tribal
members." White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 143 (1980). On increasingly rare
occasions, and generally in determinations of state court jurisdiction, self-government still operates as
an independent bar to state court jurisdiction. See supra note 176.
In the context of regulatory jurisdiction, the Ninth Circuit had reasserted the concept that sover-
eignty serves as far more than a mere "backdrop" to the preemption analysis. "Although self-govern-
ment is related to federal preemption in the sense that both depend on congressional action and in the
sense that preemption is considered in the context of the deeply ingrained traditional notions of self-
government, the self-government doctrine is an independent barrier to state regulation." Crow Tribe of
Indians v. Montana [Crow 1], 650 F.2d 1104, 1110 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 916 (1982).
On appeal from the remand of the case, however, the circuit court based its "sovereignty" argument on
the federal policy of promoting tribal self-government, and not on inherent tribal sovereignty itself.
Crow Tribe of Indians v. Montana [Crow I1], 819 F.2d 895, 902-03 (9th Cir. 1987), aff'd mer., 108 S.
Ct. 685 (1988).
205. "The self-government doctrine differs from the preemption analysis in that it specifically
prohibits state action that impairs the ability of a tribe to exercise traditional governmental func-
tions .. ." Crow 1, 650 F.2d at 1110. See also Crow II, 819 F.2d at 902-03. Thus, in the context of civil
court jurisdiction, state jurisdiction has been barred by tribal sovereignty where state action would
interfere with the laws and forums established by tribes for the resolution of civil disputes. See, e.g.,
Fisher v. District County Court, 424 U.S. 382, 387-88 (1976); R.J. Williams Co. v. Fort Belknap Hous-
ing Auth., 719 F.2d 979, 983 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1016 (1985).
206. See supra section II.B.1.
207. See supra notes 18 and 74.
208. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
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within reservation boundaries.2 °9 Tribes are empowered to enact laws,
hire police, establish courts, maintain jail facilities, and prosecute their
members for violations of tribal law.21 0
More particularly, Native governments have the power, as do all
sovereigns, to control extradition from their territory. 2 1  The sover-
eign rights of tribes to exclude persons from the reservation and to
administer criminal justice as to their members authorize tribal deter-
mination of the circumstances and procedures of extradition to the
states.2 12 Moreover, the self-governing rights to control the territory
of the reservation and to say when and how Natives may be removed
from that territory are sufficiently broad to curtail ad hoc fresh pursuit
across reservation borders by state officers. 2 13  There is no doubt that
tribes have the power to enact legislation on the subject, and thereby
209. See supra note 20.
210. See supra notes 13-15, 25, 30, 32-34, and 181.
211. See Arizona ex rel. Merrill v. Turtle, 413 F.2d 683, 685-86 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396
U.S. 1003 (1970):
•. Arizona's exercise of the claimed jurisdiction would clearly interfere with rights essen-
tial to the Navajo's self-government. The essential and intimate relationship of control of
the extradition process to the right of self-government was recognized long ago in Ken-
tucky v. Dennison, [65 U.S.] 24 How. 66, 16 L. Ed. 717 (1861), holding that there is no
power, state or federal, to compel a state to perform its constitutional duty of extradition.
The Supreme Court found in Dennison that the language of the statute implementing the constitutional
extradition clause, see supra note 79, was "not used as mandatory and compulsory, but as declaratory
of the moral duty" of the states. 65 U.S. (24 How.) at 107. Recently, however, the Court overruled this
aspect of Dennison. In Puerto Rico v. Branstad, 107 S. Ct. 2802 (1987), the Court reaffirmed what it
viewed as Dennison's "conclusion that the commands of the Extradition Clause are mandatory, and
afford no discretion to the executive officers or courts of the asylum State." Id. at 2808. See also
California v. Superior Court, 107 S. Ct. 2433, 2438 (1987) ("By the express terms of federal law, there-
fore, the asylum State is bound to deliver up to the demanding State's agent a fugitive .. "). The
Branstad Court then overruled Dennison to the extent of holding that federal courts are empowered to
compel state performance of the duty to deliver fugitives to the demanding state. 107 S. Ct. at 2808-09.
"Kentucky v. Dennison," the Court found, "is the product of another time ... We conclude that it
may stand no longer." Id. at 2809-10. The partial overruling of Dennison is in accord with the enact-
ment by forty-seven states, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands of the Uniform Criminal Extradition
Act, which makes it "the duty" of the governor to deliver to agents of any other state a fugitive from
justice. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. ANN. § 976.03 (1986).
Puerto Rico v. Branstad should have no effect on the proposition stated by the Ninth Circuit in
Turtle that extradition is closely tied to self-government. In Branstad, the Court rejected the notion
that states are coequal sovereigns with the federal government, therefore enabling the Court to find that
the federal government has the power to compel states to perform their constitutional duties, such as
the duties mandated by the Extradition Clause. 107 S. Ct. at 2808. Since neither the constitutional nor
the federal statutory extradition provisions apply to Native governments, see supra note 79, the Court's
restructuring of the federal-state relationship in regard to rendition powers likewise has no applicability
to sovereign tribal power to control extradition from Native territory.
212. See supra notes 20, 23, 27, and 73-74 and accompanying text.
213. The delimitation of unauthorized border crossings into another sovereign's territory has been
discussed previously. See supra notes 114, 131, 134 (noting the border limitation imposed on intrastate
and interstate pursuits), 157-59 (noting the border limitations imposed on international fresh pursuit)
and accompanying text. See also the relevant earlier discussion supra notes 74 (discussing tribe's inher-
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to control the circumstances of fresh pursuit onto the reservation.2 t4
For tribes considering the enactment of laws or agreements gov-
erning fresh pursuit,215 those tribal laws should serve to confer rights
in domestic courts on both the suspect and the tribe. As with statutes
governing interstate fresh pursuit, violations of the substantive provi-
sions of tribal fresh pursuit laws, at a minimum, should create enforce-
able rights on behalf of the suspect.2" 6 Violations of procedural
protections built into the fresh pursuit statutes and agreements of vari-
ous sovereigns are treated in state and federal courts similarly to viola-
tions of extradition laws: once the suspect is within the personal
jurisdiction of the court, illegal conduct by the arresting sovereign
within the territory of the asylum state typically is ignored.21 7 Domes-
tic courts generally have proved unwilling to overturn criminal convic-
tions merely because the defendant's procedural protections were not
observed. This narrow judicial focus on the injury to the individual
enables the courts to circumvent the issue of sovereign injury resulting
from disregard of the sovereign's rights, as embodied in its criminal
laws, to control its territory and its criminal justice system.
The inherent power of a Native government to administer justice
is meaningful only if tribal laws are enforced.218 Where tribal fresh
pursuit laws are enacted, violations by the arresting sovereign of either
substantive or procedural provisions should create in the asylum sov-
ereign-the tribe-the right to a remedy in the domestic courts. If the
ent power to exclude) and 160 (discussing territorial integrity and inviolability as central components of
sovereignty under international law).
There is some indication that the sovereign right of border control of Native governments may not
extend fully to non-Natives. In State v. Herber, 123 Ariz. 214, 598 P.2d 1033 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1979),
state law enforcement officers pursued Herber by air and on the ground onto the Papago Reservation,
where Herber stopped and was arrested. The court refused to follow an earlier Arizona case, Francisco
v. State, 113 Ariz. 427, 556 P.2d 1 (1976), which held that a county sheriff had no authority to make
valid service of process on the Papago Reservation because the state had no authority to apply its laws
within the boundaries of that reservation.
Francisco, however, was an Indian; Herber is not. The infringement on tribal sovereignty
presented by the facts in Francisco thus is absent from this case. Jurisdiction of Arizona to
prosecute and punish non-Indians for crimes against non-Indians committed on an Indian
reservation is beyond dispute. Conversely, Indian tribal courts lack criminal jurisdiction
over non-Indians. In the absence of any potential conflict of jurisdiction, we see no reason
to extend the rule of Francisco to preclude the arrest of a non-Indian by state law enforce-
ment officers who have pursued him onto an Indian reservation.
Herber, 123 Ariz. at 216, 598 P.2d at 1035 (citations omitted).
214. See 4 JUSTICE AND THE AMERICAN INDIAN, supra note 150, at 47-49 and 67-73 (providing
proposed legislation on the subject of fresh pursuit, involving amendments or additions to tribal, state,
and federal law). The proposed legislation is reprinted as Appendix B to this article.
215. No tribe appears to have done so thus far. See supra note 183.
216. See supra notes 143-44 and accompanying text.
217. See supra notes 95-98 and 145-47 and accompanying text.
218. See supra notes 30 and 32.
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arresting jurisdiction is free to ignore the laws of the asylum jurisdic-
tion, without penalty or consequence, then the sovereignty of the asy-
lum jurisdiction necessarily has been impaired. Tribal sovereignty,
accordingly, must serve as a barrier to violations, whether substantive
or procedural, of tribal fresh pursuit and extradition laws by state law
enforcement officers. The impairment of tribal sovereignty, mani-
fested by the arresting jurisdiction's astigmatic disregard of tribal law,
should entitle the Native government to take remedial action modelled
on the right of sovereigns in international law to seek redress for viola-
tions of their hot pursuit and extradition laws and treaties.21 9
Tribal legislation specifically governing either fresh pursuit or ex-
tradition, however, is relatively rare.22° In the absence of controlling
tribal statutes, Native governments should be accorded the same com-
mon-law recognition as other sovereigns: that fresh pursuit across
their borders is valid only if and as the sovereign authorizes.
In international law, hot pursuit on land is not a customary right,
but an exceptional prerogative permitted only with the express consent
of the asylum sovereign as embodied in an agreement or treaty. 221 The
unauthorized crossing of a frontier, as in hot pursuit, violates the na-
tional sovereignty of the asylum state and represents a grave breach of
international law.22 2 Similarly, within the United States, fresh pursuit
across state lines is justified only under the authority of the Uniform
Act on Fresh Pursuit.223 Since the legality of a fresh pursuit arrest is
determined by the law of the asylum state,224 the law of a state that
had not authorized fresh pursuit across its borders presumably would
mandate that any arrest attendant upon fresh pursuit would be
invalid.
No reason exists to accord Native governments a lesser degree of
sovereignty over either their territory or their people. Like nations
and states, tribes exercise inherent sovereign powers of control over
both the territory of the reservation and their citizens resident within
that territory. Like those sovereigns, tribes retain the right to keep
their borders free from wrongful intrusions and from the attempted
extension of jurisdiction over their territory by foreign sovereigns.
The unauthorized crossing of a national frontier or state line in fresh
pursuit constitutes a serious infringement of the sovereign integrity of
the asylum nation or state. Fresh pursuit onto a Native reservation, in
219. See supra notes 94 and 160.
220. See supra notes 150 and 183.
221. See supra notes 157-59 and accompanying text.
222. See supra notes 160-61 and accompanying text.
223. See supra notes 134-36 and accompanying text.
224. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
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the absence of tribal law or an intergovernmental agreement authoriz-
ing the pursuit, is correspondingly an impairment of the tribal right of
self-government. In accord with universal principles of intersovereign
relations, tribal sovereignty itself should serve as an unassailable bar to
the exercise of unauthorized state fresh pursuit intrusions within the
confines of the Native reservation.
V. CONCLUSION
State jurisdiction within Native reservations remains a continuing
source of state-tribal tension and litigation. Preventing further en-
croachments through the United States courts presently depends to a
great degree upon the doctrine of federal preemption. The more visi-
ble and familiar the manifestations of tribal control-tribal police,
court systems, jails, extradition procedures, and fresh pursuit laws-
the stronger the analytical "backdrop" of tribal sovereignty is apt to
appear to domestic courts.225 Each of these factors increases the likeli-
225. The tragic irony here, of course, is that the courts have lapsed into a new form of cultural
imperialism by insisting that tribal governments reflect the dominant government's non-Native political
structures. It is unconscionable that such a culturo-centric bias should become so manifest among the
courts when the equivalent legislative policy repeatedly has been eschewed by the Congress for nearly
30 years. See supra notes 39 and 190. The outrage is that in purporting to preserve Native autonomy
and self-determination, the courts, by pursuing this policy of "judicial assimilation," are attempting to
shoehorn tribal governments and institutions into political analogues wholly inconsistent with their
heritage. See supra notes 19 (referencing, inter alia, the congressional imposition of alien IRA govern-
ments on Native societies, and foreign corporate status upon Alaska Natives) and 180 (referencing
courts' insistence that tribes demonstrate self-government by enacting laws).
The historical development and continued relativistic intolerance of the United States' political,
legal, and social institutions toward Native tribal cultures and institutions has been assailed in innumer-
able articles, treatises, and texts. For recent articles, see, e.g., Strickland, Genocide-at-Law. An Historic
and Contemporary View of the Native American Experience, 34 U. KAN. L. REV. 713 (1986); Williams,
supra note 22; Bryan, Cultural Relativism - Power in Service of Interests. The Particular Case of Native
American Education, 32 BUFFALO L. REV. 643 (1983); Lobsenz, "Dependent Indian Communities" A
Search for a Twentieth Century Definition, 24 ARIz. L. REv. 1 (1982). In remarks prefatory to and
conclusory of his discussion of western understanding of and dealings with Native American cultures,
Bryan notes:
The story of relativism - here, cultural relativism - is a story of power; power dis-
guised as tolerance, disguised as neutrality, disguised as respect for other perspectives....
In a "relative world," individuals and groups impose their desires, their sense of the proper
order of the world, on others. They do so not because they are right, good, or true....
Rather, they do so simply because they want to: power stripped of all pretense.
Relativistic tolerance is practiced when cultural differences are not threatening. Tolerance
can and does disappear as quickly as it appears; Indian ways are fine when those ways do
not present too great an obstacle to the white man's desires, but they are wrong and intoler-
able when they do.
Bryan, supra, at 645, 693. See also supra notes 110-11. Chief Justice Marshall, even in the lodestar of
Native American jurisprudence, acknowledged this arrogance of power: "Indian nations had always
been considered as distinct, independent political communities, retaining their original natural rights, as
the undisputed possessors of the soil, from time immemorial, with the single exception of that imposed
by irresistable power .... " Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 559 (1832) (emphasis added).
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hood of a judicial determination that state fresh pursuit arrest author-
ity on the reservation is federally preempted.
A finding of federal preemption, however, is inadequate to protect
either the suspect or the tribe. As a general rule, state and federal
courts will validate arrests made in violation of an asylum sovereign's
fresh pursuit or extradition laws. The effect of this doctrine with re-
spect to Native tribes is that no penalty attaches for the illegal exercise
of state fresh pursuit jurisdiction within the territory of the
reservation.
The remedy is a change of judicial focus, from the injury incurred
by the individual suspect to the rights of the sovereign tribe. Fresh
pursuit arrests on the reservation, either in the absence of authorizing
legislation or in violation of tribal laws and procedures, impair the
Native government's sovereign right to self-government. Domestic
courts, in concentrating myopically on their personal jurisdiction over
the suspect or on the state's interest in immediate apprehension of sus-
pects, historically and uniformly have diverted judicial attention away
from the serious breach of tribal sovereignty that unauthorized fresh
pursuit arrests represent.
Focusing the domestic courts' attention on the injury to Native
sovereignty may require that the affected tribe itself initiate or join in
legal action protesting fresh pursuit intrusions onto the reservation. It
also may necessitate persuading the courts to accept and apply in a
Native context established principles of international law, which offer
the greatest recognition and protection of the sovereign's rights. Fi-
nally, it surely will require a court that is willing to bring the doctrine
of tribal sovereignty out of the legal limbo of preemption's "backdrop"
and employ it as the independent barrier to state authority that it was
meant to be.
And as Professor Williams caustically points out, in order to sway the "conqueror's" courts, tribes
must emphasize their acceptance and adoption of the white man's legal and political ethos:
Tribes must exercise their "rights" to self-determination so as not to conflict with the inter-
ests of the dominant sovereign. In effect, this form of discourse enforces a highly efficient
process of legal auto-genocide, the ultimate hegemonic effect of which is to instruct the
savage to self-extinguish all troublesome expressions of difference that diverge from the
white man's own hierachic [sic), universalized worldview.
Williams, supra note 22, at 274.
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APPENDIX B*
Proposed Tribal Fresh Pursuit Ordinance
1 Any member of a duly organized state, county or
2 municipal peace unit of a state of the United States
3 or of any other Indian reservation, or any federal police
4 officer, who enters this reservation in fresh pursuit,
5 and continues in such fresh pursuit within this reser-
6 vation, of any person, whether or not that person is an
7 Indian, in order to arrest him on the ground that he is
8 believed to have committed a felony in such other state
9 or Indian reservation, shall have the same authority to
10 arrest and hold such person in custody, as has any member
11 of any duly organized peace unit of this reservation, to
12 arrest and hold in custody a person on the ground that
13 he is believed to have committed a felony on this reser-
14 vation.
EXPLANATORY NOTES
1. This act is necessary because fresh pursuit arrests can be sustained legally
only if the jurisdiction which the arresting officer enters has consented to his
making a fresh pursuit arrest. The consent is needed no less when the
jurisdiction which the officer enters on fresh pursuit is an Indian reservation
than when it is another state.
2. This act is restricted to felonies in an attempt to make it consistent with
Uniform Fresh Pursuit Acts adopted by many states; however, this act is not
to be construed as limiting fresh pursuit arrest powers strictly to felonies in
situations involving offenders who flee onto Indian reservations. Any tribe at
its discretion may statutorily authorize fresh pursuit arrests to be made on the
reservation for misdemeanors committed outside the reservation.
3. Federal Indian police officers and tribal police officers are intended to
come under the provisions of this act, regardless of the particular tribe or
federal agency with which they are affiliated.
*Appendix B is reprinted from NAT'L AM. INDIAN CT. JUDGES ASS'N, 4 JUSTICE AND THE
AMERICAN INDIAN: EXAMINATION OF THE BASIS OF TRIBAL LAW AND ORDER AUTHORITY 67-71
(1974), and does not represent the recommendation of the authors. The NAICJA proposals, although
somewhat dated, are reprinted here for the reader's convenience because of the relative unavailability of
the source document.
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Proposed Companion Ordinance to Tribal Fresh Pursuit Acts
1 If an arrest is made on this reservation by a peace
2 officer of a state or of any other Indian reservation,
3 or by any federal police officer, within the provisions
4 of section 1 of this ordinance, said officer shall with-
5 out unnecessary delay take the person arrested before
6 a tribal judge of this reservation, who shall conduct
7 a hearing for the purpose of determining the lawfulness
8 of the arrest. If the tribal judge determines that the
9 arrest was lawful, he shall place the person arrested
10 in the custody of the arresting officer to be returned
11 to the jurisdiction in which the alleged crime is be-
12 lieved to have been committed. If the tribal judge
13 determines that the arrest was unlawful he shall dis-
14 charge the person arrested.
EXPLANATORY NOTES
1. This ordinance is offered for the consideration of those Indian tribes that
do not have any extradition procedures in force and that do not pass any laws
to set up such procedures prior to adopting a fresh pursuit ordinance.
2. This act is intended to confer jurisdiction over non-Indians upon Indian
tribal courts. Tribal judges, under the provisions of this act, will be
authorized to conduct hearings in the fresh pursuit arrests of non-Indians as
well as Indians.
3. Federal Indian police officers and tribal police officers are intended to
come under the provisions of this act, regardless of the particular tribe or
federal agency with which they are affiliated.
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Proposed Revision of the Uniform Fresh Pursuit Act
1 Officer of another state or of an Indian reservation
2 entering this state in fresh pursuit - Power to arrest
3 and hold fugitive. - Any member of a duly organized
4 state, county or municipal peace unit of another state
of the United States, or any member of any unit which
5 is
6 empowered to enforce any law on an Indian reservation,
7 who enters this state in fresh pursuit, and continues
8 within this state in such fresh pursuit, of a person in
9 order to arrest him on the ground that he is believed
10 to have committed a felony in such other state or Indian
11 reservation, shall have the same authority to arrest
12 and hold such person in custody, as has any member of
13 any duly organized state, county or municipal peace
14 unit of this state, to arrest and hold in custody a
15 person on the ground that he is believed to have
16 committed a felony in this state.
EXPLANATORY NOTES
1. This act is necessary because fresh pursuit arrests can be sustained legally
only if the jurisdiction which the arresting officer enters has consented to such
action by foreign officers.
2. This act is restricted to felonies in an attempt to make it consistent with
Uniform Fresh Pursuit Acts of other states; however, this act is not to be
construed as limiting fresh pursuit arrest powers strictly to felonies in
situations involving Indian reservations. Any state at its discretion may
statutorily authorize fresh pursuit arrests for misdemeanors committed on an
Indian reservation.
3. Federal and Indian tribal police officers are not mentioned specifically in
this act. However, they are authorized to come under the broad purview of
the provisions of the act.
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Proposed Revision to Statutes Regulating Hearings Concerning
Fresh Pursuit Arrests
1 Arrested person taken before magistrate - Hearing -
2 Commitment or discharge. - If an arrest is made in this
3 state by an officer of another state or by any member
4 of any peace unit which is empowered to enforce any law
5 on an Indian reservation, in accordance with the provi-
6 sions of section 1 of this act, that officer shall with-
7 out unnecessary delay take the person arrested before a
8 magistrate of the county in which the arrest was made,
9 or, if such arrest was made by a federal officer, then
10 the person arrested shall be taken to the nearest federal
11 magistrate in the state. Said magistrate shall conduct
12 a hearing for the purpose of determining the lawfulness
13 of the arrest. If the magistrate determines that the
14 arrest was lawful he shall commit the person arrested
15 to await for a reasonable time the issuance of an ex-
16 tradition warrant by the accepted procedure of this
17 state. If the magistrate determines that the arrest
18 was unlawful he shall discharge the person arrested.
EXPLANATORY NOTES
1. For further discussion of the need for this revision see the research paper
entitled "The Effect of Having No Extradition Procedures on Indian
Reservations", Volume 3 of this project [Nat'l Am. Indian Ct. Judges Ass'n,
Justice and the American Indian (1974)], wherein specific procedures are set
forth for extradition which include Indian tribes.
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